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
AQUITANIAN SEPARATISM AND THE
FRANKISH KINGDOM, 418-781

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
MIKEL VINCENT ARY
NORMAN, OKLAHOMA
1972

AQUITANIAN SEPARATISM AND THE
FRANKISH KINGDOM, 418-781

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The inspiration which motivated the course of this study came from Dr. David H. Miller. His interest in eighth century Carolingian history, and the middle ages in general, stimulates and commands respect on the part of others. In addition, the helpful advice and constructive criticism of Professors Leslie F. Smith, Philip J. Nolan, and William H. Maehl must also be commended.

From another perspective, the interlibrary loan departments of Bizzell Library, the University of Oklahoma (Norman, Oklahoma) and Linsheid Library, East Central State College (Ada, Oklahoma) provided untold assistance. Without such help in the acquisition of rare books and obscure documents, the writing of a dissertation in medieval European history would be maddeningly complicated and all but impossible. Other libraries politely extended privileges of use during visits; in particular, they include the main library at the University of Texas (Austin, Texas) and Watson Library at the University of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas). Of a more personal nature, the concern of my parents that their son should acquire an education deserves proper credit in the writing of such a work as this. Although both are deceased, their influence has been a source of encouragement. While the above aided in the composition of this paper, the

sacrifice and cooperation of my wife, Delores, allowed the author to see the work through to its completion.

NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

In second citations which involve the two collections of sources, the Patrologia Latina and the Monumenta Germaniae Historia, the respective standard abbreviations (P.L. and M.G.H.) appear. In regard to the latter work, the various series within the collection are represented by the following:

A.A. = Auctores Antiquissimi

Epp. = Epistolae

LL. = Leges

SS. = Scriptores in folio

SS. rer. Merov. = Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum

SS. rer. Germ. = Scriptores rerum Germanicarum

PREFACE

Provincial Aquitaine had universal appeal in late Roman times. Christian dogmatists and poets alike commented on the beauty and agricultural prosperity of the region. To be sure, the political and military interest that the province attracted from the fourth to the ninth centuries bore evidence that the inhabitants derived an enviable living from its soil and climate. Competing powers made the area a crossroad to invasion. For these reasons, Aquitaine attracted more than its share of interlopers intent on mining its wealth and undermining its position. Salvian, a late fourth century Christian author, noted that the province served as the very "marrow of all the Gauls."¹ Several scholars have attached a similar

¹Salvianus, De Gubernatione Dei, vii, 2, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum. ed. C. Halm, I (Berlin, 1877), p. 85: "Nemini dubium est Aquitanos ac Novempopulos medullam fere omnium Galliarum et uber totius fecunditatis habuisse, nec solum fecunditatis, sed, quae praeponi interdum fecunditati solent, iucunditatis, pulchritudinis, voluptatis. Adeo illic omnis admodum regio aut intertexta vineis aut florulenta pratis aut distincta culturis aut condita pomis aut amoenata lucis aut inrigua fontibus aut interfusa fluminibus aut crinita messibus fuit, ut vere possessores ac domini terrae illius non tam soli istius portionem quam paradisi imaginem possedisse videantur." Praise of Aquitaine by the poet Ausonius parallels the eulogies of Salvian. For his comments on her cities in particular see: Ordo Urbium Nobilium, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. C. Schenkl, V (Berlin, 1883), pp. 102-103.

significance to its history.

Medievalists once agreed that the institutional history of the age represented basically a conflict between two forces shaping the social, economic, and political elements of society. These were the mutually antagonistic influences, Germanitas and Romanitas. Many have found in the affairs of Aquitaine, the most thoroughly Romanized Gallic province of the empire, a classic vehicle by which to expound and advance arguments supporting the Romanitas viewpoint. Herein, the vestiges of the hallowed Roman Empire overshadow the crude influence of Germanic barbarians migrating into the province. The native Gallo-Roman, equipped with a knowledge of the past, culturally resisted the northern onslaught and avoided the influences of barbarian debasement.

Recently, scholars have abandoned investigations of the ethnocentric origins of institutions to give attention to the ways in which those institutions integrate. In the forefront of this movement was the late Marc Bloch, who examined the patterns of feudal society and indebted the world of scholarship to his incisive mind. Instead of ascribing a narrow significance to Gallo-Roman, Roman, or Germanic configurations within society, Bloch analyzed the concomitant workings of various social forces. It seems more useful to approach the functional aspects of medieval provincial society in this manner than to argue the case for either Romanitas or Germanitas.

During the era of Roman political and military decline, the powers contesting for supremacy in southern Gaul gave special attention to Aquitaine because of its agricultural productivity. The area thus became a battleground. More significantly, its location was strategic politically, economically, and militarily. While Aquitaine was a bridge linking Italy to Spain, it also touched the Mediterranean. It gave Germanic tribesmen beyond the Loire River access to Italy, a region whose importance transcended the ancient into the medieval, particularly in the religious context. Furthermore, as a burgeoning Islam moved into Spain in the early eighth century, Aquitaine achieved yet another importance. Just as the province had once formed a buffer between the Romans and their northern antagonists, it now separated the Germanic from the Muslim.

It remains to observe that Aquitaine did maintain a distinct culture throughout the period 418-781. Some scholars have exaggerated the importance of this independent course of affairs in relation to the rest of the Roman west. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the force of nationalism profoundly influenced historical scholarship, and in France particularly this encouraged an awareness of things French (a derivative of Romanitas), which resulted in a nationalistic self-analysis from a peculiar vantage point. Aquitaine received attention as never before or since. Accordingly, a

genre of nationalistic monographs, expounding an exclusivist thesis, arose to explain the separatist tendency that characterized the Aquitanian experience from the fifth to the eighth century. These denied the importance for Aquitaine of the barbarian invasions which generally affected the history of the rest of the Roman west in this period. The authors most representative of this position are Claude Devic and Joseph Vaissète in their monumental Histoire Générale de Languedoc and Jean de Jaurgain in his two volume work, La Vasconie. The present study takes exception to the argument that Aquitaine possessed a unique social and economic character in comparison to its neighbors. It also offers a different perspective, inasmuch as most of the scholars who have written about Aquitaine have come from the area itself, a fact which may help to explain why the exclusivist theory has been widely advanced.

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FRANCE



AQUITANIAN SEPARATISM AND THE
FRANKISH KINGDOM, 418-781

CHAPTER I

VISIGOTHIC AQUITAINE

In the early middle ages, invasions in southern Europe affected the whole gamut of human affairs. Teutonic peoples moved from one country to the next and thereby contributed to the volatile political setting of the period from 418 to 781. From this perspective, the observation of James Bryce that the long line of Teutonic kings who proceeded into Italy and found its love more deadly than its hate¹ reminds one of the situation in Aquitaine in 418.

Aquitaine had responded well to the Roman cultural assimilation that had steadily taken place since the days of Julius Caesar. More Roman than inhabitants of any other part of Gaul, the native Aquitanian had barbarians successively thrust upon him. After the Roman came the Visigoth and, even later, the Frank.

Although the Roman government of southern Gaul left

¹James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (New York, 1886), p. 52.

behind many vestiges,² the history of Roman affairs there holds no interest for this study until the early part of the fifth century. After the devastation of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 A.D., the western part of the Empire staggered under the weight of many problems. Little remained static; Roman leadership, territorial integrity, and Visigothic administration all contained chaotic elements. In the same year that the Visigoths successfully invaded Rome, their leader, Alaric, died. Thereafter, and before the eventual establishment of the Visigoths in southern Gaul, these people were led by Athaulf and then Wallia. They coveted territory ranging from Italy to North Africa, Gaul, and Spain.³ In defeat, Roman leadership underwent perplexing convolutions in the years after 410. Within seven years, however, the Romans settled

²On this topic one distinguished French historian, Robert Latouche (Études Médiévales [Paris, 1966], p. 20), contends: "Il est incontestable que, tant au point de vue économique que culturel, la Gaule a largement profité de la conquête romaine et s'est progressivement latinisée. L'effort des Romains a été essentiellement un effort d'urbanisation. Ils ont bâti des villes et construit des routes pour relier ces villes et établir des relations avec les autres parties de l'Empire." The point made in Latouche's second sentence is quite important and will occupy hereafter the attention of this study.

³For a chronological treatment of these events see: Ludwig Schmidt, "The Visigoths in Gaul," Cambridge Medieval History, I, x, 277-292; André Berthelot, "Les Royaumes Barbares de la Gaule," Histoire Générale, I, iii, 104-114; and J. B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire: From the Death of Theodosius I. to the Death of Justinian (2 vols.; New York, 1958), I, pp. 194-211.

upon a leader who could cope successfully with the Visigothic threat. This was Constantius, a man who advanced from the post of general under the Emperor Honorius to that of Consul in January, 417.⁴ The promotion was undoubtedly a consequence of his victories over the Visigoths in Gaul and in Spain. Thereafter, he managed to negotiate with the Goths, which resulted in their settlement in Aquitaine in 418.

Perhaps the most important factor in the eventual conciliation between the Romans and Visigoths in 418 was the attitude of the Goths toward the Romans. Throughout the decade, Galla Placidia, the sister of the emperor, was little more than a pawn in political machinations in southwestern Europe. First matched in marriage with the Gothic leader Athaulf, she later returned to the Roman side by marrying Constantius.

Scholars have made varying assessments of Placidia's role in the warming of Gothic-Roman political relations after her marriage to Athaulf.⁵ Upon consideration of her personal-

⁴Ernest Barker, "Italy and the West, 410-476," Cambridge Medieval History, I, xiv, 404.

⁵One of the more interesting accounts comes from the pen of Ludwig Schmidt (Geschichte der deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgange der Völkerwanderung [4 vols.; Berlin, 1904], I, p. 225) who thinks that Placidia's positive influence grew to a fruition of sorts after several years (411-414) rather than being an original condition upon which the marriage was contracted: "Man wird kaum fehlgehen, wenn man diese plötzliche, ins andere Extrem fallende Gesinnungsänderung auf rein persönliche Momente, auf den Einfluss der Placidia, den auch

ity and native talents, it appears that her influence ameliorated many of the differences between these antagonists. A contemporary historian, the Christian author Paul Orosius, observed that the Gothic leader Athaulf was influenced in the works of good government by the persuasion and advice of his wife, a woman of a very keen mind.⁶

Athaulf was assassinated in 415, but his policies toward Rome were continued by his successors, occasionally by inclination and often by necessity.⁷ The barbarians had wandered through the Roman world from 376 to 418, and this had

Orosius hervorhebt, nicht auf politische Erwägungen des Königs zurückführt; das Einlenken in römische Tendenzen ist wahrscheinlich die Bedingung gewesen, an die die kluge kaiserstochter ihre Zustimmung zur Vermählung mit dem Barbaren geknüpft hat."

⁶Paulus Orosius, *Historiarum Libri Septem*, vii, 43, *Patrologiae Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, XXXI (Paris, 1846), p. 1172: "Ob hoc abstinere a bello, ob hoc inhiare paci nitebatur, praecipue Placidiae uxoris suae, feminae sane ingenio acerrimae et religionis satis probae, ad omnia bonarum ordinationum opera persuasit et consilio temperatus."

⁷Not only were the Visigoths in a state of discomfort owing to Constantius' efforts against them, but also they lacked grain. As early as 410, after taking Rome, their leader Alaric looked toward productive North Africa to replenish his stock of supplies. Moreover, their migrations throughout Italy, Gaul, and then Spain were mainly activated by this quest for grain. Olympiodorus (frag. 29 through 31) discusses their eventual capitulation to the Romans on the basis of their reduction by famine. Interestingly enough, Jordanes in his *Getica* skirts the matter of their dire straits and asserts that the Goths pursued their enemies (the Franks, Burgundians, Alans, and Vandals) out of Gaul and into Spain where they eventually defeated them (*Getica*, 31) before their negotiations with Rome.

impaired their agricultural productivity. Their compatibility with Rome was a marriage of convenience. The Romans could provide the food the Visigoths so badly needed, and the Visigoths, as Federates, could defend the Romans against other barbarians. Since no evidence has survived to indicate an emerging hostility between Roman landowners and the new settlers, the experiment must have proved successful. Besides fearing other Germanic tribesmen, the aristocratic element in Aquitaine wished to prevent a barbarian-peasant alliance and then bind the Visigoths closer to the aristocracy by placing their interests on common footing.

Wallia ascended to the Visigothic throne, and under his governance his people came to terms with Rome. After considering migration to North Africa, Wallia directed his efforts toward a series of successful campaigns against common Gothic and Roman enemies in Spain. His victories paved the way for the entente with Rome in 418. The Romans decided to reward the Visigoths with a home north across the Pyrenees.

The settlement of these Visigothic barbarians in southern Gaul has occasioned much historical comment in recent years. The paucity of information in contemporary sources leaves many points in question. The Aquitanian annalist known as Prosper Tiro, however, recounted what took place. The Patri-cius Constantius, he noted, secured peace with Wallia; there-upon, the Second Aquitaine was given to the Goth as a dwelling

place, with certain parts of the neighboring provinces included.⁸ The Second Aquitaine originally contained six principal cities. Bordeaux stood as the métropole, or capital, of the province before Visigothic times,⁹ but thereafter the new Gothic settlers came to favor Toulouse (appanage to the Second Aquitaine in the 418 agreement) as their principal seat of government. In general terms, this rich province stretched from the Garonne River in the south to the Loire in the north. The Mediterranean coast and parts of Narbonne were excluded from the new Visigothic domain. Historians have not always agreed about what the Goths could expect from their newfound possessions for a livelihood. Contemporary accounts leave details of provisioning somewhat vague, and many authors believe that the Visigoths were allowed only a share of the produce of

⁸Prosperi Tironis Epitoma Chronicon, a. 419, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, IX (Berlin, 1892), p. 269: "Constantius patricius pacem firmat cum Wallia data ei ad inhabitandum secunda Aquitanica et quibusdam civitatibus confinium provinciarum."

⁹G. Bloch ("Le Gouvernement Central au IV^e Siècle," Histoire de France: Depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Revolution, ed. Ernest Lavisse, I, ii [1911], 276-79) attempts to clarify the ambiguities surrounding references to the First and Second Aquitaines. In part, he remarks: "L'Aquitaine, démembrée avant Dioclétien, formait deux provinces: 1° Aquitaine, dite plus tard Aquitaine première, métropole Bourges, 2° Novempopulanie, métropole Eauze." The six cities that comprised the Second Aquitaine were: Bordeaux, Agen, Angoulême, Saints, Poitiers, and Périgueux. This listing, of course, refers strictly to the area prior to its incorporation into the Visigothic kingdom. Thereafter, it grew somewhat by the terms of the 418 Roman-Visigothic agreement.

Aquitanian land and not a portion of the land itself.¹⁰

Julien Havet, however, found the answer to this riddle in his examination of the Leges Visigothorum, a codification of Gothic law under their later kings. He concluded that the Visigoths held two-thirds of this land under their own control, while leaving one-third of it in the hands of its former owners.¹¹ If this price seems dear, it should be remembered that the barbarians were meant to perform a vital task. Although the Goths had no legal prerogatives, they served as Federates, which meant that they functioned in a military capacity and were hospes, or guests, of the Romans.¹²

The barbarian Visigoths lived on the Roman estate side by side with the landowners. Although many of the technicalities are obscure, it appears that one among the Visigoths appreciated the role and title of consors ("partner"). He became a barbarian optimate among those who resided with him on the estates. Several political and sociological distinctions

¹⁰Julien Havet, "Du Partage es Terres entre les Romains et les Barbores chez les Burgondes et les Visigoths," Revue Historique, VI (1878), 91.

¹¹Ibid., 94. "Il faut reconnaître que c'est bien la terre elle-même que les Burgondes et les Visigoths ont partagée avec les Romains, dont ils ont pris pour eux les deux tiers, et dont ils n'ont laissé que le tiers aux anciens possesseurs."

¹²Ferdinand Lot deals with this subject at length in his article: "Du Regime de l'Hospitalite," Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, VII (1928), 975-1011.

characterized this peculiar relationship: (1) by law the Visigoth and the native Aquitanian could not intermarry;¹³ (2) the Visigoths were not intended to have any control whatsoever over the Roman population; and (3) under the law they had special distinction in the routine of daily affairs. In summary then, the Visigoths constructed an administrative apparatus parallel to that of the Romans, and each accounted for the respective needs of the two people. Beyond this, the Romans strengthened the alliance so that the Visigoths could not defend themselves without defending the Roman landowner as well. With the political and military power of the Romans failing, this situation could not last indefinitely. The Goths asserted themselves later in the century and thus incurred the distrust and dislike of the Catholic episcopacy.

The Visigoths, of course, conquered the Spanish barbarians, and the question might be asked: from whom were they now to protect the Aquitanians? It is precisely this question

¹³Above all else, it was this law that prevented the assimilation of the two people. Not until the last quarter of the sixth century under King Leovigild did the Visigoths rescind this law and permit intermarriage. In the eyes of both people (Visigoths and Romans), the gravity of this particular transgression merited capital punishment; hence, the intermarriage question received considerable attention throughout the duration of their Aquitanian arrangement (418-507). For comment on this question, see: K. Zeumer, "Geschichte der westgotischen Gesetzgebung," Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für altere deutsche Geschichtskunde, XXIV, ii (1899), 477-480. Religious considerations influenced this issue most and, as noted below, the Visigoths had moved into Spain by the time of King Leovigild's reign.

that has most intrigued historians about the Visigoths in the last fifteen years. The foremost recent interpretation directs attention to the northern neighbors of the Aquitanians--the Armoricans.¹⁴ These people (more specifically called the Bacaudae) lived north of the Loire River and at this time were in a rebellious mood, threatening to move south into Aquitaine.¹⁵ Because the Armoricans were an agricultural people, the imperial government determined to preserve unimpaired the productivity of Aquitaine by preventing the rebellion from sweeping southward. Also, the Rhine army depended upon Aquitanian productivity, and it was imperative

¹⁴This is in reference to the work of Professor E. A. Thompson, who has virtually established his academic reputation by his numerous inquiries into various aspects of Visigothic affairs. The principal article that serves as the hallmark of his views on the Visigothic settlement in Aquitaine is: "The Settlement of the Barbarians in Southern Gaul," Journal of Roman Studies, XLVI (1956), 65-75. Also, see his: "Barbarian Kingdoms in Gaul and Spain," Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, VII (1963), 3-33; "Early Visigothic Christianity," Latomus, XXI (1962), 505-519 and 794-810; "Conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism," Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV (1960), 4-35; and "The Visigoths in the Time of Ulfila," Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, V (1961), 3-32.

¹⁵E. A. Thompson has not been without his critics, chief among them being Professor J. M. Wallace-Hadrill ("Gothia and Romania," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XLIV [1961], 213-236). Thompson's interest in the Visigothic settlement in southern Gaul stemmed from his examination of the activities of these same rebels; the following article attests to this fact: "Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain," Past and Present, II (1952), 11-23. Herein he discusses the Bacaudae.

that Rome maintain order there.¹⁶ In short, the settlement of the Visigoths, engineered by Constantius and enlarged by Aëtius, was brilliantly contrived, for it allayed the aggressiveness of the Goths toward Roman subjects in Aquitaine and made their interests synonymous.¹⁷ In praising the political and military wisdom of Constantius, E. A. Thompson presupposed the compatibility of the Gothic and Roman citizens in Aquitaine. Was it possible for the more cultivated Roman to assimilate the barbarian hospites and evolve a satisfactory and lasting relationship with him? Indeed it was. Furthermore, said Thompson, the Roman yielded his land "voluntary and without demur" to his "comparatively highly civilized Germanic hospites."¹⁸

Set against this is the contemporary account of Paulus Orosius describing the nature of the Visigoths. Orosius learned that the Gothic King Athaulf was skeptical about the potential of his people ever to lead Romans or to replace their institutions with something Gothic. Moreover, he confided that the Goths, by reason of their unbridled barbarism, could in no way obey laws; hence, he could not aspire to transform the Roman

¹⁶E. A. Thompson, "The Visigoths from Fritigern to Euric," Historia, XII (1963), 119. This particular article excellently summarizes Thompson's views concerning the settlement of 418. See pages 118-122.

¹⁷Thompson, Journal of Roman Studies, XLVI, 74.

¹⁸Ibid., 68.

system into a Gothic one.¹⁹

It seems logical that the newly-arrived Visigoths would do their best to promote harmonious relations with the Aquitanians.²⁰ Paul Orosius related that after the first barbarian depredations many Romans did prefer poverty and freedom among the barbarians to paying the troublesome tribute which the empire exacted.²¹ Salvian went further by saying that many Romans sought Roman humanity among the barbarians in order to avoid barbaric inhumanity among the Romans.²²

¹⁹Orosius, vii, 43, P.L., p. 1172: "At ubi multa experientia probavisset, neque Gothos ullo modo parere legibus posse propter effrenatam barbariem, neque reipublicae interdici leges oportere, sine quibus respublica non est respublica; elegisse se saltem, ut gloriam sibi de restituendo in integrum, augendoque Romano nomine Gothorum viribus quaereret, habere-turque apud posteros Romanae restitutionis auctor, postquam esse non potuerat immutator."

²⁰Otto Seeck (Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt [6 vols.; Stuttgart, 1966], V, pp. 314-15) relates that likewise Romans conscientiously extended their friendship to barbarian officers of the Arian faith in earlier years: "Sogleich hatte er die schlimmsten Ketzergesetze seines Vorgängers aufgehoben, wahrscheinlich um so den arianischen Offizieren, vor allen dem Gainas, seine Gunst zu erweisen, und hatte sich auch sonst zu den Barbaren des Heeres freundlich gestellt."

²¹Orosius, vi, 41, P.L., p. 1168: "Quamquam et post hoc quoque continuo Barbari, exsecrati gladios suos, ad aratra conversi sunt, residuosque Romanos ut socios modo et amicos foveant, ut inveniantur jam inter eos quidam Romani, qui malint inter Barbaros pauperem libertatem, quam inter Romanos tributariam sollicitudinem sustinere."

²²Salvianus, v, 21, M.G.H., A.A., p. 59: ". . . ad hostes fugiant, ne persecutionis publicae afflictione moriantur, quaerentes scilicet apud barbaros Romanam humanitatem, quia apud Romanos barbaram inhumanitatem ferre non possunt." Salvian charges in his diatribe, however, that Rome's present

Salvian suggested that the Roman aristocracy in Aquitaine inclined toward barbarian values because of the general debasement of Roman ways of life. Similarly, the Visigoths emulated and identified with the Aquitanian landowners. The two peoples eventually became culturally compatible as a result of several factors: (1) Euric, the most powerful of the Visigothic kings, declared independence from Rome in 475, thus lessening administrative expense and simplifying the maintenance of the military;²³ (2) the weakened Visigothic clans could not act separately, beyond the will of their king, and thus the force of Visigothic law proved significant in the amalgamation of Euric's state; and (3) the barbarians entered into Roman society in Aquitaine to a considerable degree and in fact became a part of it. The significance of all this is borne out by the fact that there exists no mention of rebellion by the Gallo-Roman population in Aquitaine against the Visigoths.

Daily exposure to the Visigoths over a period of time must certainly have influenced the attitudes of many people in Aquitaine. Orosius and Salvian both reflect the earlier views of the literate clergy, while the writing of

political and military plight is due to her moral depravity. Furthermore, the noble barbarian's position of strength contrasts vividly with the sinful ways of pagan Rome. His Visigothic declarations do not convince and his facts are construed to tailor-fit his argument.

²³Thompson, Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, VII, 10.

Sidonius Apollinaris, the Bishop of Clermont, demonstrates the changing mood of that same class later in the fifth century. Sidonius clearly disliked the Goths and his work registers his contempt for them. He noted their unpleasant appearance and drew attention to their King Euric (466-485), the "Old Enemy" who preyed on the sheepfolds of the Church.²⁴ Other objects of his venom were two Gothic women who once lived near him. They were "the most quarrelsome, drunken, vomiting creatures the world will ever see," he claimed.²⁵ Though Sidonius personally had cause to dislike Euric, his views were those of an aristocrat and a churchman at that. That perhaps explains his position, particularly in light of the fact that Euric profitably utilized the Roman aristocracy within his own ministry. Sidonius described the last twenty-five years of Roman rule in southern Gaul and thus expressed the reactionary views of an element in society which opposed the prosperity of an Arian barbarian king.

The Bishop of Clermont was not alone in his distaste

²⁴See below p. 33.

²⁵Apollinaris Sidonius Epistulae viii, 2, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. C. Luetjohann, VIII (Berlin, 1887), p. 127: "ad hoc, et cum me defetigatum ab excubiis ad devorsorium crepusculascens hora revocaverat, vix dabatur luminibus inflexis parvula quies; nam fragor illico, quem movebant vicinantes impluvio cubiculi mei duae quaepiam Getides anus, quibus nil umquam litigiosius bibacius vomacius erit." He further acknowledged in a letter to Philagrius (vii. 10.): "You shun barbarians because they are reputed bad; I shun them even if they are good."

for the barbarian Visigoth by the middle of the fifth century. A similar attitude was expressed by the author of the life of Saint Vivian, the Bishop of Saintes, a city in the western part of Aquitaine. This bishop traveled to Toulouse to obtain compensation for aristocratic petitioners whose property was attached by the Goths. Vivian's biographer accuses the Visigoths of coveting the entire fortune of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy.²⁶ Thus, by the reign of Theoderic II (453-466), the Aquitanian clergy demonstrated antagonism toward Visigoths and openly referred to them in unfavorable terms.²⁷

In another development in Aquitaine during this period, Toulouse became the focal point of Gothic interest. Contemporary accounts began to speak of the "realm of Toulouse" and

²⁶Vita Bibiani Vel Viviani Episcopi Santonensis, 4, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch, III (Hannover, 1896), p. 96. The events that prompted Vivian to travel to Toulouse are described thusly: "Cumque pio moderamine plebem sibi commissam divinis erudiret in omnibus disciplinis, accidit, ut Gothorum tempore, rege Theodoro dominante, Sanctonis civibus intolerabilis statueretur iniunctio, ita ut, amissis facultatibus, subderentur maxime statum perdere libertatis. Cumque ablati opibus non solum mediocrium personarum, sed etiam cunctorum nobilium praesidium inhiantes, facula cupiditatis accensi, statuerunt, ut ad Tolosanam urbem cunctos in vinculis inmoderata praesumptione pertraherent, ut cum extorsissent vitam, ambitum rapinae suae intolerabili praesumptione complerent et, cessantibus incolis, quicquid inhiaverant, barbari possiderent."

²⁷Several articles in French deal with the various possible interpretations of the significance of this Vita. In the view of the present author, the most noteworthy is that of Ferdinand Lot ("La Vita Viviani et la Domination Visigothique en Aquitaine" in Melanges Paul Fournier [Paris, 1929], pp. 467-77).

the King of Toulouse in reference to the Gothic establishment there.²⁸ This city belonged to the Visigoths' Aquitanian domain, and the newcomers adopted the city as their permanent capital for the duration of their stay in Gaul. Their persistence in thus maintaining it is interesting in view of their nomadic existence during the preceding hundred years. They settled elsewhere in Aquitaine, and a letter of Sidonius to his bishop indicates that Clermont alone remained unoccupied by the barbarians.²⁹ From a geographical point of view, Toulouse did offer a number of attractions as a capital for the Visigoths. It was a base of operations in the most vital part of their kingdom. From Toulouse, the Visigoths could easily strike toward the Mediterranean Sea or undertake the conquest of Auvergne under their King Euric.³⁰ Moreover, the

²⁸Chronicorum CaesarAugustanorum Reliquiae, a. 507, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, XI, ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1894), p. 223: "Alaricus rex in proelio a Francis interfectus est: regnum Tolosanum destructum est."

²⁹Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, 5, M.G.H., A.A., p. 108: "his accedit, quod de urbibus Aquitanicae primae solum oppidum Arvernum Romanorum reliquum partibus bella fecerunt." The capital of the Arverni was Clermont-Ferrand.

³⁰Étienne Delaruelle, "Toulouse capitale Wisigothique," Annales du Midi, LXVII (1955), 214: "... mais on comprend sans peine leur préférence pour Toulouse, capitale naturelle du Midi wisigoth, moins excentrique que ces autres résidences, bases de départ idéales pour cette marche vers la Méditerranée qui fut une des idées maîtresses de la dynastie ou pour la conquête de l'Auvergne sous le règne d'Euric."

architecture of this era well illustrates an important fact about the people who populated it after 418. As nomads, they occupied pre-existing structures without supplying something new. Their poverty prevented them from developing a Visigothic style of architecture that would glorify or distinguish the Gothic experience in Gaul.³¹

The Goths not only failed to made an artistic imprint in the architectural styles of southern Gaul but also contributed insignificantly to the linguistic development of the area. The negligible Gothic contribution is surprising because of the longevity of their stay in Aquitaine (418-507). They did possess an original language, but nothing of it exists today except in proper names.

The Goths chose Latin as their medium of literary expression, and their works dealt with both law and religion. Little remains of Gothic script, perhaps because of the effectiveness of the Orthodox Christian missionary effort. Since the Visigoths strongly adhered to the Arian heresy until their

³¹Ibid., 220-21. Delaruelle concludes his interesting article in the following manner: "C'est l'evidence même que les Wisigoths, jusqu'alors nomades, n'ont pas imposé, à l'intérieur de leur royaume, une architecture nouvelle, mais ont utilisé les maçons et les façons du pays conquis. C'est dire qu'il n'y a pas, pensons-nous, de style proprement wisigothique. Tout au plus, pourrait-on penser que leur technique se définit par la pauvreté des moyens, en raison même des conditions dans lesquelles se trouvait alors l'empire."

official conversion in 589,³² they suffered from the general disapproval of the numerically superior Roman populace. The writing of Isidore of Seville exemplifies the Roman attitude that engulfed the Visigoth. An early seventh century churchman, he reflected on their blasphemous religious views and rejoiced in their conversion to Orthodoxy.³³

In another respect, the development of language in Aquitaine has received more attention than the accomplishments of the Visigoths. One prominent French scholar has written a monograph that completely ignores Gothic influence on the evolution of the Aquitanian dialect. Instead, he elaborates on the contributions of Latin and Basque on developments in Aquitaine. He thus underscores the cultural unimportance of the Goths in this phase of Aquitanian history.³⁴

³²Scholars have generally neglected the history of the conversion of the Visigoths from Arianism to Roman Catholicism. In fact, no one has published a narrative chronicling these events in English since Rafael Altamire ("Spain under the Visigoths," Cambridge Medieval History, II, vi, 159-193) wrote his article in 1913 until E. A. Thompson's work (Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 4-35) appeared in 1960. See the remarks concerning this subject that preface the latter publication.

³³Isidorus, Historia Gothorum, 8, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, XI (Berlin, 1894), p. 271: "cuius blasphemiae malum per discessum temporum regumque successum annis CCXIII tenuerunt. qui tandem remisscentes salutis suae renuntiaverunt inolitae perfidiae et Christi gratia ad unitatem fidei catholicae pervenerunt." Isidore mentions that Ulfilas, the Gothic bishop, established the Gothic script and translated the Old and New Testaments into the same language.

³⁴A. Luchaire, Les Origines Linguistiques de Aquitaine

Because of the manner of their settlement in southern Gaul, perhaps it was natural for the Visigoths to utilize Latin in their writing but as well to borrow heavily from the Romans while drafting their own laws. The frequent reference to Roman law in the earliest written code of the Visigoths, prepared during the reign of King Euric, clearly attests to this fact.³⁵ In any event, a study of the legal history of Visigothic Gaul throws further light upon the status of the barbarian in Aquitaine and the degree of his influence, or lack of it, in the succeeding years.

Euric's Code dealt with cases involving both Goths and Gallo-Romans; in cases that affected only Gallo-Romans, recourse to Roman law was made. Since the Code of Euric so obviously depended upon Roman law,³⁶ the significance of the

(Pau, 1877), p. 71: "L'invasion romaine, qui a eu pour résultats la disparition de la langue parlée par les Aquitains dans la plaine et dans la majeure partie des montagnes et son remplacement par le latin vulgaire devenu ensuite le gascon, s'est arrêté à l'extrémité sud-ouest de la région aquitanique devant des gorges et des torrents sans doute mieux défendues que les autres parties de la chaîne."

³⁵Ibid., pp. 3-32.

³⁶Whether or not the Visigoths lived under codified law before King Euric has attracted some attention. Isidore of Seville (33, M.G.H., A.A., p. 281) has written that they did not, noting that before Euric "moribus et consuetudine tenebantur." On the other hand, Euric's Code speaks of his father's (Theodoric I) laws as does a letter of Apollinaris Sidonius (ii, 1, M.G.H., A.A., p. 22): ". . . leges Theudosianas calcans Theudoricianasque proponens veteres culpas, nova tributa perquirat." It seems quite probable that they could have had a code prior to that of Euric's.

Gothic contribution attracted little attention until Julius Ficker identified its non-Roman characteristics. Euric's Code was the earliest barbarian code, but one should not expect it to reveal the influence of classical Roman law throughout. To the contrary, it became vulgarized in its Gothic form, but consequently it became more accessible and serviceable to other peoples. For that matter, however, Roman law itself had changed from what it had been during the first three centuries of empire, and in the process it lost its "inner consistency."³⁷ Yet, the very fact that the Goths wrote down their laws, and in Latin at that, demonstrates the force of the Roman influence. The precision and detail apparent in Visigothic law well depict the transition from the Roman to the Germanic.³⁸ Thus, the thoroughgoing nature of the Leges Visigothorum aligns it more closely to the Roman than to the later examples of barbarian law. Not to be neglected, of course, is the most important element evident in early Visigothic law: Romans were allowed to live by their own laws, except in dealings with the Goths.

The tendencies at play throughout the Roman west, in jurisprudence as well as in the economy, indicate that the

³⁷Ernst Levy, "Reflections on the First 'Reception' of Roman Law in Germanic States," The American Historical Review, XLVIII (1943), 23-24.

³⁸Floyd Seyward Lear, "The Public Law of the Visigothic Code," Speculum, XXVI (1951), 1.

barbarian and the Roman had attained something of a plane in their level of existence. Provincialism moved the inhabitant of Aquitaine to exalt the importance of local affairs and leaders. While the west became increasingly passive from an economic and industrial standpoint,³⁹ the two peoples, inclining more toward a primitiveness, brought their laws into a conformity that exemplified their way of life.

Euric's Code was modified by his son and successor, Alaric II. The father's code was inadequate in its treatment of subject people in the Visigothic realm, which now extended over all of southern Gaul and most of Spain. As a result, Alaric issued his compilation at an assembly at Aire in Gascony in 506.⁴⁰ This code confuses those who find mention of

³⁹Archibald R. Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, A.D. 500-1100 (Princeton, 1951), p. 14. Economics and jurisprudence depict this trend better than anything else at this particular time. By the middle of the following century, the workings of the body politic will portray the same influences. As for the economic, Lewis (supra, p. 13) writes: ". . . the end of the fifth century and the opening of the sixth saw little change in the Eastern monopoly of international Mediterranean trade and commerce." Also, Henri Pirenne (Mohammed and Charlemagne, trans. Bernard Miall [London, 1965], pp. 105, 109) discusses the fact that the west had fairs during Merovingian times but of a purely local variety. Likewise, he notes (p. 109): ". . . the organization of the mints was, so to speak, decentralized. The Visigoth kings established mints in various different cities."

⁴⁰The Monumenta Germaniae Historica does not include this in their edition of Visigothic law. The standard edition used is that of G. Haenel, Lex Romana Visigothorum (Leipsig, 1903).

it. Spanish legal historians refer to it as the Breviary of Anianus. Anianus was the royal referendary, and all authentic copies of the code bore his signature. Other European scholars speak of it as the Breviary of Alaric or the Roman Law of the Visigoths. Only these two codes accommodated the Visigothic population during its stay in Aquitaine.

The proximity of the drafting of Alaric's Code to the Visigothic defeat by Clovis at Vouillé in 507 stimulates interest in the possibility of a correlation between the two events. Alaric II attempted to reconcile Gallo-Romans to his tottering rule by a new, more compatible code that affected only the native Roman population.⁴¹ He lacked his father's leadership abilities and this complicated his efforts to maintain the vast holdings left him by Euric. The Franks to the north exploited his difficulties, particularly with the Gallo-Romans, and drove a wedge between him and the native population. While the Franks took the initiative in this struggle by penetrating deep into Visigothic territory a full decade before Vouillé, they well may have begun settling on Aquitanian territory at

⁴¹Felix Dahn, Westgothischen Studien (Würzburg, 1874), pp. 4-5: "Eine Darstellung dieser Duelle von nur römisch rechtlichem Inhalt liegt nicht in unserer Absicht und Aufgabe: sie sollte nur für die Römer, nicht für die Gothen und andere Barbaren, im Reiche gelten. Das tiefere politische Motiv lag unverkennbar in jenem Bestreben Alarichs, seine romanischen Unterthanen zu versöhnen und der gefährlichen katholischmerowingischen Propaganda zu begegnen, das in den Verhältnissen seiner Zeit und Regierung so dringend geboten war."

an equally early date, thus prompting the Visigothic exodus.⁴² The Aquitanians expected to reap the fruit of their success. They would obtain a less obnoxious sovereign in a Frankish king and be done with the Visigoths, who retreated into Spain. Clovis represented the Orthodox Catholic cause, ridding Gaul of the Arian heresy that had dominated its southernmost provinces for nearly a hundred years.

The most recent work on Visigothic law codes has emphasized the undercurrent of Gothic influence beneath the characteristic Roman exterior. The earliest codes exemplify the Roman influence more strongly, probably because of the long association between these two peoples. As time passed, Germanic tendencies emerged more and more in Gothic legislation, a fact often overlooked in the writings of many scholars until the late nineteenth century. It has been observed that the Visigoths of Spain and present-day France adopted Roman enactments wholesale, and it is further estimated that about one-third of the so-called Antiqua that are attached to the

⁴²J. M. Wallace-Hadrill (Long-Haired Kings [London, 1962], pp. 173-174) gives special attention to these raids mentioned in Prosper's Chronicle under the years 496 and 498. He further observes that Frankish settlements in the area date from the early sixth century. As for Frankish initiative at Vouillé, see Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii, 37, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, eds. B. Krusch and W. Levison, I (Hannover, 1937), p. 85: "Igitur Chlodovechus rex ait suis: 'Valde molestum fero, quod hi Arriani partem teneant Galliarum. Eamus cum Dei adiutorium, et superatis redeamus terram in ditioe nostra.'"

Lex Visigothorum can be traced to Roman sources. Nonetheless, in official laws of the Visigoths, this Romanization has been exaggerated.⁴³

In what particular area does the Roman influence give way to the force of the Gothic or Germanic? Most noticeably, it is in the evolution of the concept of leadership among the Visigoths and their attitude toward treason as expressed in their codes. The absolutism of monarchical power exercised in Roman times merged with the Germanic concept during the Visigothic era to produce a new atmosphere in which the power or authority of the king was limited by law. Quite often a Visigothic king would ascend to the purple by assuring his people that he would refrain from certain acts prerequisite to his promotion. This particular phenomenon authenticates the fact that a proto-feudalistic society existed. This stands in contrast to assumptions that Aquitaine possessed a static polity with origins and continuing characteristics of a Roman, nationalistic sort. Eventually clerical influence entered into these arrangements concerning ascension to power, so that durable rules evolved concerning these affairs.⁴⁴ In the second book of Visigothic law, an interesting passage appeared that

⁴³Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (Reprinted edition; New York, 1968), pp. 29-31.

⁴⁴Fritz Kern, Kingship and the Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S. B. Chrimes (New York, 1970), pp. 75-76.

deals directly with the limitations of the king's powers. Therein, he was to bind himself by oath to observe the stipulations that affect his exercise of power. The law also stated that if a king were found to have acquired his position by plotting or by popular insurrection, he would be deprived of rank and secluded from the company of Christians.⁴⁵ Solemn, binding promises on the part of an aspirant to the throne seem to have originated with the Visigoths. When the Church became involved in ceremonies for the inauguration of a king in the ninth century Frankish kingdom, these same subscribed undertakings came into force.⁴⁶ The influence of the Frankish association with the Visigoths in Gaul therefore becomes clear.

Another problem existed, however, that concerned those who refused to give the king their oaths of allegiance if they disapproved of him. Authority in the later Visigothic state was based on a reciprocal contractual agreement. If the subject failed to extend his oath, he did not feel personally indebted to his sovereign in times of strife.⁴⁷ Therefore,

⁴⁵Leges Visigothorum, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum, Sectio I, I, ed. K. Zeumer (Hannover, 1902), pp. 51-52: "Quemcumque vero aut per tumultuosas plebes aut per absconsa dignitati publice macinamenta adeptum esse constiterit regni fastigia, mox idem cum omnibus tam nefarie sibi consentientibus et anathema fiat et christianorum communionem amittat, tam dire percussionis ultione conlisus, ut omnis divini ordinis cultor, qui illi communicare presumserit, simili cum ipso damnatione dispereat et pena tabescat."

⁴⁶Kern, Kingship and the Law in the Middle Ages, p. 76.

⁴⁷Lear, Speculum, XXVI, 5.

a section of the Lex Visigothorum stipulated the penalty for those refusing the king their oaths. Under such circumstances, the injured king possessed the right of disposing of the guilty party's person as well as his property.⁴⁸ This approach to fidelity was alien to the Roman spirit of allegiance. It characterized the Germanic, and if the king initially was not law unto himself, he certainly had recourse under the law if his will was ignored by his subjects.

Chronology was important in these developments in Visigothic legislation. The non-Roman traits did not surface in these codes until after the Goths moved into Spain. Perhaps the defeat of the Visigoths in Aquitaine helped to account for this. As a result of their defeat in 507, they took the opportunity to develop after their own fashion.

To what extent have various legal authorities appreciated the Visigothic law codes over the centuries? Montesquieu spoke skeptically of Visigothic law, but in so doing he referred to the later codes of Kings Chindasvindus and Reccessvindus. He wrote more sympathetically, however, about the earlier Gothic efforts, observing that both the Burgundians and Visigoths endeavored to conciliate the ancient inhabitants of their

⁴⁸Lex Visigothorum, M.G.H., L.L., I, pp. 53: ". . . quicquid de eo vel de omnibus rebus suis principalis auctoritas facere vel iudicare voluerit, sui sit incunctanter arbitrii."

provinces by giving them the most impartial civil laws.⁴⁹ Savigny, Gibbon, and Guizot all freely admired Visigothic compilations of law in light of the age in which they were composed, while recognizing Montesquieu's reservations.⁵⁰ François Guizot summarized his impressions on the subject by commenting that Visigothic law bore a wise, systematic, and social character which evinced the influence of the clergy.⁵¹

Just as the law codes reflected the barbarian influence in Aquitaine so does archaeology admit several worthwhile observations on the Visigoth settlement in the province. Although much concerning this topic yet remains veiled in ambiguity, it appears that the Visigoths possessed a low standard of living as evidenced by their cemeteries.⁵²

⁴⁹Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York, 1901), pp. 93-94.

⁵⁰Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter (7 vols.; Heidelberg, 1834), II, pp. 72-73 and Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury (7 vols.; London, 1925), IV, p. 143-44.

⁵¹François P. W. Guizot, History of Civilization in Europe, trans. William Hazlitt (New York, 1901), pp. 48-49. Moreover, Jordanes (Getica, 5, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, V [Berlin, 1882], p. 64) compares the Goths quite favorably to all other barbarians by noting that they were less cruel in war and more prudent in council: "unde et pene omnibus barbaris Gothi sapientiores semper extiterunt Grecisque pene consimiles, ut refert Dio, qui historias eorum annalesque Greco stilo composuit."

⁵²Édouard Salin, La Civilisation Mérovingienne, D'Après les Sépultures, les Textes et le Laboratoire (4 vols.; Paris,

Funereal furniture was scant; Gothic weapons were therein noticeably absent, characteristic of Visigothic countries, and mainly Gallo-Romans repose in those sites assumed to be Visigothic.⁵³ Weaponry which has been exhumed from these graves is more Frankish than Visigothic. The scramasax of the Franks prevails to the exception of the preferred spear and javelin of the Visigoth.⁵⁴ Outside of Septimania, archaeological evidence contributes to the conclusion that southern Gaul experienced a decided mingling of the barbarian and Gallo-Roman.⁵⁵ In this, the burial sites of the

1950), I, p. 388: "Il n'en est pas moins certain que l'apport visigothique en matière de peuplement a dû demeurer très faible."

⁵³Ibid.: "Dans ces divers cimetières, le mobilier funéraire est le plus souvent peu abondant; . . . l'absence d'armes--caractéristique en pays visigot--s'accorde bien, d'ailleurs, avec la coutume gallo-romaine. Et ce sont des Gallo-Romains qui, en très grande majorité, reposent dans la plupart de ces cimetières." The work of Barriere-Flavy (Études sur les Sépultures barbares du Midi et de L'Ouest de la France [Toulouse, 1892]) attests to the existence of 114 of these Visigothic burial sites. This figure is undoubtedly overstated, 80 being a closer estimate. Barriere-Flavy's work possesses admirable qualities but often has to be used with discretion.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 395-396: ". . . --à l'exception du scramasax cité plus haut--les armes font entièrement défaut, ce qui témoigne qu'il s'agit de Visigots." As for the different weapons that the early Germanic tribes preferred, see: E. A. Thompson, "Early Germanic Warfare," Past and Present, XIV (1958), 2-29.

⁵⁵The situation in Septimania deserves an explanatory note. The Visigoths managed to maintain their hold on this southeastern corner of Gaul even though the Franks successively tried to wrest it from them in 585, 589, and 673.

two peoples confuse almost as much as clarify. Owing to Christian influences, the Gallo-Roman population by circa A.D. 400 had begun to abandon the practice of interring goods with the deceased; however, with the advent of the Goth and later still the Frank, the custom occurred as it had under barbarian auspices. While barbarian graves cannot as yet be strictly discerned from those of Christians through grave goods, scholars believe that the distinction may eventually be made. It appears that a deterioration of old customs had taken place by late fifth century because of the influx of outsiders into Aquitaine and that new standards of life generally favored simplicity as well as militarism.

Since the days of Pope Leo the Great, Roman civil administration in the west had devolved by precedent upon ecclesiastical officials for execution. In actual practice, the municipal bishop had civil, financial, and even military responsibilities. If this were not enough, the bishop's vision of his role transcended that of his narrower municipal concern through the medium of Rome and the emerging monastic movement. He conceived of his functions as surpassing the limited parochialism of his civilian predecessor in the Roman west. The bishop felt he could perform the greatest good by attempting to create a society in which the salvation

of men's souls would take place.⁵⁶ Compared to the petty Arianism of the Visigoths in Aquitaine and their short-sighted political ambitions, this objective enlarged the designs of the Gallo-Roman episcopate and the nobility from which it had sprung.

Episcopal independence indicates much about the prevailing political and religious situation in Visigothic Gaul. Bishops felt secure in their positions as civil servants of the barbarian overlord. Representing the native Gallo-Roman populace, they mirrored the Roman influence in all that they did. Conversely, the Gothic kings relied upon these churchmen for many services. Necessity dictated this reliance in light of the nobility's inability to serve in this capacity. The crude aristocrat, whether Gallo-Roman or Visigoth, operated in a subsistence agricultural economy and yielded increasingly to conformity in a proto-feudal society. In this decentralized political atmosphere, power devolved upon an urban, literate episcopacy.

⁵⁶J. B. Russell (A History of Medieval Christianity: Prophecy and Order [New York, 1968], p. 37-41) describes in general terms the new attitude and participation of the Church in civil administration throughout the fifth century. On the monastic front, see the recent works on John Cassian and his influence by Owen Chadwick (John Cassian [Cambridge, 1968]) and Peter Munz ("John Cassian," The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XI [1960], 1-22). In part, the latter says (p. 19) that Cassian "was, among other things, a reformer of society." Also, what his monastic movement represented "was an attempt to replace natural society by a social life in the framework of which the struggle for redemption could begin."

The bishop, however, possessed a certain confidence in his time-honored status as an ecclesiastic. Roman law, as transmitted to Visigothic Gaul, strengthened his authority as well as that of the Orthodox Church. Beginning with the Theodosian Code, the Roman state had taken note of their position in society. Although the Goth was not religiously compatible with Rome, he still allowed the Church to preserve and perpetuate the Roman legal heritage within his realm.⁵⁷ The bishop did not always have the freedom of action that allowed him to exercise his will regardless of the concerns of the state. In later times, the Visigoths stipulated in their law codes that Orthodox bishops should employ themselves in the defense of the state; in consequence of a defeat without their help, they had to remunerate the state for its losses.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Some legal historians write that the rules of the Visigothic Code reflect the attempts of churchmen to get their moral ideals on the statute book. See Monroe Smith, The Development of European Law (New York, 1928), p. 100.

⁵⁸Lex Visigothorum, M.G.H., LL., I, p. 371: ". . . vel quocumque modo ad suam cognitionem pervenerit, et ad defensionem gentis vel patrie nostre prestus cum omni virtute sua, qua valuerit, non fuerit et quibuslibet subtilitatibus vel requisitis occasionibus alibi se transferre vel excusare voluerit, Hec sola sententia in episcopis, presbiteris et diaconibus observanda est." Zeumer devoted considerable attention to the development of Visigothic law in his Praefatio to the above work (pp. xi-xxviii). While this answers many of the basic questions concerning the code, Zeumer also took the occasion to expand his commentary on the topic in a series of excellent but incomplete articles: "Geschichte der westgothischen Gesetzgebung," Neues Archiv

Gothic efforts to secure an Aquitanian kingdom culminated during the reign of Euric (466-484). This Visigothic king reigned simultaneously with Odovacar in Italy and Gaiseric in North Africa in 476, at the time of the deposition of Romulus Augustulus. His character was in keeping with that of his better-known contemporaries, and his independent stance vis à vis Rome actually preceded that of Odovacar. In French political history, Euric receives special attention because he freed the Visigoths in Gaul from Roman political control. Furthermore, he seized all southern Gaul in the Visigothic name on the basis of jure suo and, in so doing, increased the Gothic holding to include the expanse of land from the Atlantic Ocean east to the Rhone and to the Loire in the north.⁵⁹ In the south, Euric had captured all of Spain by his death in 484, except for the territory of present-day Portugal, then

der Gesellschaft für altere deutsche Geschichtskunde, XXIII, ii (1898), 419-516; XXIV, i (1899), 39-122; XXIV, ii (1899), 571-630; XXVI, i (1901), 91-149. Also, see the short, but excellent, article on Visigothic law by Christian Pfister, "Early Germanic Law," Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed.) XI (1910), 775-76.

⁵⁹Paul Viollet, Histoire des Institutions Politiques et Administratives de la France (3 vols.; Paris, 1890), I, p. 172-73. Viollet cites Jordanes as his source here and further observes that the first Visigothic kings were not independent and it is only with Euric that the trend is reversed: "Théoriquement, les premiers rois wisigoths n'étaient pas réputés rois indépendants: au dire de Jordanès, c'est Euric (466-484), ce prince conspirateur et conquérant, qui s'affranchit le premier de toute sujétion, et occupa la Gaule méridionale en souverain, jure suo. Cet Euric promulgua le premier un code de lois dont M. Gaudenzi a peut-être retrouvé tout récemment quelques fragments."

held by the Suevians.

Euric's administration was a topic of controversy in the writings of his contemporaries. Certainly it did evoke strong reaction from those who experienced its forcefulness. It must be remembered, however, that Euric waged war almost incessantly during his reign and either threatened or conquered many neighboring kingdoms. Also, the disdain that the Roman Catholic episcopacy felt toward Visigoths, while due in part to cultural bias, was as well a response to the threat Euric posed as a powerful barbarian monarch committed to heresy and the advancement of his own interests. Euric rose to power through the expedient of fratricide.⁶⁰ He quickly accepted the responsibilities that his office demanded of him. Two French historians, in surveying his leadership and that of his son, observe that the government of these kings "was the more often gentle and wise."⁶¹

Euric soon asserted his independence from Rome. He

⁶⁰Jordanes fails to detail the events surrounding the death of Euric's brother, the former emperor Theodoric II. Isidore of Seville does, though, and in the process, reproduces the account of the Chronical of Idatius, a Spanish bishop who continued the Chronicle of Prosper of Aquitaine to the year 468. In the Historia Gothorum, he (Isidorus, 33, P.L., p. 281) relates: "Sallanem quoque legatum denuo Theudericus mittit ad Remismundum: qui reversus ad Gallias Theudericum ab Eurico fratre suo repperit interfectum."

⁶¹Charles Bémont and G. Monod, Medieval Europe, From 395 to 1270, trans. Mary Sloan (New York, 1902), pp. 63-64.

sent a succession of emissaries to neighboring kingdoms, including one to the eastern emperor, ostensibly to gain recognition of his autonomy.⁶² As his various military endeavors began to prosper, his court grew to become a meeting place for foreign dignitaries. So impressive was his court that even his enemies spoke of its brilliance. Apollinaris Sidonius stated that one could gather information there about the whole world's affairs.⁶³ Sidonius criticized the king on almost every other count, having been imprisoned by Euric for supporting the unsuccessful struggle of the Gallo-Romans to secure the independence of the city of Auvergne.⁶⁴ Sidonius paid for his opposition and never forgot to mention Euric unkindly in his literary pursuits. Often he castigated the king unfairly, and his pen has influenced the thoughts of many later writers on the quality and motivation of Visigothic leadership in southern Gaul.

⁶²Both Hydatius (Continuatio Chronicorum Hieronymianorum, 238) and Isidore of Seville (34, M.G.H., A.A., p. 281) tell of this embassy. In the words of the latter: "in qui honore proventus et crimine statim legatos ad Leonem imperatorem dirigit"

⁶³Apollinaris Sidonius, iv, 22, M.G.H., A.A., p. 73: "cotidie namque per potentissimi consilia regis totius sollicitus orbis pariter negotia et iura, foedera et bella, loca spatia merita cognoscis."

⁶⁴Thomas Hodgkins (Italy and Her Invaders [8 vols.; Oxford, 1897-1899], II, pp. 313-316) devotes considerable attention to this. He feels that momentarily Sidonius the courtier and rhetorician was lost in the patriot; consequently, ". . . his life rose into real grandeur."

In particular, Sidonius found fault with Euric's treatment of the Orthodox Church in Gaul. To vent his pent-up antagonisms against the Gothic king, he wrote a letter to Basilius of Aix, a fellow bishop.⁶⁵ The western Roman Emperor, Julius Nepos, had designated Basilius as one of four bishops to represent the Gallo-Romans in negotiations with Euric. Sidonius expected to turn the bishop against the Goth. The letter contains much invective that historians have accepted to a greater or lesser degree.⁶⁶ Only one charge against Euric actually merits acceptance. In the king's efforts to promote his state and Arianism, he had allowed certain Orthodox bishoprics to go unfilled after the deaths of their incumbents.⁶⁷ The situation convinced Sidonius that his people were "scorched in a Babylonian furnace."⁶⁸ Other information illuminates the situation. Euric's chief ministers, Leo and

⁶⁵Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, 6, M.G.H., A.A., pp. 108-110.

⁶⁶It is difficult to agree with J. B. Bury (History of the Later Roman Empire, I, p. 341) who writes that Euric ". . . was a fanatical Arian." His remarks exemplify those of an historian who takes Sidonius' letter too literally.

⁶⁷Apollinaris Sidonius, vii, M.G.H., A.A., p. 109: "Burdigala, Petrogorii, Ruteni, Lemovices, Gabalitani, Helusani, Vasates, Convenae, Auscenses, Multoque iam maior numerus civitatum summis sacerdotibus ipsorum morte truncatus nec ullis deinceps episcopis in defunctorum officia suffectis, per quos utique minorum ordinum ministeria subrogabantur, latum spiritalis ruinae limitem traxit."

⁶⁸Ibid.

Victorius, belonged to the Orthodox Church. Moreover, as Euric unfolded his plans to expand the Gothic kingdom, the attitude of the Gallo-Roman clergy changed from benevolence to hostility.⁶⁹ Sidonius' letters clearly reflect the fears of the clergy concerning their own future.

If Sidonius portrayed Visigothic treatment of the Church in exaggerated terms, how did the reality of the situation differ from his comments to Basilus? The Goths at times persecuted Catholics, but Catholics fought valiantly for their Arian sovereign against the Franks.⁷⁰ Euric did act out of political and military necessity, and persecution may be the wrong term to use in describing his actions.⁷¹

⁶⁹The article of Georges Yver ("Euric, Roi des Wisigoths" in Études d'Histoire du Moyen Age dédiées a Gabriel Monod [Paris, 1896], pp. 11-46) has clarified many of the historical misapprehensions about this reign. He draws this conclusion: "Mais l'attitude de clergé, conciliante et presque bienveillante durant les premières années de l'occupation, s'était transformée en une hostilité déclarée, à mesure qu'apparaissait plus clairement chez les rois de Toulouse, chez Euric en particulier, l'intention de substituer leur propre puissance à l'autorité romaine." Also, see the book by K. Stroheker (Eurich, König der Westgoten [Stuttgart, 1937]).

⁷⁰See the published doctoral dissertation of Aloysius K. Ziegler (Church and State in Visigothic Spain [Washington, D.C., 1930], p. 201. Ziegler emphasizes the civic responsibilities of Catholic bishops in their resistance to the spread of the Gothic kingdom in Aquitaine.

⁷¹Thompson, Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 9. Thompson thinks that the Goths were remarkably tolerant, especially when compared to the attitude of Catholic kings toward the Arian Church.

His son and successor, Alaric II (484-507), attempted to appease the Orthodox Church by being tolerant, but the policy was attributed to his weakness. The truth of Alaric's liberalism is attested to in the praise accorded by Catholic bishops on several occasions.⁷² Moreover, it is worthwhile to remember that these same bishops came from the Gallo-Roman nobility. This was the case with Sidonius, who educated himself in theology after his appointment. Some have argued that it was the nobility that allied itself against the Visigothic cause in Aquitaine;⁷³ however, their discontent must surely have been motivated by the Aquitanian episcopacy. When the Salian Franks turned their attention toward southern Gaul, it was the bishop, instead of the aristocrat, who took the initiative in rallying Aquitaine to Clovis' standard.⁷⁴

⁷²For a case in point see: J. D. Mansi, Concilii Agathensis Praefatio in Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio, VIII (Paris, 1901), p. 325.

⁷³The recent work by Eugen Ewig ("L'Aquitaine et les Pays Rhénans au haut moyen âge," Cahiers de Civilisation Médiéval, I [1958], 49) notes that it was basically this class that checked the aspirations of the Visigoths in Aquitaine. "Au début du VI^e siècle, les Mérovingiens s'étaient alliés avec la noblesse sénatoriale gallo-romaine contre les Wisigoths et peut-être même contre les Burgondes."

⁷⁴The reader should not necessarily associate nationalism with the independent attitude of the bishops nor with the Arianism of the Visigoths. Historians who incline in this direction (see above fn. 64) "retroject" into the past the sentiments of the present age. A. H. M. Jones ("Were Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?," The Journal of Theological Studies, X [1959], 295) argues "the

The Visigothic experience in Gaul failed to leave an enduring impression. Originally entrenched there to protect Aquitaine from its northern neighbors, the Visigoths were defeated by those northerners, in league with the native population. While their settlement postponed the invasion of northern barbarians, they were unable to harmonize or contribute in a positive fashion to the betterment of Gallo-Roman society on a long-term basis. The Visigoths patterned their culture on the Roman model, particularly in the areas of jurisprudence, architecture, and politics. Politically, they depended almost slavishly upon the decadent Roman example, which not only failed but also turned against them as their state grew in size. This became most noticeable when Euric expanded Visigothic holdings and thereupon threatened the established prerogatives of the episcopacy. Furthermore, the heterodox religious views of the Visigoths weakened their efforts to secure themselves in Aquitaine. While Goths depended upon the clergy in the municipal administration of government and also in the formulation of their legal codes, their Arianism could hardly further promote clerical co-operation. On the other hand, the aspersions of Sidonius about

evidence for nationalism of any kind in the later Roman Empire is tenuous in the extreme." The maintenance of the unimpaired prerogatives of the Orthodox bishops as well as the religious sincerity of the Arians both play their parts in the course that this struggle takes.

Euric's persecution of the Orthodox Church carry little weight. The bishops, especially those literateurs of Sidonius' brand, represented their own peculiar interests in their opposition to the last three Visigothic kings, more than they represented the Gallo-Roman aristocracy. In short, they were the last of their kind, men who only grudgingly yielded to the Gothic overlord. The fact that the Church in Aquitaine emerged unscathed from the Visigothic experience speaks for the effectiveness of the bishops' efforts to protect themselves. This fact, however, indicates the inclinations of only a segment of society. If the separatist tendencies in Aquitaine in the eighth century are to be explained, the broader spectrum of society must receive attention. Indeed, from the third to the early sixth centuries, Aquitanian society underwent change that produced a semi-barbarized, agrarian, subsistence economy that utilized a semi-feudal polity and social organization. A kind of leveling process occurred within society that brought Goths and Gallo-Romans to a point at which they were indistinguishable. With the coming of the Merovingians, more discernable outlines of the separatist movement came into focus.

CHAPTER II

MEROVINGIAN AQUITAINE

The Franks, like so many other Germanic peoples, moved about considerably throughout the fifth century. While many of the details concerning their migrations during this century remain conjecture, recent studies verify several basic observations. Most interesting is the fact that the Franks existed as a comparatively obscure people; then, toward the end of the fifth century, they emerged into a position of political mastery in western Europe. Perhaps the best, as well as the most obvious, explanation for this stems from their military dormancy at a time while other tribes became involved in warfare that left them decimated and debilitated.¹

The Franks established themselves first in Belgium and northern France. This did not occur before the middle of the fifth century.² Then, as they began to expand south to encompass the Loire River valley, confrontation with the Visigoths in Aquitaine became necessary. Only in this fashion could

¹Charles Verlinden, "Frankish Colonization: A New Approach," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, IV (1954), 13-14.

²Ibid.

they ensure the permanence and security of their new acquisitions to the north. In particular, the peace of the new Frankish domain beyond the Seine, a belt of land bordered on the extreme south by the Loire, depended upon the mastery of the Loire River valley.³ Involvement there necessitated Frankish intervention along the Atlantic seacoast of Aquitaine and eventually in the whole province. In the early eighth century, a Saracenic enemy of the Franks would also become militarily committed along the Aquitanian coast.

For several years prior to 507 the Visigoths and the Franks had waged a desultory war along their frontier. In the continuation of Prosper's Chronicle, mention is made of skirmishes taking place as early as 496 and 498. In the latter year, the Franks advanced to Bordeaux, deep in Aquitanian territory.⁴ As the tempo of Franco-Gothic differences increased, the difficulties of Alaric II in keeping his own kingdom in order also mounted. In particular, the root of his problem lay with the activities of Frankish sympathizers within the Gallo-Roman episcopacy. The more discontent among these churchmen provoked Alaric to the point that they required his attention. Gregory of Tours remarked that Alaric took the initiative

³Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings, p. 173.

⁴Continuatio Hauniensis Prosperi, a. 498, M.G.H., A.A., p. 331: "Alarici Franci Burdigalam obtinuerunt et a potestate Gothorum in possessionem sui redegerunt capto Suatrio Gothorum duce."

in negotiating with Clovis, the King of the Franks, but even by that time many among the Gauls desired the Franks as overlords.⁵ Gregory cited the case of Quintian, the Bishop of Rodez, as an example of one who felt accordingly and was thus driven from his city.⁶ Reference occurs in other sources to two bishops who, as allies of the Franks, plotted against the Visigothic cause. These bishops, Ruricius of Limoges and Caesarius of Arles, were discovered and sent into exile to Bordeaux in 505.⁷ In another case, the reaction of the Gothic king toward episcopal infidelity to his cause was even more

⁵Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiae Francorum*, ii, 35, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 84: "Quod Chlodovechus non respuens, ad eum venit. Coniunctique in insula Ligeris, quae erat iuxta vicum Ambaciensem terreturium urbis Toronicae, simul locuti, comedentes pariter ac bibentes, promissa sibi amicitia, pacifici discesserunt. Multi iam tunc ex Galleis habere Francos dominos summo desiderio cupiebant."

⁶*Ibid.*, 36: "Unde factum est, ut Quintianus Rutenorum episcopus per hoc odium ab urbe depelleretur." Gregory also cites two other examples of episcopal conspiracy in somewhat less detail at the bishopric of Tours. Bishops Volusianus (*ex genere senatorio*) and Verus suffered exile too and died in this circumstance before obtaining their freedom (x, 7-8, p. 531).

⁷*Vitae Caesarii Episcopi Arelatensis Libri Duo*, i, 21, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum*, ed. Bruno Krusch, III (Hannover, 1896), p. 465: "Igitur instigatione praesentium nec innocentiae fides attenditur, nec accusationibus condemnatus, cum ab Arelato fuisset abstractus, in Burdigalensem civitatem est quasi in exilio religatus." Insofar as Ruricius is concerned, see the remarks of Bruno Krusch in the *Praefatio in Ruricium*, ed. B. Krusch, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum*, VIII, p. LXIV: "Burdigalae Caesarius cum Ruricio convenit."

severe. He punished Galactorius, the Bishop of Bénarn (today Lescar), by death.⁸ The inescapable conclusion is that the bishops appear in the available sources as the only real opponent of the Goths. Episcopal control over municipal administration allowed bishops to exert their will in an effective, pervasive manner that facilitated the Frankish advance and thwarted what remained of the Gothic hegemony in Aquitaine. An additional factor in the bishops' effectiveness concerned Alaric II's difficulties in administering his father's realm. The cumulative results gave the Franks the edge, both militarily and politically, over the Visigoths.

Traditionally, the religious motivation that spurred Clovis in 507 has received more attention than anything else to explain his successful conquest of Aquitaine. He fought the battle of Vouillé as an Orthodox Catholic, experiencing conversion to Christianity by baptism at Rheims, most probably in 496. Gregory of Tours attributed paramount importance to this.⁹ Although the religious element certainly had a profound

⁸Godefroid Kurth (Clovis [2 vols.; Paris, 1901], II pp. 84-85) discusses the events surrounding the death of Galactorius whom the Church later canonized. He remarks: "Les textes nous disent, il est vrai, qu'il périt pour avoir refusé d'abjurer la foi catholique; mais que peut-on croire d'une telle assertion? . . . Si donc on peut se fier au récit en cause, il est probable qu'ils auront voulu, en faisant périr Galactorius, le châtier de sa rébellion plutôt que de sa religion."

⁹See above, chapter one, fn. 46. Also, a longstanding academic debate has raged in respect to where Clovis was baptized. Bruno Krusch, the editor of Gregory of Tours in the

impact upon the nature of the conflict, Gregory exaggerated by giving it his singular attention as the reason for the fighting. Religion may have played a more decisive role after the conflict than it did before, as the Bishop of Tours suggested. As the champion of orthodoxy, Clovis was not above obtaining the help of Arians to fight Arians. The Arian Burgundians assisted the Catholic Franks against the Arian Visigoths.¹⁰ In particular, Gondebaud, the Burgundian king, had rendered the Franks valuable assistance during the Visigothic campaign.¹¹ Hence, the position of the Aquitanian bishops

M.G.H. series, denies the truth of the bishop's remarks concerning Rheims as the baptism site. Since Krusch also edited the Vita S. Remigii in the same series, a document that substantiates Gregory's statement, an interesting problem arises. For a perceptive analysis of the question, as well as a discussion of the reliability of the latter work, see A. H. M. Jones, P. Grierson, and J. A. Crook, "The Authenticity of the 'Testamentum S. Remigii,'" Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, XXXV (1957), 356-373.

¹⁰Reference is made to this alliance in the Vita S. Caesarii (i, 28, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 467): "Etenim, obsidentibus Francis ac Burgundionibus civitatem iam enim Alarico rege a victoriosissimo rege Chlodoveo in certamine perempto, Theudericus Italiae rex Provinciam istem, ducibus missis, intraverat." Also, an entry in the Chronica Gallica (a. DXI, 689, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctorum Antiquissimorum, ed. T. Mommsen, IX [Berlin, 1892], p. 665) similarly takes note of the entente: "Tolosa a Francis et Burgundionibus incensa [690] et Barcinona a Gundefade rege Burgundionum capta."

¹¹An analysis of the effects of this alliance appears in Cl. Devic and J. Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc (15 vols.; Toulouse, 1872-1892), I, p. 537: "Nous avons déjà dit que Clovis avoit eu soin de se liguier avec Gondebaud, leur roi, contre les Visigoths. Les Bourguignons le secoururent puissamment durant cette guerre, & ils avoient déjà fait en sa faveur"

who detested the Arian Goth but yet would receive help from an Arian Burgundian has an inconsistent ring to it, especially in view of Gregory's remarks.

The Burgundians interested the Frank in other ways than as allies. Having campaigned against them in 500, Clovis came to terms with them before Vouillé. The successors of the Frankish king, however, would later cast covetous eyes in the direction of Burgundy and succeed in subjecting the area to their will. Thus, Aquitaine geographically offered the Franks a lucrative front from which to launch offensives against their new neighbor to the east.

The mere fact that Clovis belonged to the Orthodox faith did not win all the Roman Catholic aristocrats over to his side. It is true that the higher clergy supported his cause, but even the Bishop of Tours told of a group of lay aristocrats, senators among them, who fought and died in great numbers for the Arian Visigoth at Vouillé. Notably, this contingent came from the Aquitanian city of Auvergne and was led by Appolinaris, the son of the poet Sidonius.¹² In this context, one remembers that the recalcitrants whom Alaric reprimanded for their disloyalty were solely from the episcopacy, at

¹²Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiae Francorum*, ii, 37, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 88: "Maximus ibi tunc Arvernorum populus, qui cum Apollinare venerat, et primi qui erant ex senatoribus corruerunt." Oddly enough, the son supported the Arian Goths, whereas the father disliked them exceedingly.

least in those cases reported in the sources. Therefore, it appears that the prerogatives of this particular class were more threatened by the Visigothic hegemony in Aquitaine than were those of the aristocracy as a whole. Consequently, when Clovis achieved success, his first political debt would be to these bishops.¹³

The southward territorial expansion of the Franks to the Loire river accounts for this conflict, but so does the status of the Visigothic state. Indeed, both states had recently over-extended themselves geographically, the Visigoths having just done so in Spain under Euric. In consideration of their hostile relationship, the growth of both kingdoms to an administratively awkward size contributed decidedly to the precipitation of hostilities. Moreover, aroused suspicions and a rash of incidents between the two powers prior to 507 brought about war. Another factor somewhat more difficult to document is the Gallic interest of the Ostrogothic leader, Theodoric

¹³A good, reliable account of this struggle is that of Ernest Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire (2 vols.; Amsterdam, 1968), II, pp. 145-151. On tenuous grounds, E. A. Thompson (Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 6) suggests that the Roman landowners as a class had not been dissatisfied with barbarian rule and tended to support Alaric II in 507. While this is not so illogical, he continues by risking the observation that the poor, on the other hand, had grown tired of Visigothic rule and hence remained neutral.

the Great, then the master of Italy.¹⁴ The Franks later accused Theodoric of fostering discord and rivalry between the political and military powers of Gaul.¹⁵ The resulting chaos would be to his advantage, if no strong power emerged from the conflict. This is what happened, and it sheds light on the strained relations between Clovis and Theodoric in the post bellum period. Theodoric meant to secure his Italian frontiers by a series of alliances with the Germanic Arian kingdoms of the west. By creating and preserving a balance of power among these rulers, Theodoric could coordinate their stances in the face of Constantinople. To accomplish this, he concluded a number of marital alliances (capped by his own marriage to Clovis' sister) and consequently not only assured his own usefulness to the emperor but also resisted the possibility of future expansion of the Frank in the west. A successful Clovis at Vouillé would completely upset this

¹⁴Most authorities, however, accept the validity of Theodoric's intentions to preserve peace, as his three letters written before the outbreak of hostilities to Alaric, Gondebaud, and Clovis indicate. These letters are preserved in Cassiodorus, Variae, iii, 1, 2, 4.

¹⁵Kurth, Clovis, II, pp. 57-58: "La tradition populaire des Francs, consignée dans une légende, est d'accord avec la correspondance politique de Theodoric le Grand pour attribuer le discord à ces rivalités entre les deux puissance de la Gaule." Kurth observes in a footnote that this account comes from obscure barbarian legend. Furthermore, this interpretation attributes blame to the Visigothic king and vindicates the Frank. Kurth continues by saying that this story particularly attracts attention to barbaric custom and, therefore, is quite noteworthy.

design.¹⁶ In the final analysis, however, as Gregory of Tours well elucidated, the Visigoths attempted to avoid war by conciliation, while the Franks assumed the initiative and succeeded in waging war and winning it on Aquitanian soil. In retaliation, Theodoric struck against the Frankish-Burgundian coalition and took the coastal area of the Riviera, thus giving succor to the threatened Visigoths.¹⁷

In the aftermath of Vouillé, Clovis indicated by his actions what his interest and plans were for Aquitaine. He spent the winter at Bordeaux and collected Alaric's treasure that had been stored at Toulouse. Undeterred in accomplishing this, he had yet to contend with isolated garrisons of Visigothic adherents between his winter quarters and the Loire River to the north. He proceeded that spring to Angoulême, fearing that the Ostrogoths might take advantage of that city's

¹⁶See the discussion of H. St. L. B. Moss (The Birth of the Middle Ages, 395-814 [New York, 1964], pp. 71-72, 76) concerning the statecraft of Theodoric.

¹⁷Lucien Musset (Les Invasions: Les Vagues Germaniques ["Nouvelle Clio," L'Histoire et ses problèmes, No. 12; Paris, 1965], p. 88) observes that after Vouillé in 507: "Le peuple visigot fut sauvé par l'intervention des Ostrogots, au nom de la solidarité qui unissait les deux rameaux. Pendant une génération, Théodoric et ses lieutenants prirent en main les destinées des vaincus. Ce sauvetage ne fut assuré qu'au prix d'une transformation radicale: le royaume de Toulouse, essentiellement gaulois et largement ouvert sur l'extérieur, devint le royaume de Tolède, presque uniquement espagnol et jalousement fermé sur lui-même; mais ses institutions fondamentales--arianisme, modus vivendi avec les Romains, structure de l'État--furent préservées."

opposition to him, and reduced it.¹⁸ After driving out the Goths, Clovis traveled north to the Loire and crossed to the city of Tours. There he delivered gifts to the Church of St. Martin, the saint to whom the Franks felt they owed their victory.

By leaving Aquitaine for Paris, Clovis displayed a disinterest in the domestic affairs of southern Gaul and a preference for the north. Two formidable powers contested for the control of Mediterranean Europe, and his concern naturally inclined toward the region of his birth rather than that of the south. Since he now had the Loire River area secured, Clovis leisurely attended to the conduct of affairs in Aquitaine after 507. He did not tamper with the social and cultural structure of southern Gaul but left the episcopacy, presumably in league with the aristocracy, to carry on in most of the Aquitanian cities.¹⁹

¹⁸Gregory of Tours (Historiae Francorum ii, 37, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 88) writes that Clovis experienced considerable ease in taking Angoulême through the miraculous collapse of the city's walls as he gazed upon them. Relatively to the Ostrogothic threat, Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, p. 543) discuss this: "... mais, craignant qu'en laissant au milieu de l'Aquitaine un poste aussi important, il ne prit envie aux Ostrogoths de porter leurs arms dans cette province, il se présenta, chemin faisant, devant cette place &, à son approche, une partie des murailles ayant croulé comme par miracle, il s'en empara aussitôt & fit passer tous les Visigoths au fil de l'épée."

¹⁹Ewig, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, I, 49: Ils ne portèrent donc pas atteinte à la structure sociale et culturelle de la Gaule mérodingienne. La vieille noblesse gallo-romaine continuait de gouverner bon nombre de cités aquitaines,

The degree to which the Merovingian dynasty (as initiated by Clovis) ever controlled Aquitaine is in doubt. For some years, the Gothic threat there poses innumerable problems for the Franks, and until 511 the land could hardly be looked on as a Frankish possession because of the indecisive foothold of the conqueror.²⁰ Not only was Merovingian power uncertain in Aquitaine, but so it was as well in the ancestral lands of the Franks. The importance of a developing feudalism, in addition to a lapse into anarchy after 511, made Frankish control dubious at home. The growth of bodies of armed retainers and the quest for security on a local level helped to prevent the accumulation of centralized power.²¹ By the middle of the sixth

provençales et même lyonnaises. Elle fusionna enfin avec la noblesse franque et burgonde. Ses traces se perdent vers 700." Ewig relies upon the nationalistic arguments of the nineteenth century historians who expound the exclusivist theory (e.g., "la vieille noblesse gallo-romaine"). Furthermore, his suppositions relative to the coalescence of the nobility would appear the more logical if predated to the last generation of the Visigothic experience in Aquitaine.

²⁰Eugen Ewig, "Die fränkischen Teilungen und Teilreiche, 511-613," Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, IX (1952), 661: "Dafür gibt es nur eine Erklärung: Aquitanien konnte in seiner Gesamtheit 511 noch nicht als gesicherter fränkischer Besitz angesehen werden, weil die endgültigen Grenzen zwischen Franken und Goten noch nicht feststanden." Various studies have recently dealt with the Frankish struggle for Aquitaine, the most prominent being those that have come from the pen of Eugen Ewig.

²¹See F. L. Ganshof's (Feudalism, trans. Philip Grierson [New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964], pp. 3-12) discussion of the origins of feudalism in the Frankish kingdom of the Merovingians.

century, however, a rapprochement of sorts had been worked out between the Franks and the Aquitanians.²² The effects of this particular union were largely wasted, though, in consequence of the disorder that had come to the Merovingian-Frankish state. Dissension among the sons of Clovis prevented the creation of a unified front to cope with governmental affairs.²³ Furthermore, Aquitaine and northern Gaul were more closely aligned, but factional differences among the Merovingians hampered efforts to create an effective administration for the whole realm.²⁴

While Clovis paid his debt to St. Martin at Tours, he received an embassy from the eastern emperor Anastasius. The emperor bestowed upon Clovis the title of consul and, according to the Bishop of Tours, the Frankish leader was henceforth called either "consul" or "Augustus."²⁵ The value of the title

²²Ferdinand Lot, "La Conquête de Pays d'entre Seine-et-Loire par les Francs," Revue Historique, CLXV (1930), 244: "Si le royaume des Francs était si redoutable, c'est parce que, dès le milieu du VI^e siècle, un rapprochement intime, sinon la fusion, s'était opéré entre les envahisseurs et les Gallo-Romains."

²³Ewig, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, I, 42: "Mais le royaume mérovingien n'était pas un État unitaire. L'Austrasie, la Neustrie et la Bourgogne, issues des partages de la dynastie, étaient en fait des royaumes largement autonomes."

²⁴James Bryce (The Holy Roman Empire, p. 48) well characterizes the resulting situation when remarking that the Merovingian empire was a congeries of principalities rather than a united kingdom.

²⁵Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, ii, 38, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 89: ". . . et ab ea die tamquam consul aut augustus est vocitatus."

at that time was not to be taken lightly. A sixth century author spoke of the consulship as "the greatest good and the foremost distinction to be decreed in the world."²⁶ Furthermore, the appointment came at a very opportune moment. It emphasized the breadth and importance of his recent accomplishment, and it raised his esteem in the minds of the Gallo-Roman populace, who especially valued a title in the old Roman empire context.²⁷ Clovis took note of his new responsibility in Aquitaine and acted accordingly.²⁸

²⁶Jordanis, *Getica*, 57, M.G.H., A.A., p. 132: ". . . factusque consul ordinarius, quod summum bonum primumque in mundo decus edicitur."

²⁷A balanced account of Clovis' acquisition of the title of consul and the significance of the occasion appears in J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Long-haired Kings*, pp. 175-176. On the other hand, Pierre Courcelle (*Histoire Littéraire des Grandes Invasions Germaniques* [Paris, 1948], p. 204) writes: "Un jour viendra, où les Byzantins auront lâché pied en Occident: le roi des Francs se fera tout de bon proclamer auguste et couronner empereur des Romains. On peut se demander si cette décision n'a pas été lentement mûrie dans les milieux ecclésiastiques de Tours, depuis le temps de Clovis. Car c'est Alcuin, abbé de Saint-Martin de Tours, qui lance en 799 l'idée de faire couronner Charlemagne empereur."

²⁸The importance of the title should be viewed in its correct perspective, however. An interpretational trend has recently appeared that attaches utmost importance to the title "Augustus." This school of thought advances the notion that Anastasius delegated, and therefore divided, supreme jurisdictional powers in the west to Clovis on a coequal basis. Nothing of the sort was implied in the conferment of the title. See Pierre Levell ("Le consulat de Clovis à Tours," in *Études Mérovingiennes, Actes des Journées de Poitiers* [Paris, 1953], p. 190) who thusly concludes his article: "Grégoire se fait l'écho d'acclamations populaires; il n'affirme en aucune façon qu'Anastase ait songé à partager juridiquement avec le roi franc le titre suprême d' 'auguste'. Fustel de Coulanges

If Clovis depended upon the episcopal ranks for support in his venture into Aquitaine, he continued to do so in victory. In consideration of this assistance, Clovis called a national council at Orleans in 511, the year of his death. The Aquitanian episcopacy figured largely in the affairs of this council, and one from their number, Bishop Cyprian of Bordeaux, presided over the meeting of thirty-two bishops. The purpose of the council was to clarify the essential points which governed the relationship between the Church and the king. The fruit of its work rested in thirty-one canons which were adopted and sent to Clovis for his approval.²⁹ The council expressed much respect for the rights of individuals and mirrored the influence of the Frankish leader who suggested topics for discussion.

In particular, the council dealt with such matters as the treatment of guilty persons who sought refuge in the Church.³⁰ Also of note was the division of offerings to the Church between the bishop and his clergy.³¹ Of special interest to Aquitanians, the tenth canon provided for the treatment of

l'avait parfaitement compris de la sorte et l'on s'étonne que des études plus récentes aient continué à se gausser de l'évêque de Tours faisant de Clovis un empereur."

²⁹Concilium Aurelianense, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum, Sectio III, Concilia, ed. F. Maasen, I (Hannover, 1893), pp. 1-14.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 2-3.

³¹Ibid., p. 6.

heretical clerics who remained with the Goths and desired conformity to orthodoxy.³² In addition, the bishops limited their own authority (canon 8) in the ordination of slaves. The council prohibited this act without the master's expressed consent.³³

The work of the council represented an affirmation of the close ties between Church and state at that point in Frankish history. The adulatory remarks of the council directed to Clovis, "the most renowned son of the Catholic Church," exemplified this. Furthermore, this cooperation, as well as Clovis' conquests, demonstrated what potential existed for the advancement of both when they coordinated their efforts.

At the death of Clovis in 511, the history of Aquitaine acquired new dimensions. The geographical holdings that Clovis had assembled passed on to his heirs in shares divided as nearly equally as possible. The regnum Francorum thus had four kings instead of one, and in a sense the 511 settlement gave

³²Ibid., p. 5. Carlo de Clercq (La Législation Religieuse Franque de Clovis a Charlemagne [Paris, 1936], p. 13) notes that this council took a patronizing view of the Arian clerics of the old Visigothic realm in southern Gaul. Simultaneously, the council failed to deliver an attack against paganism, which had troubled northern Gaul for a long time. Hence, de Clercq observes: "Ces deux dernières conclusions s'expliquent sans doute par le fait que les évêques des anciens territoires wisigothiques étaient venus très nombreux au concile, alors que les évêques du Nord s'y trouvaient en petit nombre."

³³Ibid.

Frankish-Merovingian history some degree of continuity down to 561 when another such agreement revamped Gaul. Clovis' sons, Theodoric (Thierry), Clodomir, Childebert, and Clotaire, divided the kingdom, and Clotaire and Theodoric both received the bulk of southern Gaul. Clotaire inherited roughly the western half (including Toulouse) and Theodoric the eastern. Although the Franks managed to secure Aquitaine from the Visigoths in the sixth century, they nonetheless lacked the ability to partition the area in the manner of those lands to the north which Clovis had held more firmly.³⁴ Hence, Merovingian power in the area existed on a qualified basis.

For an account of the events following the 511 distribution, one must depend upon the history of the Bishop of Tours, who chronicled the incessant fratricidal fighting of the Merovingians in the sixth century. He reflected the values of his times, the power of the episcopacy, and most of all, the changing character of a Gaul governed by the Franks.³⁵ Gregory

³⁴Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings, p. 186.

³⁵O. M. Dalton (The History of the Franks by Gregory of Tours [2 vols.; Oxford, 1927], I, pp. 3-44) discusses Gregory as a man, a writer, and an authority. He also surveys the existing manuscripts and editions of the Historiae Francorum. For an interesting evaluation of him as an historian and how his work compares with that of his immediate successors, see Siegmund Hellmann, "Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geschichtschreibung: Gregor von Tours," Historische Zeitschrift, CVII (1911), 1-43. In part, Hellmann notes (pp. 21-22): "So wenig wie der kunstlose, ist Gregor der treuherzige und naive Barbar, als den man ihn am Ursprung der mittelalterlichen Geschichtschreibung stehen lässt. Dass dieser

projected in his writing the importance of cities in southern Gaul as opposed to the significance of provinces or nations. In this respect, the influence of the Roman domination of Gaul made itself felt.³⁶ Indeed, of those cities in Gaul the largest ones, as in the days of the Roman Empire, were located south of the Loire.³⁷ The immediate future held dim prospects for the city, however. Just as the economic order of Merovingian Gaul found its basis on agricultural foundations, likewise the coming feudalism gave decreasing importance to the city as an institution.

In Aquitaine, the distribution of the realm among the sons of Clovis³⁸ resulted in an era of political instability. Several factors contributed to the intensity and longevity of

,Herodot des Mittelalters' nicht ganz so objektiv ist, wie es scheinen will, hat die Kritik wohl von jeher bemerkt. . . . Wer mit solchem Temperament Sätze hervorsprudelt, die, scheinbar wirr, sich doch zu einem dunklen Gesamtbild zusammenfügen, wie Gregor bei der Charakteristik Chilperichs), besitzt Leidenschaft."

³⁶André Berthelot, Histoire Générale, I, 131: "La Bourgogne, le pays des Saliens, celui des Ripuaires et de l'Est, étaient devenues des individualités historiques caractérisées; le reste, non. Quatre cents ans de domination romaine y avaient effacé tout caractère national politique."

³⁷Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, trans. Frank D. Halsey (Garden City, New York, 1956), pp. 9, 12.

³⁸Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iii, 1, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 97: "Defuncto igitur Chlodovecho regi, quattuor filii eius, id est Theudoricus, Chlodomeris, Childeberthus atque Chlothacharius, regnum eius accipiunt et inter se aequa lantia dividunt."

this situation. Basically, however, the core of the post-511 problem in Aquitaine related to the attitude of Clovis' heirs toward their new possessions in southern Gaul. They all established their capitals north of the Loire River in that part of the Frankish realm which seemed most comfortable to them. Theodoric chose Rheims; Clodomir, Orleans; Childebert, Paris; and Clotaire, Soissons. Consequently, Aquitaine acquired the status of a militarily occupied zone from which the brothers appropriated as many spoils as possible.³⁹ Not only did this area interest the Merovingian kings in a military context, it attracted them as well for its agricultural production. The rich countryside could supply them with choice produce, such as grapes for wine, and could, therefore, complement their holdings to the north.⁴⁰ As the Frankish social structure tended more and more in the direction of feudalism, and given the absence of the Visigoths and the northward orientation of the

³⁹M. Prou, La Gaule Mérovingienne (Paris, n.d.), p. 29: "L'Aquitaine, récemment annexée, était considérée comme un territoire occupé militairement d'où il s'agissait de tirer le plus de richesses possible."

⁴⁰Jules Tardif (Études sur les Institutions Politiques et Administratives de la France, Vol. I: Période Mérovingienne [3 vols.; Paris, 1881], pp. 24-25) comments on this specific interest of Clovis' successors in Aquitaine: "Les contrées situées au delà de la Loire furent divisées en autant de parts que le reste du royaume. Le pays étant riche en productions particulières et recherchées, surtout en vin, chacun des héritiers voulut, à ce qu'il semble, avoir sa part de la terre meridionale, comme complément de ses domaines du Nord."

Merovingians, political conditions in Aquitaine allowed the local aristocracy to develop its own power. Without question, this last influence had greater impact on subsequent events than any other factor in the late sixth century.

Another recurrent theme in sixth century Aquitanian history that contributed to political instability was the tendency of the Frankish kings to try to despoil their brothers of their rightful share of the kingdom. Initially, however, the continual partitioning of the kingdom (still considered basically a whole as the regnum Francorum) from generation to generation disastrously weakened the power of the Merovingian dynasty. In addition, the brothers remained dissatisfied with their shares and in turn either concentrated their attentions in depriving each other of their portions or in wresting shares from their nephews when a death occurred in the family.⁴¹ Nothing undercut the power of the Merovingians more than this incessant activity.⁴² The natural wealth of Aquitaine aroused

⁴¹Nothing illustrates this generalization better than the events following the death of Clodomir in 524. Clodomir's portion of the kingdom encompassed all of northern Aquitaine and, upon his death, both Childebert and Clotaire desired to share his portion equally between themselves. Since their widowed mother, Clotilda, still lived and showed special attention to Clodomir's three sons, this too, necessitated, to their way of thinking, the execution or tonsure of his heirs. Consequently, they killed two of the boys, one ten years old and the other seven, while the third escaped and voluntarily became a cleric. See Gregory of Tours (iii. 18).

⁴²Almost all commentaries on Merovingian history, whether or not in reference to Aquitaine, mention this as the foremost divisive element in sixth century Gaul. M. Prou

Merovingian interests in this context. Because of its lucrative natural wealth, it became a pawn in family machinations.

The deaths of Clodomir in 524 and Theodoric in 534 signaled the beginning of these customary upheavals. As the two surviving brothers struggled for ascendancy after 534, southern Gaul experienced arbitrary taxation and systematic pillaging.⁴³ A notable case in point was the attempt by Clotaire to tax excessively the Church in his part of the kingdom around the year 545. Since he held most of western Aquitaine within his realm, the larger municipal areas experienced the effects of his decision. It must be conceded, however, that perpetual Frankish interest in Church wealth stimulated the clergy to adopt a protectionist attitude. When

(*La Gaule Mérovingienne*, p. 31), for one, neatly summarizes the whole problem: "--Rien ne contribua plus à l'affaiblissement du pouvoir des Mérovingiens que cette coutume des partages. Ce fut une source de guerres civiles. Il était rare qu'un prince se contentât du lot que le sort lui avait assigné, outre qu'à chaque fois qu'un roi mourait, ses frères cherchaient à s'emparer de son royaume au détriment de leurs neveux."

⁴³Ludovic Drapeyron, "Essai sur le Caractère de la Lutte de l'Aquitaine et de l'Austrasie sous les Mérovingiens et les Carolingiens," *Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, CIV (1875), 812-813: "La Gaule méridionale était mise hors la loi. Impôts arbitraires et pillages systématiques: tel était le régime qui pesait sur elle. Partagée entre quatre rois (511 et 561), qui ne cessaient de se jalouser et de se combattre, elle souffrait cruellement." Drapeyron enlarged his study of this question by publishing two further articles in the same periodical. These successively appeared in volumes 105 and 106 in the following year (1876). Also, the three articles were brought together into book form in 1877 and published under the identical title by Thorin of Paris.

the Merovingians challenged the security of their possessions, literate churchmen reacted strongly in a manner that bordered on hysteria. In this instance, Clotaire demanded that all the Churches in his kingdom pay a third of their revenues into his treasury.⁴⁴ After all but one of the involved bishops agreed, one, Injuriosus of Tours, scorned and eventually shamed the king into rescinding the action.⁴⁵ Thus, a resolute bishop saved the Aquitanian Church considerable expense and helped all the inhabitants of the area. Southern Gaul did not always experience such a favorable outcome in her conflicts with the Merovingians.

Shortly before the death of Theodoric, the people of Auvergne received a false report of his death in a battle in Thuringia. The Aquitanians, seeking a more equalitarian rule than that which they had formerly experienced, appealed to Childebert to take them into his governmental household. He responded favorably and thus brought down Theodoric's wrath upon the Auvergnians when he returned very much alive. According to the Bishop of Tours, the king assuaged his grievance by pillaging and laying waste the whole region.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiae Francorum*, iv, 2, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 136: "Denique Chlothacharius rex indixerat, ut omnes ecclesiae regni sui tertiam partem fructuum fisco dissolverent."

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., iii, 12, p. 108: "Theudoricus vero cum exercitu Arverno veniens, totam regionem devastat ac proterit."

Even though the Aquitanians revolted on many occasions against the Merovingians, their protests cannot be termed "national insurrections."⁴⁷ In fact, one should not speak at all of a national movement throughout this whole era, even though separatism created the illusion of one. More specifically, in this proto-feudal society, the local aristocracy moved in a centrifugal context that has often been confused with non-feudal nationalism.

Often the Aquitanians suffered, not through any of their own misdeeds, but simply through circumstance and aristocratic folly. The exploits of the Merovingian prince, Chramn, are a case in point. Chramn's ambitions and impatience got the better of him, and he desired to usurp the prerogatives of his father, Clotaire. He excited a rebellion in Auvergne, a center of Frankish discontent, and it eventually spread to a number of provinces beyond the Loire River. The Bishop of Tours denounced the character of Chramn and remarked that

⁴⁷C. Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine (Paris, 1881), p. 14: "Ce n'étaient pas des insurrections nationales, au sens propre du mot; nous ne voyons nulle part que les Gallo-Romains du midi eussent de l'aversion pour les Francs, en tant que Francs. Mais ils trouvaient leur gouvernement détestable et, dans des accès de désespoir, essayaient de s'y soustraire (émeute de Limoges, 580)." Perroud's careful delineation between Gallo-Romans and Franks demonstrates the overconcern of many nineteenth century historians in ethnology rather than the actual workings of feudal institutions.

the people reviled him.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, he secured a following in Auvergne as well as in the Breton peninsula.⁴⁹ Chramn also journeyed to Poitiers and entered into an agreement with his only surviving uncle, King Childebert, and thereupon assumed authority over part of his father's kingdom.⁵⁰ Defeat followed in 560. Clotaire, after capturing his son, executed him--an act for which he later felt remorse. Aquitaine, however, again suffered. Gregory of Tours, possibly speaking allegorically, noted that two hosts of locusts passed through Auvergne and Limousin prior to a battle on the plain of Romagnac (near Clermont) in which great destruction occurred. Owing to the

⁴⁸Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiae Francorum*, iv, 13, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 144: "Chramnus vero his diebus apud Arvernus resedebat. Multae enim causae tunc per eum inrationabiliter gerebantur, et ob hoc acceleratus est de mundo; multum enim maledicebatur a populo. Nullum autem hominem diligebat, a quo consilium bonum utilemque possit accipere, nisi collectis vilibus personis aetate iuvene fluctuantibus, eosdem tantummodo diligebat, eorumque consilium audiens, ita ut filias senatorum, datis praeceptionibus, eisdem vi detrahi iuberet."

⁴⁹J. Loth (*L'Émigration Bretonne en Armorique, du Ve au VIIe Siècle de notre Ère* [Rennes, 1883], pp. 177, 200) discusses the military and political situation in Brittany in the context of Chramn's rebellion. In Brittany, Chramn depended upon the services of Chonoover, Count of the Bretons, to whom Gregory of Tours refers (iv, 20). This count advised Chramn to allow him to lodge a night attack on Clotaire but the latter forbade this. During the battle on the following day, Chonoover fled and lost his life in the process.

⁵⁰Gregorius Turonensis, *Historiae Francorum*, iv, 16, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 147-150. When Chramn needed the material assistance of King Childebert, he could not obtain it. His uncle had fallen ill and died at Paris in 558 before the issue was decided in battle in Brittany.

widespread disorder, the city of Tours had been consumed by fire the preceding year, he wrote, and many churches in it were left desolate.

The grandsons of Clovis,⁵¹ who divided the regnum Francorum again in 561 as their fathers had done in 511, maintained all their seats of government north of the Loire River. As in the 511 settlement, the Frankish kings still gravitated to the north, considering Aquitaine a dependent state subsidiary to their principal interests. In the south, Gothic affairs continued to affect the society of Gaul, even though these people had retreated into Spain following Vouillé. At the time of Clovis' death, it appears that the two people had failed to establish clearly a boundary line between their respective possessions.⁵² Moreover, shortly after 511, the

⁵¹Only the sons of Clotaire survived to divide the kingdom in 561. In this distribution, Charibert, Gunthram, Chilperic, and Sigibert respectively took the following cities as their capitals: Paris, Orleans, Soissons, and Rheims. See Gregory of Tours, iv, 22. As in the earlier division, the heirs squabbled incessantly over each others' portion of the kingdom. Upon the death of the first of the brothers, Charibert, in 561, a new round of conflicts began. An historian of Poitiers (Marcel Garaud, "Note sur la Cité de Poitiers a l'Époque Mérovingienne" in Histoire du Moyen Âge dédiés a Memoire Louis Halphen [Paris, 1951], p. 275) during the Merovingian age discusses the import of these rivalries in northwestern Aquitaine: "Après la disparition de Charibert, son souverain, en 567, Poitiers devint un enjeu de la rivalité des rois qui se disputaient le territoire de la Gaule."

⁵²Ewig, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, IX, 661: "Dafür gibt es nur eine Erklärung: Aquitanien konnte in seiner Gesamtheit 511 noch nicht als gesicherter fränkischer Besitz angesehen werden, weil die endgültigen Grenzen zwischen Franken und Goten noch nicht feststanden."

Goths made headway in reducing the size of the territorial holdings that Clovis had won.⁵³

If religious strife first brought the Franks into conflict with the Goths, as many historians contend, it had no such influence during the rest of the century. It is true that hostilities occurred from time to time, but the casus belli was not religious.⁵⁴ Family loyalty counted in a primary sense as a motivating factor. On several occasions in the sixth century, the Merovingians intermarried with Visigothic royalty. Quite often these unions came to a sad end which resulted in war. Such was the case in 531 and 585 when the two powers came to blows over a familial tie. In 531, King Childebert invaded Spain in order to avenge the ill-treatment that the Visigothic king, Amalaric, had meted out to his sister, Clotilda.⁵⁵ Success followed the Frankish effort momentarily, but upon the defeat and death of Amalaric later that same year, the Goths found a leader equal to the

⁵³Ibid.: "Dass die Goten gleich nach dem Tode Chlodwigs einige Civitates der Grenzzone zurückeroberten, ist allgemein bekannt."

⁵⁴Thompson (Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, IV, 15) discusses the conversion of the Visigoths to Catholicism which occurred late in the sixth century. He specifies: ". . . no one expected at any time, so far as we know, that the Franks would invade Spain from religious motives."

⁵⁵Gregorius Turonensis, Historiae Francorum, iii, 10, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 106: "Quod certissime Childeberthus cognoscens, ab Arverno rediit et Hispaniam propter sororem suam Chlotchildem dirigit."

task of ejecting the Franks from their territory. King Theudis accomplished this, and according to Isidore of Seville, the Franks finally escaped Spain, which they had penetrated as far as the province of Aragon, by judiciously bribing their enemy.⁵⁶

Later in the same century, Visigothic abuse of a Frankish princess by the name of Ingundis resulted in further attempts by a Merovingian king to invade Gothic territory. Ingundis married a Visigothic prince and because of a civil war in Spain, she came to a pitiful end.⁵⁷ The Franks under King Guntram, taking offense at this, advanced toward Spain in 585, intending to cross the Pyrennes, but they accomplished nothing. A peasant rebellion in southern Gaul diverted the king's attention. The net result of this uprising was widespread destruction in Aquitaine. Principally, the men of the cities of Bourges, Saintes, Périgueux, and Angoulême took part in the onslaught which initially had been meant for the

⁵⁶Isidorus, Historia Gothorum, 41, P.L., p. 284: "dux idem prece atque ingenti pecunia sibi oblata viam fugae hostibus residuis unius diei noctisque spatio praebuit: cetera infelicium turba, cui transitus conlati temporis non occurrit, Gothorum perempta gladio concidit."

⁵⁷Her husband Hermenegild met defeat in war prior to his imprisonment and execution at the hands of his father Leovigild. Ingundis escaped Spain through the help of the "Greeks" (emissaries of the eastern emperor) and died at Carthage en route to Constantinople.

Visigoths.⁵⁸ The following year (586) the Goths sent envoys to King Guntram to sue for peace but received evasive answers. They responded by invading Septimania, but with little success.⁵⁹

How did Frankish-Gothic fighting throughout the sixth century affect Aquitaine? A French historian believes that the Merovingian effort there always came at the expense of Aquitaine.⁶⁰ The 585 episode certainly substantiates that view. Furthermore, on many other occasions the Franks displayed little sensitivity to Aquitaine or its problems.

⁵⁸Visigothic territory around Nîmes in Septimania particularly suffered, as did Toulouse, from the Frankish attack but so did Aquitaine. Gregory of Tours (Historiae Francorum, viii, 30, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 394) writes: "Tunc, accepto consilio, unusquisque ad propria est regressus. Tantaque per viam scelera, homicidia, praedas, direptiones per regionem propriam gesserunt, ut ea usquequaque memorare perlongum sit." Furthermore, the bishop concludes his account of the rebellion by observing that five thousand perished in these disasters. Also, not even churches were exempt from despoliation. The rebels killed bishops as well as other clergy and stripped the churches of their movable wealth. For example, the churches of Auvergne lost all their plate to thievery. What accounted for the uprising? According to Gregory (Ibid.) the leaders of the rebellious army reported to King Guntram afterward that the whole people had fallen into corruption and all took joy in doing iniquity. Beyond this, he advances no other explanation.

⁵⁹Ibid., viii, 38, p. 405: "Richaredus autem, filius Leuvichilde, usque Narbonam venit et infra terminum Galliarum praedas egit et clam regressus est."

⁶⁰Drapeyron, Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CIV, 813: "Les guerres entreprises contre les Goths se faisaient aux frais de l'Aquitaine."

According to Gregory of Tours, they usually reacted in a heavy-handed fashion that must have offended more often than not. To reach Spain the Franks necessarily had to move across Aquitaine. Hence, southern Gaul became a pawn in north-south relations, both militarily and religiously. In light of this phase of Aquitanian history, it appears that the Merovingians conceived southern Gaul to be little more than a buffer state. It would cushion Gothic aggression and serve as a source of revenue through produce and plunder. In the years immediately ahead (early seventh century), Aquitaine would also serve as a source of land for Merovingians to parcel out to reward loyal nobles. This activity added a new dimension to the importance of the area, fostering both the spread of feudalism and a Francicized population.

As the sixth century progressed, the Franks began to divide their realm into three major areas, each of which encompassed several provincial areas. The Franks first called two of these territories by the characteristic names of Austrasia and Neustria. Scholarship has determined that Austrasia was created before Neustria. Later still, the Franks added, by conquest, a third division under the designation of Burgundia.⁶¹ In 534, the heirs of Clovis successfully completed

⁶¹Ewig, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, IX, 693-694: "Ein seltsames Geschick hat es gefügt, dass die fränkischen Teilreiche sowohl nach 511 wie nach 561 durch den Tod eines der Könige von vier auf drei reduziert wurden. Ein

their assault against Burgundy and thereby won her over not only to the Frankish state but to the fold of Orthodox Catholicism as well.

Although these divisions within the realm figure largely in the politics of Gaul in the last half of the sixth century, the respective boundaries of territories were extremely fluid. The complicated political setting in the Merovingian state in regard to succession further clouds any analysis that contains permanence. Aquitaine in particular had various masters and alternately found it (or parts of itself) attached to one territory or the other. In 584, in fact, Neustria, Austrasia, and Burgundia each had a part of Aquitaine within their holdings.⁶² Thereafter, although Gaul was split through the efforts of Brunhild (the Queen Mother) to spread her influence,⁶³ only Austrasia and Burgundia had control periodically over Aquitaine. In 613, however, Clotaire II cruelly

Zeichen für die Festigung der drei Teilreiche ist das Auftreten der drei für das 7. und 8. Jh. charakteristischen Ländernamen Austrasien, Neustrien und Burgund. Steinbach hat darauf hingewiesen, dass die Bezeichnung Austria-Austrasii früher begegnet als der Name Neustria-Neustrasii. Wir fügen hinzu, dass auch die Bezeichnung Burgund für das fränkische Teilreich Orléans jüngeren Datums ist."

⁶²Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 24: "En 584, les trois royaumes francs: Neustrie, Austrasie, Burgondie, avaient chacun une part de l'Aquitaine."

⁶³The efforts of her opponents, who eventually succeeded in toppling her from power, were equally divisive.

executed Brunhild and once again Gaul, rather uncertainly, owed its allegiance to one man.⁶⁴

Upon Clotaire II's assumption of power, Burgundia alone came to acquire the bulk of Aquitaine as the spoils of the victor in the civil wars that had ravaged the regnum Francorum for the last twenty-five years.⁶⁵ Neustria continued to be denied its old possessions south of the Loire River, just as Austrasia now unsuccessfully laid claim to its former provinces in the same area.⁶⁶ As for the latter, it considered refusals for Aquitanian territory particularly distressing. The Austrasian nobility had immense domains in Aquitaine, and they habitually pursued a policy of matrimonial alliances which made Aquitaine increasingly important to them. One scholar, who has given this issue considerable attention, takes note of these particular alliances on the basis of extensive

⁶⁴François Chamard ("L'Aquitaine sous les Derniers Mérovingiens, aux VIIe et VIIIe siècles," Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV [1884], 5-9) discusses the complicated web of Merovingian intrigue and partitioning as it concerns Aquitaine from the Treaty of Andelot in 587 to the accession of Clotaire II.

⁶⁵Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 25: "La réponse ne saurait être douteuse: l'Aquitaine fut annexée au royaume vainqueur, à la Burgondie, et soumise à l'administration burgonde."

⁶⁶Ibid.: "Clotaire II, ... , paraît n'avoir rien changé aux limites et à l'organisation des trois royaumes; on ne voit nulle part qu'il ait rien rendu à la Neustrie de ses anciennes possessions au sud de la Loire; quant à l'Austrasie, il lui dénia constamment les provinces méridionales qu'elle aurait pu revendiquer,"

research into hagiology. Through this means, he has discerned eleven such aristocratic unions contracted during the seventh century.⁶⁷ Carrying the matter of Austrasian possessions in Aquitaine a step further, a logical question arises as to whether or not the Franks ever maintained lands there in the royal fisc. To the Franks, the fisc possessed a two-fold purpose for existing: (1) the kings lived to a great extent from the produce from these royal domains, and (2) a fiscus also had its uses in keeping certain districts under control.⁶⁸ Those regions in the northwest of France provided the later-day Franks with a majority of their royal domains; and generally speaking, the border kingdoms and duchies had few (with the exception of Bavaria). Aquitaine supplied the

⁶⁷Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 9: "Ce refus fut particulièrement pénible aux chefs austrasiens qui, en réclamant l'autonomie administrative pour l'Austrasie, avaient espéré que cette faveur s'étendrait à tout le territoire de l'ancien royaume de ce nom. Les intérêts politiques n'étaient pas seuls en jeu dans cette revendication. Les plus illustres familles austrasiennes possédaient d'immenses domaines en Aquitaine, grâce surtout aux alliances matrimoniales qu'ils aimaient à y contracter." Chamard takes note of the fact that even St. Itta, the wife of Pepin of Landen, was from Aquitaine.

⁶⁸Two books of F. L. Ganshof contain excellent discussions of the significance of the royal fisc in Frankish history. See his Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne (trans. Bryce and Mary Lyon [Providence, R.I., 1968], pp. 34-37) and The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy (trans. Janet Sondheimer [Ithaca, N.Y., 1971], pp. 96-97, 131, 296). For the best, most comprehensive discussion of the topic during Carolingian times, consult Wolfgang Metz, Das Karolingische Reichsgut (Berlin, 1960).

Frankish state with only a very limited number of these domains, even at the height of Carolingian fortunes,⁶⁹ and possibly none in the seventh century. This seems odd in light of Aquitaine's natural resources, but then again, it substantiates the fact that to a considerable degree Frankish kings were disinterested in the area, particularly because of its troublesomeness, and when Aquitaine did spark the monarch's interest, it arose in consideration of rewarding either the Church or the nobility for faithful service.

Before many years passed, the fortunes of Clotaire II waned. In 622, he was forced to elevate his son, Dagobert, to the position of king of Austrasia. Later yet, in 625, Clotaire returned to Austrasia most of its old frontiers, taking care, however, to retain both Aquitaine and Provence under his own administration.⁷⁰ While Clotaire maintained himself

⁶⁹Thegani Vita Hludowici Imperatoris, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, II (Hannover, 1829), pp. 610-611 mentions the existence of four of these domains in Aquitaine at the end of the eighth century: "Nam ordinavit qualiter in quatuor locis hiberna transigeret, ut tribus annis exactis, quarto demum anno hiematurum se quisque eorum susciperet locus, Theotvadum scilicet palatium, Cassinogilum, Andiacum et Eurogilum." For an interesting monographical discussion concerning the most famous of these, Cassinogilum, first referred to in Carolingian annals in 778, see Camille Jullian, "Le Palais Carolingien de Cassinogilum," Études d'Histoire du Moyen Age dédiées a Gabriel Monod (Paris, 1896), 89-94.

⁷⁰Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 53, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch, II (Hannover, 1888), p. 147:

in power for several more years, the guarded position of Burgundia allowed it to become the most prosperous and powerful of the Frankish territories.

The northern part of the kingdom still retained some of its former influence in Aquitaine. It did so through substantial episcopal holdings south of the Loire River. A noteworthy example of this is the case of the church of Rheims which had possessions in Marseille, Rennes, Gevaudan, Auvergne, Limousin, Poitou, and Touraine.⁷¹ If one seeks a similar situation, in which churches of the south owned property north of the Loire, he would do so in vain.⁷² In brief, Aquitaine experienced a partitioning between the bishops of Neustria and of Austrasia in the seventh century.⁷³

"Reddensque ei soledatum quod aspexerat ad regnum Austrasiorum, hoc tantum exinde, quod citra Legere vel Provinciae partibus situm erat, suae dicione retenuit."

⁷¹Flodoard, Historiae Ecclesiae Remensis Libri Quatuor, ii, 9, Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, CXXXV (Paris, 1879), p. 114: "... omnes ipsius sanctae Dei ecclesiae res, tam in Campania, et infra urbem, vel suburbanis, quam in Austrasia, seu Neustria, vel Burgundia, seu partibus Massiliae, in Rodonico, etiam, Gavalitano, Arvernico, Turonico, Pictavico, Lemovicino,"

⁷²Drapeyron, Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CV, 262: "... il faudrait montrer que les évêchés de Marseille, de Toulouse avaient eux-mêmes des domaines et des rentes en Bourgogne, en Austrasie et en Neustrie. Nous en trouvons rien de semblable."

⁷³Ibid., 260: Le VIIe siècle vit une chose plus extraordinaire et qu'on n'a pas encore signalée, le partage de l'Aquitaine entre les évêques de la Neustrie et de l'Austrasie. Citons quelques exemples."

The involvement of the Frankish episcopacy in Aquitaine, and indeed the expansion of its holdings, was of considerable importance. The mere mechanics of administering this property meant the influx of a corps of Frankish officials. The immunities that ecclesiastical wealth enjoyed precluded the participation of local officers in Church affairs. Hence, the Austrasian episcopacy could delegate their own tax collectors and special judges to serve their needs in Aquitaine regardless of the desires of the local populace.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the Merovingian monarchy came gradually to have an influence in episcopal elections and, indeed, even to confer the office themselves. Consequently, after the death of Dagobert, the Frankish Church fell into profound decadence, to the extent that eventually many bishops and abbots, appointees and favorites of the Merovingians, wore martial instead of clerical vestments.⁷⁵ Church property dissipated at an alarming rate, in

⁷⁴Ibid., 263: ". . . les juges et les percepteurs ordinaires n'avaient sur eux aucune autorité (1); les églises du Nord déléguaient des percepteurs et des juges spéciaux. C'est ce qu'on appelait «la juridiction des églises franques (2).»

⁷⁵For a concise, yet excellent, discussion of this topic see Christian Pfister, "Gaul under the Merovingian Franks: Institutions," Cambridge Medieval History, II, v, 142-146. Concerning the practicalities of Merovingian lay investiture, Jules Tardif (Études sur les Institutions Politiques et Administratives de la France, I, p. 139) has summarized rather well its ramifications: "En conférant l'épiscopat à leurs serviteurs et à leurs favoris, les rois trouvaient un moyen de les récompenser et de nommer des évêques dévoués à leurs intérêts."

fact more extensively than ever before. It is therefore no surprise that an extension of Frankish influence in the Aquitanian Church took place and that a thoroughgoing Frankish penetration of the region came about, particularly through the ecclesiastical avenue. The proof of this resides in the fact that an increasing number of episcopal vacancies in Aquitaine fell to men of Germanic extraction.⁷⁶ This practice allowed the Frankish monarchy to spread its influence and its favors in Aquitaine in a convenient fashion. Thus, the stratum of the Frankish aristocracy in Aquitaine was expanded.

While the neighbors of Aquitaine to the north and the east persisted in exploiting the region for their own ends, a double-edged threat existed to the south. The Goths of Septimania and the Gascons of Novempopulana viewed southern Gaul as a bountiful spoil of which they could take advantage. The tumultuous politics which made Frankish Aquitaine more vulnerable further jeopardized its standing with both the Goths and the Gascons. Knowing this, Dagobert installed his brother Charibert in Aquitaine and gave him command of five

⁷⁶Consult the listing of the holders of these episcopal seats in Aquitaine throughout the seventh century in P. B. Gams, Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae (Graz, 1957), pp. 479-638. Herein a noticeable increase appears in the names of those bishops who have a Germanic "rt" ending to their names. This stands in contrast to the more peculiarly Roman names of the fifth and sixth centuries.

cantons.⁷⁷ Charibert obtained the cantons of Toulouse, Cahors, Agen, Périgueux, and Saintes.⁷⁸ He made Toulouse his capital and in effect, until his death in 632, he dominated a marche rather than a realm.⁷⁹ By sending Charibert

⁷⁷Much controversy surrounds this whole episode in Merovingian history (see below, fn. 79). Past treatment of Aquitaine by the Franks, as well as the family difficulties pertaining to ascendancy, both suggest that the Merovingians created a buffer zone in setting up Charibert in Aquitaine. Drapeyron (*Ibid.*, 264) correctly summarizes this by observing: "... Il commandait, en réalité, non à un royaume, mais à une marche franque."

⁷⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 57, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 149: "Cumque regnum Chlothariae tam Neptreco quam Burgundias ad Dagobertum fuisset preoccupatum, captis thinsauris et suae ditione redactis, tandem miserecordia mutus, consilio sapientibus usus, citra Legere et limitem Spaniae quod ponitur, partibus Wasconiae seu et montis Parenei pagus et civitates, quod fratri suo Cairiberto ad transagendum ad instar privato habeto cum vivendum potuisset sufficere, nuscetur concessisse: pagum Tholosanum, Cathorcinum, Agenninsem, Petrocorecum et Santonecum, vel quod ab his versus montis Pereneos excludetur. Hoc tantum Chairiberto regendum concessit, quod et per pactiones vinculum estrinxit, ut amplius Airibertus nullo tempore adversus Dagobertum de regno patris repetire presumerit. Airibertus sedem Tholosa aeliens, regnat in partem provinciae Aquetaniae."

⁷⁹Charibert's installation in Aquitaine has occasioned an interesting academic debate. Perroud (Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 33) sees in this event the founding of two distinct realms within the Aquitanian kingdom. Furthermore, he believes, although in this instance mistakenly, that Charibert's realm had been created prior to 628 through the good graces of his father Clotaire II (p. 28). Building on this supposition, Perroud devotes a whole chapter (pp. 33-40) to this subject which he entitles "Le Royaume de Toulouse (628-630)." For a refutation of this view, see the remarks of François Chamard in Revue des Questions Historique, XXXV, 10-11. Chamard points out that a more careful reading of Fredegar indicates that Dagobert was Charibert's benefactor and not the father.

into Aquitaine, Dagobert may have paved the way for the establishment of a ducal house. While this development lay in the very near future, the Gallo-Romans with Charibert became conditioned to a Frankish overlord close at hand, as opposed to the more distant Austrasian north of the Seine.

Later events proved the validity of Dagobert's fears of invasion through the Pyrenees. After the death of his brother Charibert, the Gascons took up arms and crossed over into the Frankish kingdom (presumably Aquitaine) and took much plunder.⁸⁰ Dagobert countered this by sending ten Frankish dukes, placed under the orders of the Referendarius Chadoinde, against the Gascons. The Franks were victorious, but lost the flower of their army under Duke Arimbertus.⁸¹

⁸⁰Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 78, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 159-160: "Anno quarto decimo regni Dagoberti, cum Wascones fortiter revellarent et multas predas in regno Francorum, quod Charibertus tenuerat, facerint, Dagobertus de universum regnum Burgundiae exercitum promoveri iubet, statuens eis caput exercitus nomeni Chadoin-dun referendarium, qui temporebus TheudERICI quondam regis multis praeliis probatur strenuos. Quod cum decem ducibus cum exercetibus, id est Arimbertus, Amalgarius, Leudebertus, Wandalmarus, Waldericus, Ermeno, Barontus, Chairaardus ex genere Francorum, Chramnelenus ex genere Romano, Willibadus patricius genere Burgundionum, Aigyna genere Saxsonum, exceptis comitebus plurimis, qui ducem super se non habebant, in Wasconia cum exercito perrixissent, et totam Wasconiae patriam ab exercito Burgundiae fuisset repleta, Wascones deinter moncium rupes agressi, ad bellum properant."

⁸¹Ibid., p. 160: "Feliciter haec exercitus absque ulla lesionem ad patriam fuerunt repedati, se Arnebertum ducem maxime cum seniores et nobiliores exercitus sui per negliencia a Wasconibus in valle Subola non fuisset interfectus."

Historians consider Dagobert (629-639) the best ruler of the Merovingian line after the victor of Vouillé. Although his morality left something to be desired, he interested himself in the arts, established abbeys, and promoted missionary works. Furthermore, he checked momentarily particularism in Merovingian politics and imposed a settlement in Aquitaine that ensured her integrity in the face of a threat from the south. Besides appointing a member of his own family to accomplish the former (something that Charles the Great duplicates in the eighth century by setting a member of his own family over the duchy), Dagobert's comparatively powerful military machine also helped to prevent the realization of the duchy's instinct to free itself of Merovingian control during the king's lifetime.⁸² As for the rest of his family, he sent his first son, Sigebert, to Austrasia to be reared (by Saint Chunibert, the Duke of Adalgisele and Bishop of Cologne) and to become the representative of Austrasian interests in Frankish statecraft. By another of the three wives which he simultaneously kept,⁸³ he had a son named Clovis in 634. Since this son's

⁸²The recent work by Bernard S. Bachrach (Merovingian Military Organization, 481-751 [Minneapolis, 1972], pp. 85, 108) substantiates the fact that Dagobert developed the Merovingian army to a greater degree than his predecessors.

⁸³Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 60, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 151: ". . . luxoriam super modum deditus, tres habebat maxime ad instar reginas et pluremas concupinas. Reginae vero haec fuerunt: Nantechildis, Vulfe-gundis et Berchildis. Nomina concubinarum, eo quod plures fuissent, increvit huius chronice inseri."

mother, Nantechildis, was Neustrian, she successfully pushed for a division of the realm, with her child quite logically receiving the land of her birth, as well as Burgundia, as his share of the kingdom.⁸⁴ Undoubtedly, this important decision, solemnized in an impressive convocation of all the nobility of the realm, shattered the early hopes of the Austrasians to enforce their predominance over the rest of the kingdom through Dagobert's initial selection of a single heir. Also, the fact that Dagobert had convened the nobility and exacted their signatures on a document to this effect gave permanence to the arrangement after his death in 639.⁸⁵

This settlement had important ramifications for Aquitaine. It was now attached, not to Burgundia, but to Austrasia, to which it had formerly been given by the treaty of Andelot.⁸⁶

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 159: "Cumque anno duodecimo regni Dagoberti eidem filius nomen Chlodoveos de Nanthilde regina natus fuisset, consilio Neustrasiorum eorumque admonicione per pactiones vinculum cum Sigybertum, filium suum, firmasse dinuscetur,"

⁸⁵Ibid.: ". . . et Austrasiorum omnes primati, pontevicis citirique leudis Sigyberti manus eorum ponentes insuper, sacramentis firmaverunt, ut Neptreco et Burgundia soledato ordine ad regnum Chlodoviae post Dagoberti discessum aspecerit; Aoster vero idemque ordine soledato, eo quod et de populo et de spacium terre esset quoequans, ad regnum Digyberti idemque in integretate deberit aspecere; et quicquid ad regnum Aostrasiorum iam olem pertenerat, hoc Sigybertus rex suae dicione rigendum recipere et perpetuo dominandum haberit, excepto docato Dentilini, quod ab Austrasius iniquiter abtultus fuerat, iterum ad Neustrasius subiungeretur et Chlodoveo regimine subgiceretur."

⁸⁶Gregory of Tours, Historiae Francorum, ix, 20, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 434-439.

By thus having its allegiance again involuntarily transferred, Aquitaine's ultimate loyalty to the Franks was weakened. Aquitaine struggled to obtain the status of an independent duchy, and, just as the Austrasian Mayors of the Palace were to slough off the shrouds of Merovingian scrutiny, so did Aquitaine succeed in coming of age politically.

The Austrasians utilized Aquitaine when conditions were favorable, but they maintained their principal interests in the north. The area proved convenient, but the Austrasian hierarchy at home lacked the power to become involved there, even if it was so inclined. Although a Frankish aristocratic element had migrated into Aquitaine through ecclesiastical channels and a series of well-chosen marriages, the exact degree of their infiltration cannot be ascertained. The degeneration of the Church after Dagobert coincided with the growth of the separatist instinct in Aquitaine. As the fortunes of the Church took a turn for the worse, the secular aristocracy in Gaul grew in stature and had far more power in administrative affairs of the kingdom than in the preceding century. All of this was emphasized by the fact that the Church failed to convene a council for eighty years in the late seventh and early eighth centuries. During this era, a continuation of feudal, local particularism occurred that paralleled the extension of the mayors' influence in Austrasia. If these same royal officials could subvert the political

power of the Merovingian king, what prevented the Frankish aristocracy settled in Aquitaine from emulating their feat on a lower level south of the Loire? Moreover, in the semi-feudal society that existed there, why should the transplanted Franks even offer their patronage to these mayors and their institutions when they so patently lacked legitimacy? The example of the Frankish prince Charibert suggested the direction of things to come for the province in the seventh century: he was an Austrasian aristocrat struggling to unify the bases of his power in a decentralized setting that depended upon agriculture to sustain itself against the threat of neighboring military pressure.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT AQUITANIAN DUCHY

During the course of the seventh century, Aquitaine strove to obtain its independence. It succeeded, but not in one bold stroke. Its fortunes vacillated to the extent that the province briefly experienced an era of freedom from outside involvement in domestic affairs from roughly 613 to 628;¹ then with the advent of Dagobert's ascendancy, the Merovingians checked its particularistic aspirations. After his death, the Aquitanian aristocrats resumed their efforts to create a duchy independent of outside control. To this end, they consciously proceeded in a piecemeal fashion to sever the links that bound the province to the Franks. It took much time after 638 to realize completely this objective. Indeed, between 638 and 718, the aristocrats detached the province bit by bit from the Frankish empire, so that by Carolingian times they had virtually won their independence.² Thus, the separa-

¹Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 9: "Durant les quinze ans qu'il vécut encore (613-628), nos provinces aquitaniques reconnurent sans conteste son autorité souveraine."

²Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 74: "... nous essaierons de surprendre le travail, tantôt

tist movement in Aquitaine fully realized its goal.

By what means, generally speaking, did the Aquitanians achieve their separatist ends after 638? The ties that bound the northern Austrasians and the Aquitanians together were quite flimsy. Indeed, the Frankish aristocracy that had migrated into the area utilized its holding of rich lands to expand and appropriate to itself the particularistic sentiment inherent in the socio-economic scene. In this sense the Frankish enclaves in the province assumed a leadership in Aquitanian affairs and derived benefit from the weakness of the Merovingian administrative system. Consequently, elevating one from their number with special perquisites, the Aquitanian aristocracy, led by the local Frankish Austrasian element, capitalized upon authority specifically delegated to them by Merovingian leadership to expand their own power. The Frankish aristocrats in the province began to drift away under their own guidance rather than consummating and building upon the foundations of the northern Austrasian power in the province. Moreover, in this semi-feudal, barbarized society, little more could actually have been expected of them.

The seventh century was an extremely significant period in Aquitaine's history, but from a literary point of view it

visible, tantôt à demi-caché ou même tout-à-fait mystérieux, qui, entre 638 et 718, a détaché l'Aquitaine de l'empire franc lambeau par lambeau;"

was an equally obscure one. Regrettably, there exists no colorful or informative text like that of Gregory of Tours, who wrote of the sixth century. Although the Chronicle of Fredegar supplies students of French history with a continuation of the History of the Franks, this dry narrative ends with a discussion of the events of 640.³ Thereafter, attempts were made to proceed with an historical compilation describing developments in the Frankish state, but these efforts were decidedly meager. The Liber Historiae Francorum, written at the abbey of St. Denis in 727, represented an effort in this category. For Aquitaine, however, formularies, hagiography, and annalistic sources provide a patchwork of information from which a reasonably cohesive and reliable account may be drawn.

By the end of Dagobert's reign, the Aquitanians had begun to rely more heavily upon the authority of their local dukes. At the death of Charibert in 632, Dagobert had allowed his brother's prerogatives in the province to descend into the hands of a powerful duke by the name of Barontus. This duke enjoyed great authority in Aquitaine and exercised all the important

³Robert Latouche (Caesar to Charlemagne: the Beginnings of France, trans. Jennifer Nicholson [New York, 1968], p. 307) has an informative discussion of seventh century historical documents. Of note is his observation concerning the chronicler popularly known as Fredegar. Writers of the sixteenth century misnamed him "Fredegar" and out of force of habit he continues to be so referred to. For further details on the topic, see the introductory remarks of Bruno Krusch in his edition of "Fredegar" in the M.G.H. series (pp. 16-18).

functions of a semi-independent ducal leader.⁴ His primary responsibility was to serve in a military role. Although the manner in which his special elevation came is unclear, he was born in Anjou to aristocratic parents (hence the landed class),⁵ enjoyed the favor of Dagobert, and received delegated authority from the Austrasians. Several items attest to the prestige of Barontus throughout these years. Fredegar mentioned his name among those ten Frankish dukes who were sent in 636 to punish the insolence of the Gascons.⁶ Not always did his actions stand in the good favor of Dagobert, however. When Charibert died, Dagobert joined his brother's realm with that of his own and entrusted Barontus with the task of guarding Charibert's treasury. Demonstrating his independent attitude in this capacity, Barontus made off with the fortune and betrayed the king's good faith.⁷ Most interesting is the fact that this occurred

⁴François Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 13-14) mentions that Barontus residence was at Poitiers, not at Toulouse as had been Charibert's. Also, his authority extended over the neighboring cities, including Cahors and Clermont.

⁵Ibid.

⁶See above, chapter two, fn. 80.

⁷Gesta Dagoberti I. Regis Francorum 25, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum, ed. B. Krusch, II (Hannover, 1888), p. 410: "Omneque regnum Hairberti una cum Wasconia Dagobertus rex protinus suae dicioni redegit. Ad adducendos quoque thesauros Hairberti et sibi praesentandos Barontum quendam ducem direxit. Barontus autem grave dispendium fecisse dinoscitur, infideliter una cum thesaurariis furtum faciens, nimiumque exinde fraudulenter subtraxit." The Chronicle of Fredegar (iv, 67) similarly tells of these events.

several years before Dagobert sent him on the Gascon expedition. Barontus exercised enough power to thwart Dagobert, and that was an indication of his strength. The separatist inclination in Aquitaine had considerable distance to go in order to reach maturity, but with Barontus, the province made much progress in that direction.

Not many years passed until the efforts of men like Barontus came to fruition. Aquitaine seemed to be moving in the direction of separatism, but conditions within the Frankish state as a whole had to be ripe before this became a reality. First, a decentralization of Merovingian authority had to arise. This occurred as a result of impotent kings. Second, the cities of southern Gaul experienced an isolation that stimulated their desire to achieve independence.⁸ By this time the political leverage of the Gallic city was lessened by slackening trade. After Dagobert, the aristocracy largely usurped the decision-making power which the urban bishop had formerly held. Thus, the locally oriented trend in Aquitanian politics was accompanied by a secularization, but still within the municipal context.

⁸Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 108: "Si l'ambition de fonder un État dans la Gaule meridionale dût naître quelque part, --au moment où l'impuissance des rois et surtout les progrès de la désorganisation administrative rendaient les cités du midi à cet isolement municipal que plusieurs avaient déjà connu au cours du Ve siècle,"

mountains.¹¹ Although of uncertain lineage, he had a feudal domain which stretched far enough south to encompass the Gascons. Felix appreciated the title "most noble patrician," and upon his death his succession went to the young Lupus, to whom ascendancy was granted, not by the Merovingian king, but by the favor of the regional aristocracy and by the support of some Burgundian exiles then in Aquitaine."¹²

As for the significance of Felix's title of "patrician," it bore a connotation virtually synonymous with that of "duke."¹³ In a more specific context, the title of "patrician" conveyed an honorific implication that was not necessarily associated with that of "duke." Conversely, the latter

¹¹Ex Miraculis S. Martialis, Episcopi Lemovicensis, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. O. Holder-Egger, XV, pars I (Hannover, 1887), p. 281: "Quodam tempore, cum Ebroinus comes palatii, maior domus Francorum regni, in aula regis adesset et omnes nequitias seu iniquitates, quae in universa terra fiebant, superbos et iniquos homines super eorum facinus viriliter subpremebat, et pax per omnem terram plena et perhacta adrisit. Tunc surrexit puer unus nomine Lupus, qui et auctor nominis sui adesse voluit, ad Felecem, nobilissimum et inclitum patricium ex urbe Tholosanensium, qui et principatum super omnes civitates usque montes Pireneos, super gentem nequissimam Wascorum obtinebat."

¹²Ibid.: "Eo defuncto, antedictum Luponem principem super se omnes statuerunt, et omnes vagi profugique ad eum adeserunt,"

¹³Formulae Merovingici et Karolini Aevi, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum, Sectio V, I, ed. K. Zeumer (Hannover, 1886), pp. 47-48: "Ergo dum et fidem et utilitatem tuam videmur habere conpertam, ideo tibi accionem comitiae, ducatus aut patriciatus in pago illo, quem antecessor tuos illi usquae nunc visus est egisse, tibi ad agendum regendumque commissemus,"

indicated military command.¹⁴ Even though Felix's power extended over a considerable area, the force of his command applied only to the city of Toulouse. Thus, he was commonly referred to as the "Duke of Toulouse" rather than as the "Duke of Aquitaine."

The brief, sporadic references to both Felix and Lupus leave many important questions unanswered. Particularly is this the case in light of their relationship to their fellow aristocrats. It appears most logical, however, to assume that their power stemmed from the holding of land; in the evolution of a titular position, they traced their power to a nucleus of one or more municipalities.

At what date does one read of an independent duke over all of Aquitaine and not the more narrow municipal duchy? This occurs with the ascension to power of Lupus. Genealogical tables of Aquitanian and Gascon dukes often begin by listing Lupus as the first of the line.¹⁵ Although Felix attracts noteworthy attention, he nonetheless does so as a transitional

¹⁴Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 16: "On a fait de Félix un duc de Toulouse. Cependant, le titre de patrice, bien que synonyme, en certain sens, de celui de duc, est le plus souvent simplement honorifique et n'exprime pas le commandement." Also see the remarks of F. L. Ganshof (Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, pp. 31-33) contrasting the authority and functions of the duke (dux) with that of the count (comes).

¹⁵Jean de Jaurgain, La Vasconie (2 vols.; Pau, 1902), II, pp. 1-2.

figure who marks an important stage in the progress of Aquitaine from a subject to an autonomous duchy.

For all purposes Aquitaine was an independent duchy during the lifetime of Felix. However, with the election of Lupus to an autonomous ducal position, a man with a Frankish background must surely have come to power in Aquitaine. In contrast to the case of Barontus and his Angevin origins, nothing is known about Lupus' birthplace. He had a Latin name, but the probability of a Gallo-Roman with the name of Wolf (i.e., Lupus) seems slight indeed. This name sounds far more Germanic and suggests that Lupus was an indigenous German who ascended to high office in the province.

Since the career of Ebroin spanned twenty-two years, at what point did Felix die and allow the duchy to pass on to Lupus? This question possesses merit for two reasons: (1) because of the significance of the first Aquitanian duke, per se, and (2) because of the date at which autonomy came to the area. The date of Felix's death roughly determines the answer to both questions. To resolve this matter, however, an oblique approach must be taken. A contemporary Spanish source indicates that by 673, the year in which Ebroin regained power after three years imprisonment, Lupus had acceded to the office of duke in Aquitaine.¹⁶ Hence, if Felix enjoyed power simultaneously with Ebroin, it must have been before 670 when the

¹⁶Julian of Toledo, Historis Rebellionis Pauli Adversus

latter was expelled from the mayoralty. Thus, Aquitaine acquired its independence before 670, most probably between the years 660-670.¹⁷ Furthermore, the province first asserted its autonomous prerogatives in the succeeding decade under Lupus.

As affairs in Aquitaine took a new direction in the 670's, so did the Frankish kingdom to the north undergo a transformation. This decade marked the termination of the decisive struggle for mastery in the Frankish state between Ebroin and Leodegar, the Bishop of Autun. Ebroin emerged the winner but found that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Of the three subdivisions within the regnum Francorum, he kept command of two, Burgundy and Neustria, while a new rival, Pepin, arose in the third area, Austrasia, which stubbornly resisted his will to rule. Ebroin eventually executed Leodegar, whom he had held in captivity, and, in consequence, a reaction set in that resulted in the bishop's canonization.

Wambam Gothorum Regem, 27, Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, XCVI (Paris, 1862), p. 793. On occasion, the book, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, by Cl. Perroud has to be used with care. He advances the notion (p. 127) that Lupus existed as only one from a number of dukes of southern Gaul. This interpretation stems from a misreading of Julian of Toledo who writes (p. 793): "unum e ducibus Franciae nomine Lupum." This analysis of Perroud conveniently squares with his mistaken belief that Eudes and not Lupus first held the title of "Duke of Aquitaine." For further comment on this topic see: Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, p. 24.

¹⁷Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, pp. 110: "... nous ne croyons pas errer en plagant entre 660 et 670 l'apparition du nouvel État."

In 681, Ebroin met his death at the hands of an assassin. After the death of the mayor, the political affairs of Francia continued to remain askew. While this promoted even further the development of an independent Aquitanian duchy, the former competitor of Ebroin, Pepin (II), managed to consolidate his authority by defeating his current rival, the Mayor Berthar of Neustria, in the battle of Tertry in 687. These seventeen years (670-687) of civil disorder in Francia were undoubtedly of great benefit to Aquitaine. A preoccupied Francia could not look beyond her own internal problems to extend her wavering influence abroad. In fact, a veritable revolution within the regnum Francorum raged throughout these years; furthermore, Pepin's victory in 687 did not immediately bring peace. A contemporary annalist depicted the internal strife in Francia, and the new order of things politically as well, in his entry of 688. The "lazy" Merovingian king and domestic dissension were both credited with the responsibility for the chaotic plight of the Frankish state.¹⁸ But beyond this, the ties of dependency

¹⁸Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 688, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum, X, ed. B. de Simson (Hannover, 1905), pp. 4-5: "Hae enim gentes olim et aliae plurimae multis sudoribus adquisitae Francorum summo obtemperabant imperio. Sed propter desidiam regum et domesticas dissensiones et bella civilia, quae in multas partes divisi regni ingruerant, legitimam dominationem deserentes, singuli in proprio solo armis libertatem moliebantur defendere." In this instance, Heinrich Bonnell (Die Anfänge des karolingischen Hauses ["Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte"; Berlin, 1866], p. 129) evaluates the Annales Mettenses: "Die A. M. [Annales

that the Merovingians had built up in Aquitaine must have rested upon personal bases. Granting that this was the case, then how firm could the connection have been between the new mayors and the provincial aristocracy to the south? Obviously the mayors (Ebroin and his immediate successors) could not readily transfer from one to the other these personal bonds that legitimate Merovingian kings had created. So the successors of Ebroin, whether he had assumed these ties himself or not, would only with extreme difficulty exact the obedience of the Aquitanians. The next mayor, Pepin II, began the line that became known as the Carolingian. The importance of this fact is likewise observed by an annalist after the Battle of Tertry in 687.¹⁹ Thus, while Aquitaine became increasingly self-reliant throughout these years, political turmoil north of the Loire moved Francia ever closer to a new unification under strong Carolingian leadership.

Mettenses], welche ein Zusammentreffen Peppins mit Radbod unmittelbar nach der Schlacht bei Tertry und die Bewaltigung des letztern beim ersten Anlauf Pippins geschehen lassen, stimmen nicht mit den Angaben anderer Berichterstatter. Wir müssen deshalb die Richtigkeit dieser Angabe, so lange sie nicht anderweitig beglaubigt ist, in zweifel ziehen, und begnügen uns mit der Auskunft unsrer sonstigen Duellen, nach mannichfachen Irrungen und Kämpfen sei es endlich"

¹⁹Ibid., a. 687, p. 1: "Anno ab incarnatione domini nostri Iesu Christi DCLXXXVIII. Pippinus filius Ansegisili nobilissimi quondam Francorum principis post plurima prelia magnosque triumphos a Deo sibi concessos orientalium Francorum glorioso genitori feliciter succedens suscepit principatum."

Other factors contributed to strengthen the position of Aquitaine at the beginning of Lupus' ascendancy. The Visigoths in Spain elected a new leader in the person of Wamba in 672. A bellicose individual, he immediately engaged the Gascons in a successful war that in turn prompted them to move north and come into the service of Duke Lupus. Moreover, the heavy-handed rule of the Mayor Ebroin caused a considerable element of disaffected Franks to seek refuge in Aquitaine.²⁰ In the eyes of these exiles, the mayor had unrightfully arrogated power to himself, and the hospitality of the Aquitanian duke appealed to them. As for the disposition of the arrangement between Lupus and these Franks, the particulars are unknown. Certainly an affiliation on a personal basis played a part in the alliance, but it is impossible to say whether or not the extension of land entered into the bargain. With these combined forces, Lupus established a formidable power with which the Merovingians now had to reckon. In the final analysis, however, no single catalyst provoked the creation of an independent duchy. The Gascons provided the Aquitanian duke with new strength while the divisiveness of the Austrasian and Neustrian struggle eroded Frankish opposition to Aquitanian separatism. In addition, the subversion of Merovingian prerogatives (however incompetently administered) by

²⁰See above, fn. 12: ". . . omnes vagi profugique ad eum adserunt"

the mayors encouraged centrifugal tendencies by abbreviating the personal ties between the Franks on either side of the Loire. Although the seeds of later Frankish greatness lie in the efforts of Pepin II, this factor contributed negligibly at the time due to the infancy of the movement.²¹

Not all commentaries on Merovingian Aquitaine agree that Lupus served as the first independent duke of a united duchy. Some prefer to cite Eudes, his successor, as the first of the line.²² A church council, that of Bordeaux (663-675), suggested the contrary, however, and testified to the elevated station to which Lupus had risen shortly after his election to office. In the record of the council's proceedings, the convened churchmen referred to Lupus as a vir inluster, a title of nearly royal significance, and, in addition, as dux.²³ Conversely, Felix did not enjoy the same

²¹Ludovic Drapeyron (Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CV, 265) aptly observes: "Coincidence instructive! la campagne de Wamba qui déterminâ une immigration basque si considérable en Gaule, la lutte d'Ebrouin et de saint Léger qui brisa, en quelque sorte, les liens qui unissaient les différentes parties de la domination franque, la bataille de Testry qui soumit la Neustrie à l'Austrasie, mais creusa, pour de longues années, un abîme entre l'Austrasie et l'Aquitaine, correspondent à la fondation d'un duché gallo-romain sous une dynastie qui prit à sa solde les Basques."

²²Ibid., 266: "Plusieurs hypothèses, recueillies par Alteserra, ont été émises touchant l'origine d'Eudes, premier duc indépendant d'Aquitaine." Also, see above, fn. 16.

²³Concilium Burdegalense, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum, Sectio III, Concilia, ed. F. Maassen, I (Hannover, 1893), p. 216.

accolade.²⁴ Also of note is the fact that the council expressed the wish that the Merovingian king, Childeric II, enjoin Duke Lupus to oversee the execution of its decisions in his duchy.²⁵ Since the council met in Aquitaine, the position of the duke relative to the Merovingian crown surely influenced its statement to this effect. Indeed, this request of the council emphasizes the fact that the duke deferred in a politic way to the overlordship of the Merovingian king. Certainly such a statement would not have originated at the instance of the assembled bishops alone, who, coming principally from Aquitanian cities, acknowledged Lupus as their secular lord.²⁶ Thus, as in later times, the dukes of Aqu-

²⁴See the evaluation of Perroud (Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, pp. 139-140) who remarks: "Mais il portait déjà le titre royal ou presque royal de vir illustre, et vers 674 (plus tôt peut-être?) nous le voyons agir en souverain, exiger des cités d'Aquitaine le serment de fidélité qui ne se prêtait qu'aux rois."

²⁵The commentary of Carlo de Clercq (La Législation Religieuse Franque de Clovis à Charlemagne, p. 70) on the affairs of this council mentions this point. Of those items that attracted the council's attention, he evaluates the following as the more important of their concerns: "Les évêques s'engagent à donner à leur clergé l'exemple d'une vie droite, conformément aux préceptes de saint Paul et de saint Jérôme (c. 4). Il est interdit aux clercs de porter l'habit séculier, de posséder des armes (c. 1), de rechercher le patronage des grands sans permission de l'évêque (c. 2), de cohabiter avec des femmes étrangères (c. 3)."

²⁶The question of the ethnic background of Lupus aroused considerable consternation among nineteenth century French authors. To them, it meant a great deal of difference as to whether Lupus was of Germanic or Gallo-Roman extraction. An excellent case in point to illustrate this concern of

taine arrogated sovereignty in their duchy to themselves but recognized, in a nominal fashion, the ultimate suzerainty of the Merovingian king.²⁷ The accession of Lupus to the ducal position came through election by his fellow aristocrats and not through appointment by the Merovingian king. Hence, like the mayors, Lupus lacked a legitimate foundation for his power.²⁸ Also, it appears dubious as to whether the nobility supported the Aquitanian duke wholeheartedly or extended loyalty to him in the same fashion as the duke himself did to the Austrasians. In this proto-feudal, agricultural society, in which state formation existed tentatively, the latter

these authors appears in the writing of Jean de Jaurgain (La Vasconie, I, p. 44). In fact, the question of nationalism has broader implications than just this isolated example. Quite often, the matter obscures historical interpretation of events by European authors in general and among nineteenth century historians in particular. As a result, statements such as the following one of Ludovic Drapeyron "Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CIV, 829) depicts a specific prejudice: "on oubliait trop aisément, toutefois, que les Francs, à la différence des Vandales, des Goths orientaux et occidentaux, des Suèves et des Burgondes, étaient restés en communication directe avec la Germanie dont le Rhin seul les séparait, et que leurs bandes guerrières se recrutaient sans fin ni trêve." In short, through their associations, the Franks possessed basically a Germanic ethos--something to which, in its context, Drapeyron pinned significance.

²⁷An analogous situation characterized the later relationships of the great national duchies of Bavaria and Alemannia to the Carolingians of the eighth century. Likewise, the dukes of Aquitaine maintained this same stance themselves into the eighth century.

²⁸Supra, fn. 10.

situation must certainly have been the case. Thus, the duke lacked binding ties with those aristocrats beneath him and also needed an adequate revenue or supply of men to assure a preponderance of power in his own province.

Regrettably, Lupus had no chronicle to describe systematically the events of his ducal tenure. The information available concerning him pertains almost exclusively to his acquisition of the duchy as Felix's successor and, broadly, to his existence in the decade of the 670's as the Duke of Aquitaine. Lupus took pains to extend his influence throughout Aquitaine during this decade, and he undercut the failing Merovingian influence wherever he could by expanding his own power to the exclusion of that of the Austrasians. Shortly after his election, he appeared before the city of Limoges.²⁹ His purpose in journeying there was to extort the fidelity of the inhabitants by oaths of allegiance. In the process of executing this plan, he got more than he bargained for from the townsmen. After receiving the homage of these people, he went to the sanctuary of the patron of the city, Saint Martial. While admiring the precious objects therein, he attempted to confiscate an ornament for himself. At this point, an inhabitant of the city, whose name was Proculus, seized his sword and

²⁹Ex Miraculis S. Martialis, Episcopi Lemovicensis, M.G.H., SS., p. 281.

dealt Lupus a blow to the head.³⁰ Rather mysteriously, the source for this story does not carry it to its logical conclusion. Whether or not he died of the wound remains a matter of speculation. The importance of the incident is clear, for if he was assassinated, the individual usually cited as his successor, Eudes, most probably did not immediately follow him.

Scholars have reacted variously to this information. Although details survive in a sketchy outline, the notion has been advanced that Lupus did indeed perish as a result of his wound at Limoges.³¹ If so, when did this transpire? It appears, although on the basis of supposition, that it occurred in late 673 or 674. By this reckoning, Lupus remained in power only

³⁰Ibid.: "Advenit et pontificem ex ipsa urbe [Lemovicensi] et omnes concives ad se adunare iussit, ut fidem eorum extorqueret et eos ad suum regimen perstringeret. Cum vero in cubiculum, ubi sanctus Marcialis sepultura meruit tumulari, fuisset ingressus, cepit perspicere eius sepulcrum. Quod cernens, vidit ibi lumbare aureum cum preciosis gemmis ornatum et eum exinde cogitavit auferre. Sed cum ingressus ad limen ostii ipsius speluncae esset, sic iubente Domino et intercedente beato Marciale, quidam homunculus ex ipsa civitate nomen Proculus arripuit gladium et eum in cerebrum eius defixit."

³¹Perroud, Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 136: "Mais il semble que Lupus ait péri à Limoges même." Thus, Perroud (p. 164) contends that intermediately the succession to the duchy fell to an individual (or individuals) of whom record is lost: "... nous ignorons même le nom de ses princes, car il nous semble qu'il dut y avoir entre Lupus et Eudes un ou plusieurs ducs de Toulouse dont les noms même ont péri."

a few years.³² While these views are not those commonly advanced, they are nonetheless noteworthy, for the customary date given for the demise of Lupus is circa 710.³³

It seems more logical to accept the 710 date, for if an intermediary duke filled the post prior to Eudes, no mention of him exists. As for Lupus' power, he failed to have a "constitutional" basis upon which either to justify or to broaden it. While this same situation epitomized the succession of later dukes, it deepened the cleavage of separatism and largely explains later hostilities between the province and the northern Franks.

Beyond the decade of the 670's, documentary information concerning the history of Aquitaine fades from view. It is not until 718 that reliable information again surfaces in

³²Ibid., p. 138. Another authority (C. Fauriel, Histoire de la Gaule Méridionale sous la Domination des Conquérants Germains [4 vols.; Paris, 1836], III, p. 32), who likewise sees an early death for Lupus but does not necessarily connect it to the incident at Limoges, remarks: "On ignore l'époque précise de la mort de Lupus; on peut seulement présumer qu'elle est de peu postérieure à 681" Fauriel also discusses the conquest of Limoges by Lupus but believes that it took place in the neighborhood (voisine) of 675.

³³Jaurgain, La Vasconie, II, p. 1. On several counts, it appears illogical that Lupus died within five years of acquiring his duchy. While whatever is said amounts to conjecture, it seems logical that if Lupus committed (or attempted to commit) sacrilege at St. Martial's tomb and died in the effort, the author of Martial's life would surely have wanted posterity to know that Lupus' just reward was death. Thus, he would have implicitly informed his readers of Lupus' deserving end and not let the issue hang as he does.

contemporary records. Fortunately, the affairs of southern Gaul then emerge into a daylight that leaves little question about the direction of events. By that time, Duke Eudes had acquired control of Aquitaine, and he remained at the helm until his death in 735. As for the previous era, 674-718, those who attempt to construct a chronology of events hypothesize throughout,³⁴ in consideration of this void in the history of the province. Deductions, if attempted, have to be based upon the preceding events in Aquitanian history and those of the post-718 period. No cataclysmic break appears to have occurred throughout these years. The separatist tendencies which Lupus promoted evidently continued unabated to the extent that upon the advent of Eudes' career, Aquitaine had

³⁴Perroud (Des Origines du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine, p. 165) summarizes this problem confronting students of seventh century Aquitaine: "... nous allons nous trouver en présence d'une effrayante lacune, car le premier duc d'Aquitaine que nomment les documents après Lupus est Eudes, et il n'apparaît avec certitude qu'en 718, pour ne mourir qu'en 735. Voilà donc un espace de trente-sept ans (681-718), probablement même de quarante-quatre (674-718), absolument vide. C'est comme un trou dans l'histoire." Although this breach exists in Aquitanian history, some have incorrectly imagined it to be of a more extensive nature than actually characterizes the situation. Hence, E. A. Freeman (Western Europe in the Eighth Century and Onward: An Aftermath [London, 1904], pp. 16-17) remarks: "For eighty-six years (633-719), for fifty-nine years from the time that we have now reached, we know absolutely nothing of one of the great divisions [Aquitaine] of Gaul. It then appears as a powerful and united state, under a prince of its own, practically, perhaps formally, independent. Of the progress of this change we can say nothing; but, whatever were its details, it must have been busily at work during all these years."

arrived at an extremely independent position, which explains its willingness to confront the Franks under Charles Martel. In short, the ducal prerogatives founded by Lupus apparently grew apace throughout those years and in turn contributed greatly to the establishment of a powerful duchy to which Eudes fell heir.³⁵ The means by which these dukes obligated the aristocracy to serve them militarily remains lost in the sparse accounts pertaining to their accession and wielding of power. Presumably, ties of vassalage brought them together, but under what circumstances, it is impossible to say.

Just as the nature and date of Lupus' death remain questionable, likewise the obscurities of the early eighth century confuse scholarship concerning Eudes' origins.³⁶

³⁵Ibid., p. 166: "... de l'autre, la puissance militaire fondée par Lupus dut contribuer grandement au maintien du nouvel état."

³⁶See the article on Eudes by Jean-François Bladé ("Eudes, Duc d'Aquitaine," Annales du Midi, IV [1892], 145-197), which represents the sole monographical contribution to scholarship on the topic. The traditional approach to the succession question in Aquitanian history has been to make Eudes a son of Lupus while the latter was preceded by Felix. Bladé, however, observes (pp. 145-146): "Plusieurs annalistes des seizième et dix-septième siècles font d'Eudes un fils de Lupus, duc d'Aquitaine après Felix. Mais cette portion de leur doctrine n'est appuyée d'aucun texte." The matter does not end here, however. Bladé summarized (p. 157) the main points involved in the history of Eudes' career, assuming that the duke did indeed follow Lupus, although, without offering his own original theory for the obvious documentary reasons: "Mettons qu'Eudes n'eût que vingt ans à l'époque de son avènement. C'était bien peu, dans ces époques troublées, pour exercer utilement l'autorité. A ce compte, le duc d'Aquitaine serait né vers 680. A vingt ans, il aurait donc lutté avec

Spanish chroniclers, however, thought Eudes a Frank, and he undoubtedly proceeded to usurp the remaining Merovingian authority in Aquitaine.³⁷ Certainly, his name has the Germanic ring to it. Whatever his parentage and date of accession, Eudes came to loggerheads with Charles Martel shortly after Martel rose to mastery as the Austrasian Mayor of the Palace. Of this little doubt exists and, because of this antagonism, Aquitanian history becomes something more than a matter of conjecture.

As the illegitimate son of Pepin II, Charles ambitiously cleared the chaotic field of competitors to become mayor after his father's death in 714. To accomplish this, he had to win a series of battles that culminated in his victory over the Neustrians at Vincy (Vinchy) in late 717. Charles' success here well depicts the irregularity of the Carolingian advent to power. Neither the mayor nor the Aquitanian duke could

grand succès contre un homme tel que Pépin d'Héristal, et se serait emparé du Berry; et a cinquante-six ans, il aurait encore combattu contre les Franks de Charles Martel (732) et les Sarrasins d'Abdérane. Ainsi, nous aurions au moins, pour Eudes, quarante années de fonctions duciales. Quarante années de fonctions duciales, cela est-il vraisemblable? Et sur quoi repose cette supposition si téméraire? Sur le simple rapprochement de deux légendes: sur le récit des miracles de saint Austrégisile, partiellement appuyé par la légende de saint Bonet.

Heureusement, je n'ai pas besoin de discuter celle-ci."

³⁷Rerum Aquitanicarum Libri Quinque, ed. Antoine Alteserra, VII (Tolosae, 1657), p. 127: "Nonne probabilius est Eudonem fuisse unum e Francis qui regibus nostris in soporem lapsis, rerum suarum gerendarum occasionem nactus?"

claim titular security by way of time-honored, hereditary succession. Vincy worked to the discomfort of the Merovingian king, Chilperic II, and his Mayor of the Palace, Ragenfroy.³⁸ In turn, this situation set the stage for the conflict between the Franks and the Aquitanian duke, because the logical courts of appeal for the dejected Merovingian king were the independently oriented duchies on the fringe of the Frankish state. The relative prosperity of Aquitaine, ministered by astute leadership, assured the Merovingian that he could expect redress.

In 718 an appeal for help went out to Eudes from Chilperic II and his mayor, Ragenfroy.³⁹ The Merovingian king and his minister tempted the duke with gifts and promises of the kingdom, undoubtedly proposing to let him rule as Charles'

³⁸French scholars prefer to spell his name thusly, or as Raganfred, while in the Latin it appears as Ragamfredus. In the context of Charles' accession to power in 714, Heinrich E. Bonnell (Die Anfänge des karolingischen Hauses, p. 131) comments on the status of Aquitaine relative to the rest of the Frankish state: "Das eigentlich fränkische Land, Auster, Neuster und Burgund, stand jest kaum anders denn als ein Erbgut zu seiner Verfügung, und hatte er auch im Südwesten, in Aquitanien, bisher noch dulden müssen, das ein eignes herzogsgeschlecht sich daselbst unabhängig von dem Gebieter des Frankenreiches geberdete,"

³⁹Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum, ed. Bruno Krusch, II (Hannover, 1888), p. 327: "Chilpericus itaque vel Regamfredus Eudonem ducem expetunt in auxilio." Also see: Chronicon Universale (Annalibus Maximinianis) a. 717, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 1881), p. 19.

successor in the event of a victory.⁴⁰ The offer surely tantalized Eudes by giving his ducal position the prospect of a lawful air of respectability through Merovingian associations. While the duke gave a favorable reply to this request, Charles set up in the meantime another Merovingian to supplant the defeated Chilperic. This phantom king, Clotaire IV, reigned only shortly before dying.⁴¹ Early in the following year the Aquitanians took the initiative and moved their army north under the leadership of Duke Eudes. After having crossed the Loire, Eudes advanced on Paris, ostensibly to rally the defeated army of Chilperic and Ragenfroy. With the Austrasian Franks nearby under Martel's command, the two forces ultimately joined battle to the northeast of Paris, not far from Soissons. The two sides hotly contested the issue, but the force of Charles' attack proved too much for the Aquitanians, who had to retire from the field, but not without slaughtering many Franks.⁴²

⁴⁰Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici, iv, 10, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 174: "Chilpericus itaque et Ragamfredus legationem ad Eodonem dirigunt, eius auxilium postulantes rogant, regnum et munera tradunt."

⁴¹Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 327. Relative to this obscure Merovingian claimant to the throne, see T. Breysig (Jahrbücher des frankischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741 ["Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte", Leipzig, 1869], pp. 119-120): "Von Chlothar ist kein Diplom, das er selbst ausgestellt hatte, bekannt. Pardessus theilt mehrere Schenkungsakten, von Privatleuten für das Kloster Weissenburg im Gau von Speier ausgestellt, mit, in welchen nach den Jahren Chlothars gezählt wird."

⁴²Annales Nazariani, a. 719, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 25:

Eudes fell back on the city of Paris after suffering his defeat, in preparation to withdraw his whole army south beyond the Loire.⁴³

In victory, Charles bided his time, concerned himself with a rebellious Saxony, and then sent an embassy to the Aquitanian duke the following year (720). The Frank's proposal contained two demands prerequisite to his friendship. Conditional upon Charles' good will, the duke had to hand over King Chilperic and the royal treasury. Hardly in a position to reject this proposition, Eudes agreed, relinquishing most of the treasury but apparently not all of it.⁴⁴ The king did not long survive the consummation of the trade, but for the Aquitanian duke other matters began to generate a pressure that required his attention. The Saracens to the south moved

"occisio Francorum ad Suessionis civitate et mors Ratboti."

⁴³Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 717, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 291: "At ille constanter occurrit ei intrepidus. Sed Eudo fugiens Parisius civitate regressus, Chilpericum regem cum thesauris regalibus sublatum, ultra Ligerim recessit."

⁴⁴Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 327-328: "Carlus eum persecutus, non repperit. Chlotharius quidem memoratus rex eo anno obiit, Carlusque anno insecuto legationem ad Eudonem dirigens amicitiasque cum eo faciens. Ille vero Chilperico rege cum multis muneribus reddidit, sed non diu in regno resedit." Also see Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 717, M.G.H., SS., p. 291. Eudes fared exceptionally well in his contest with Charles, considering the fact that he took the offensive against him and then lost. Perhaps the best explanation for this is the preoccupation of Charles, as well as the skill of Eudes in effecting his retreat.

into Aquitaine to challenge the duke on his home front.

In 711, the Saracens had crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and established a foothold in Spain. With startling rapidity, they expanded their holdings at the cost of the weakened Visigoths, who were then experiencing the twilight of their history. By 714, the invaders had won virtually the whole Spanish peninsula⁴⁵ and thereupon broadened their range of vision to encompass southern Gaul. First, they attacked the old Visigothic state of Septimania, taking Narbonne in the process. As a Christian chronicle, written at Moissac, reports, the Saracens slaughtered the men of Narbonne and led the women and children captive into Spain, all of this taking place nine years after passing over the Straits.⁴⁶ Next, they proceeded into Aquitaine by advancing upon the capital of Duke Eudes, the city of Toulouse. Besieging the city, they soon found themselves confronted by an army of Aquitanians

⁴⁵Lucien Musset, Les Invasions: Le Second Assaut Contre l'Europe Chrétienne (Paris, 1965), p. 148: "On sait avec quelle fulgurante rapidité l'Etat visigotique, rongé de dissensions intestines, fut balayé par les conquérants après leur victoire du rio Guadalete (juillet 711). En août Tariq est à Cordoue, en novembre il atteint Tolède, la capitale. Dès 714 sans doute, toute la péninsule est occupée, sauf un infime noyau de résistance dans la zone la plus inaccessible des Asturies, tandis que les chefs des principaux clans gotiques vont faire leur soumission à Damas."

⁴⁶Chronicon Moissiacense, M.G.H., SS., p. 290: "Sema, rex Sarracenorum, post nono anno quam in Spania ingressi sunt Sarraceni, Narbonam obsidet, obsessamque capit, virosque civitatis illius gladio perimi iussit; mulieres vero vel parvulos captivos in Spaniam ducunt."

and Franks led by Eudes. The duke had been at Bordeaux when the enemy struck and, summoning a powerful force, he attacked the foe. On this occasion, Eudes enjoyed complete success.⁴⁷ He killed the governor of Spain, Al-Samh, who commanded the Saracenic host and decimated his army in the process. His victory was so overwhelming that the duke could not resist exulting about it to the papacy. Perhaps his recent embarrassment at the hands of Martel had injured his vanity to the extent that it needed salving. Whatever the case, he promptly notified Pope Gregory II of his success and took the opportunity to embroider the details. The biography of this particular pope relates the account of the victory that was relayed to Rome. By his own reckoning, Eudes had destroyed no less than 375,000 of the infidels at the expense of 1,500 of the Franks.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Ibid.: "Et in ipso anno mense tertio ad obsidendam Tolosam pergunt. Quam dum obsiderent, exiit obviam eis Eudo, princeps Aquitaniae, cum exercitu Aquitanorum vel Francorum, et commisit cum eis proelium; et dum proeliare coepissent, terga versus est exercitus Sarracenorum, maximaque pars ibi cecidit gladio."

⁴⁸Vita Gregorius II, Liber Pontificalis, ed. L. Duchesne (3 vols.; Paris, 1886), I, 401: "Eodem tempore nec dicenda Agarenorum gens a loco qui Septem dicitur transfretantes, Spaniam ingressi, maximam occiserunt partem cum eorum rege; reliquos omnes subdiderunt cum suis bonis et ita eandem provinciam annis possiderunt decem. Undecimo vero anno generalis facta Francorum motio contra Sarracenos circumdantes interemerunt. Trecenta enim septuaginta quinque milia uno sunt die interfecti, ut Francorum missa pontificis epistola continebat; mille tantum quingentos ex Francis fuisse mortuos in eodem bello dixerunt, quod anno praemisso in benedictione a praedicto viro eis directis tribus spongiis quibus ad usum mense pontificis apponuntur, intra qua bellum committebatur, Eodo, Aquitanie

In spite of his gross exaggeration, the duke undoubtedly marked the apex of his fortunes in this battle. But the Islamic threat failed to subside, and the succeeding years proved that his success had been only temporary. Significantly, contemporary sources mention the Aquitanian army synonymously with the Franks. Hence, the provincial aristocracy and the migrated Franks had mutually participated in Aquitanian affairs to the extent that by this time they were referred to collectively as Franks.

Following their defeat at Toulouse, the Saracens fell back and regrouped their forces. A lieutenant of the dead Al-Samh, Anbessa-ben-Sohim, who had remained in Spain, assumed the leadership of Islamic forces. Determined to avenge the death of his former captain and to lead a holy war (jihad), Anbessa-ben-Sohim resumed the initiative in 725 against the Christians in Gaul. He took Carcassonne, located between Toulouse and Narbonne, and conquered almost all of Septimania. Generally speaking, however, he skirted the province of Aquitaine, perhaps remembering the misfortune of four years before. Elsewhere, he pressed on into Provence, crossing the Rhone with an Arab army for the first time. Certain annalists of the period even insisted that the city of Rodez fell victim to

princeps, populo suo per modicas partes tribuens ad sumendum, ex eis ne unus vulneratus est nec mortuus ex his qui participati sunt."

the onslaught; however, more confusion surrounds the campaign of 725 than any other phase of the Christian-Islamic conflict of the decade.⁴⁹

With the appearance of the Saracen in southern Gaul, the scope and meaning of Aquitaine as a Frankish buffer state changed. Clovis had crossed into the province in order to protect and secure his acquisitions between the Seine and the Loire, but no longer would the Loire serve as a defensible barrier to ward off the attacks of a southern enemy. Indeed, a stronger Aquitanian duke, in addition to the aggressions of a powerful Saracenic host, necessitated the reassessment of Frankish frontiers. Now the Franks had to attach an importance to the Pyrenees in order to continue the maintenance of their possessions immediately north of the Loire. Henceforth, the mountain range figured predominantly into Frankish strategic thinking. The Austrasians thereafter showed a greater concern in the Aquitanian duchy as a whole, and their involvement there came en masse rather than incidentally.

One chronicle, that of Moissac--which is unusually

⁴⁹Bladé (Annales du Midi, IV, 173) discusses the clouded atmosphere relative to the different accounts of the Islamic campaign of 725 by noting: "Mais ces assertions sommaires auraient grand besoin d'être confirmées." If indeed the Saracens took the city of Rodez in 725, it seems quite illogical that mention of it does not appear in the Chronicle of Moissac in the entry for that year. If they had, this would have put them considerably less than a hundred miles from Moissac, a situation that would have undoubtedly alarmed the author of the chronicle.

concerned about the Islamic invasions into Christian Gaul and generally quite trustworthy--took note of the fact that the Saracens advanced northward along the Rhone into Burgundia. Indeed, in the entry for the year 725, the chronicler observed that the city of Autun fell to the aggressors, at which time they took much booty and then returned to Spain.⁵⁰

After 725, a change of leadership once again came to the Spanish Moslem state. The Caliph appointed Abdurrahman, later the opponent of Charles Martel, to the governor-generalship of Spain. Under his guidance, a renewed offensive against the Christians in southern Gaul was launched. In this instance, however, the attack came through provocation. The Saracen commander, Munuza, who had been entrusted with the defense of the frontier region of the Pyrenees (both Septimania and Catalonia), abandoned the Islamic cause by negotiating a treaty between himself and Duke Eudes of Aquitaine. Being an ambitious man,⁵¹ he aspired toward the establishment of an independent Moorish state between Spain and Christian Aquitaine.

⁵⁰Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 725, M.G.H., SS., p. 291: "Anno 725. Sarraceni Augustudunum [Autun] civitatem destruxerunt 4. feria, 11. Calendas Septembris, thesaurumque civitatis illius capientes, cum praeda magna Spania redeunt."

⁵¹Although a Moslem, Munuza was not an Arab. He came from North Africa, which could therefore explain his independence from the Caliph. Also, his name is variously spelled: Munuz, Munniz, Muzuu, or Abi-Nessâ.

He sealed his compact with Duke Eudes by marrying his daughter.⁵² Even though the arrangement concluded a strange alliance between a Christian and a Moslem, the politics of the moment had cast both men into quite similar roles. It must have appeared that each needed the other to survive in the face of a common danger looming close at hand. Nevertheless, the alliance fared badly.

When Abdurrahman learned of the treachery of his subordinate, he mobilized his troops and moved against him. Utilizing the element of surprise, he quickly put an end to the rebellion. Munuza attempted to escape with his wife but, overtaken by Abdurrahman's force, he committed suicide by leaping from a precipice.⁵³ His wife was captured and eventually sent to the Caliph at Damascus for his seraglio.⁵⁴

⁵²Isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 58, Patrologiae Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, XCVI (Paris, 1862), p. 1270: "Et quia filiam suam dux Francorum nomine Eudo causa foederis ei in conjugio copulandam ob persecutionem Arabum differendam jam olim traderat ad suos libitus inclinandam,"

⁵³Ibid., pp. 1270-71: ". . . dum eam tarditat de manu persequentium liberandam, suam morti debitam praeparat animam: sicque dum eum publica manus insequitur, sese in scissuris petrarum ab alto pinnaculo jam vulneratus cavillando praecipitat, atque ne vivus comprehenderetur animam exhalat: cujus caput statim ubi eum jacentem reppererunt, trucidant, et regi una cum filia Eudonis memorati ducis praesentant: quam ille maria transvectans sublimi principi procurat honorifice destinandam."

⁵⁴This is a topic to which French authors in particular have directed attention. See the lengthy, and rather romantic, account of this by F. Guizot (The History of France: From the Earliest Times to the Year 1789, trans. Robert Black [8 vols.;

The defeat of Munuza heralded the coming conflict between Eudes and Abdurrahman. The Duke of Aquitaine, not sitting idle, had had to cope with his own difficulties while Abdurrahman beset his son-in-law. In fact, when his newly formed alliance to the south was put to the test, Eudes could not respond positively because of a Frankish invasion of Aquitaine. Not only had the Munuza-Eudes compact promoted an internecine struggle among the Saracens but, as well, it precipitated hostilities to the north. Charles Martel must have viewed the alliance with alarm and decided that his own well-being required intervention of a retributive sort. Thus, the mayor accused Eudes of having broken his pledge of friendship of a dozen years before and crossed the Loire with an army. Once again, he put the Duke of Aquitaine to flight, laid waste his country, and returned home with much joy and plunder.⁵⁵

London, 1893], I, pp. 182-184). A more serious analysis of the political and military ramifications of this marriage appears in Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, pp. 793-795). About the misfortunes of Eudes' daughter, the latter work (p. 794) concludes: "Tel fut le sort infortuné de cette princesse d'Aquitaine, suite funeste d'un mariage où l'intérêt du duc, son père, avoit eu sans doute plus de part que son inclination."

⁵⁵Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 731, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 26-27: ". . . Eodo dux Aquitaniorum a iure federis, quod Carolo principi promiserat, recessit. Quo comperto Carolus princeps exercitum congregans Ligerem fluvium transiit. Eodoneque fugato bis eodem anno Aquitaniam populatus est. Multisque thesauris sublati an proprias sedes principatus sui cum gaudio remeavit."

In truth, however, neither the Franks nor the Saracens desired a strong middle kingdom between them that would hamper the realization of their ambitions in Aquitaine. Although a certain degree of prejudice began to creep into contemporary chronicles and annals,⁵⁶ the combined efforts of Abdurrahman and Charles Martel served to weaken the provincial buffer state that had formerly isolated the two powers. Ironically, Charles did much to break down the duchy himself, but perhaps Eudes lacked the strength to match forces with Abdurrahman, regardless of his 731 campaign against the Franks. At any rate, the famous 732 engagement (in the fall of the year) at Tours between Martel and Abdurrahman was preceded by the campaign of earlier 732 between Eudes and the Saracenic chieftain in Aquitaine which prepared the way for the later forays of the Muslim northward.

Driven on not only by the flush of success but also by the desire to punish Eudes for his alliance with the traitor

⁵⁶The authors of the Histoire Générale de Languedoc (Cl. Devic and J. Vaissete) contend that the then contemporary Austrasian authors cast a shadow on the Duke of Aquitaine and abuse him for the difficulties of the Franks in order to heighten the prestige of Martel and his line. To Devic and Vaissete (Vol. I, pp. 792-93, 797) both the Annales Mettenses and the continuations of the Chronicle of Fredegar exemplify this slant in their accounts of these events. While both of these works do come down hard on Eudes, the latter had contrived his Islamic alliance with Charles Martel obviously in mind. The interpretation of Devic and Vaissete, so implicitly stated, demonstrates the fact that the separatist element in southern Gaul never did die out. Indeed, it penetrates the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Munuza, Abdurrahman moved his army into Aquitaine in early 732. Proceeding to Bordeaux, he laid siege to the city while Duke Eudes collected a force to meet him. The two armies clashed some distance above the Garonne in the vicinity of the Dordogne. The Saracen wrought a terrible vengeance upon the duke and his army.⁵⁷ Such a thorough-going decimation occurred that Eudes had no hope of continuing the struggle against the invader alone. In fact, a chronicler of the day observed that so many of Eudes' followers were slain that only God knew the number.⁵⁸ The victory allowed the Saracens then to turn their fury upon the countryside. They burned churches and slew the inhabitants of the area as they proceeded northward.⁵⁹

In quick succession, during a two-year period of time,

⁵⁷Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 732, M.G.H., SS., p. 291: "Abderaman, rex Spaniae, cum exercitu magno Saracenorum per Pampelonam et montes Pireneos transiens, Burdigalem civitatem obsidet. Tunc Eudo, princeps Aquitaniae, collecto exercitu obviam eis exiit in praelium super Garonna fluvium, sed inito praelio, Sarraceni victores existunt, Eudo vero fugiens maximam partem exercitus sui perdidit, et ita demum Sarraceni Aquitaniam depraedare coeperunt."

⁵⁸Isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 59, P.L., p. 1271: ". . . ut praelio ab Eudone ultra fluvios nomine Garonnam vel Dornomiam praeparato, et in fugam dilapso, solus Deus numerum morientium vel pereuntium recognoscat."

⁵⁹Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 108, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 175 and Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 732, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27. The latter remarks: "Ibique ecclesiis Dei igne concrematis pluribusque Christianis interfectis, usque ad Pictaven urbem profecti sunt. Basilicaque sancti Hilarii igne concremata, ad beatissimi Martini ecclesiam subvertendam summo conamine profisisci contendunt."

both the Franks and the Saracens had ravaged Aquitaine. Even though Eudes maintained his prerogatives, he nonetheless had to ask for the assistance of Charles to blunt the invasion and to recapture his duchy. Hence, he dutifully approached the Austrasian to beseech his help. The mayor, fully aware of the delicate situation into which Eudes had fallen, agreed to come to his aid, but he probably did so at a price.⁶⁰ The possibility remains open that Eudes might have ceded land to the Frankish mayor for his deliverance. Austrasian sources decline, however, to indicate at what cost, if any, the duke received help, thereby maintaining Martel's reputation for generosity. Whatever the case, Charles gathered an army, crossed the Loire, and gave succor to the Aquitanian duke in his own territory. Although the resulting battle between Abdurrahman and Charles popularly goes by the name of Tours, in reality it surely took

⁶⁰Neither the chronicles nor the annals of the day so state that Eudes had specifically to agree to anything in return for Charles' help. They provide, however, only the briefest descriptions of these events. Furthermore, considering Charles' experience in ruling, the remark of Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 36-37) seems a propos: "Ce dernier [Eudes] eut probablement à subir des conditions qui limitaient la pleine indépendance de l'Aquitaine vis-à-vis du pouvoir royal." The only statement relevant to the topic appears in the Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 732, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27: "Eudo dux cernens se superatum et ad defendendam, patriam suam contra Carolum se viribus esse destitutum, gentem perfidam Sarracenorum ad auxiliandum sibi invitat." Thus, Charles did, at least, require Eudes to take an oath as a subject from him.

place closer to the city of Poitiers.⁶¹ One chronicle, in describing the Frankish leader, eulogized his talents as a military leader, and well it might, in consideration of his enviable record of success in such affairs.⁶² Success he once again had in 732 against Abdurrahman. In both Gallic Gascony and Aquitaine, the Saracenic cause almost withered away as a result of Martel's victory. For Eudes, the battle brought tranquillity to the remaining years of his life (he died in 735), a rare commodity in his troubled career.⁶³

⁶¹See the recent comments of Robert Latouche, Caesar to Charlemagne, p. 316. The importance of the Battle of Tours is undeniable in the history of western Europe. Separating fact from diverse statements of generalities concerning it is another matter, however. Due to the sparse comments passed down in contemporary records, scholarship lacks particular information for which it yearns. Several articles exist, though, which do provide trustworthy statements on the basis of the available information. In this category refer to: M. G. J. L. Lecointre, "La Bataille de Poitiers entre Charles Martel et les Sarrasins: L'histoire et la Legende; Origine de celle-ci," Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires de l'Ouest, 3rd series, VII (1924), 632-42; E. Mercier, "La Bataille de Poitiers et les Vraies Causes de Recul de l'Invasion Arabe," Revue Historique, VII (1878), 1-8; and L. Levillain and C. Samaran, "Sur le Lieu et la Date de la Bataille de Poitiers en 732," Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, XCIX (1938), 243-67.

⁶²Isidori Pacensis Chronicon, 59, P.L., p. 1271: ". . . viro ab ineunte aetate belligero, et rei militaris experto"

⁶³If validity exists in the charge that Austrasian authors deprecate Eudes to the edification of Charles (see fn. 56), it stems from a statement in the Continuations of the Chronicle of Fredegar (108, p. 175): "Eudo namque dux cernens se superatum atque derisum, gentem perfidam Saracinatorum ad auxilium contra Carlum principem et gentem Francorum excitavit." Also, see the interesting remarks of Breysig (Jahrbücher des

How should Eudes be evaluated in light of his accomplishments? In the face of much adversity, Eudes managed to perpetuate the integrity of his duchy and, by merely remaining in power, deserves considerable praise. Specifically, however, he maintained the prerogatives of his duchy in several important areas: (1) he prevented the Saracens from reducing Aquitaine to the status of an appanage to Moorish Spain; (2) he held fast to the geographical limits of the duchy; (3) he sustained hereditary rights of succession within his family so that his son succeeded him; and (4) he preserved the independent stance of Aquitaine to the extent that no mention of the duchy appears in Martel's division and appropriation of his realm among his heirs. This was no mean feat, particularly in consideration of his formidable opponents, but it does not substantiate the claims of some who exaggerate his abilities.⁶⁴ Clearly, the Austrasian Franks twice overpowered

fränkischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, pp. 68-69) concerning the Arab retreat from Poitiers: "Die Araber aber eilten flüchtend nach Spanien zurück. Sie nahmen nicht den nächsten Weg, nämlich den, welchen sie gekommen waren, sondern wendeten sich nach dem östlichen Aquitanien, durch welches von Poitiers nach Bourges und Limoges alte Römerstraßen führten."

⁶⁴Devic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, p. 800: "Quoique nous ne prétendions pas justifier toutes ses actions, on voit cependant, par ce que ces historiens ont laissé échapper & par quelques autres monumens du temps, que ce duc fut un très-grand prince, & il nous paroîtroit sans doute encore plus grand, s'il avoit eu le même bonheur que Charles Martel & autant de panégyristes."

him, being first unable to deliver a decisive blow because of a Saxon insurrection and then because of the perplexing events of the year 732.

In another sense, perhaps Martel's victory at Tours helped to create an equilibrium between an emerging Francia and the Aquitanian duchy. Decentralizing feudal tendencies could well have weakened both political entities, leaving each unable to defeat the other. In addition, the duchy perplexed the Austrasians because a large element of migrated Franks had made common cause with the local Aquitanian nobles. They did so because of the fact that they possessed a common outlook. Furthermore, these transplanted Franks usurped the remnant of Merovingian authority in the province and thus created a private power of their own, of which the mayors disapproved, but which had at least a semblance of legality. On two further counts Aquitanian separatism alarmed the mayors: (1) the duchy served as a haven for refugees who escaped to the south, and (2) Austrasian enemies had good prospects of obtaining military support from the duke, as in the case of Chilperic II and Ragenfroy. Indeed, from 718 to 735, a pattern emerged in Frankish-Aquitanian relations. This consisted of a rebellious duke requiring constant Frankish surveillance in a largely unsuccessful attempt to ensure his obedience. Moreover, the quest for the duke's obedience presented the Carolingians with a problem having neither a solution nor a termination.

CHAPTER IV

AQUITAINE AND THE AUSTRASIAN REVIVAL

After the death of Eudes in 735, Charles Martel, as Mayor of the Palace, capitalized on both his experience and his strengthened position in Francia to depreciate the separatist position of Aquitaine. A military renaissance in northern Gaul made it quite impractical for a successful challenge to be launched from a provincial area such as Aquitaine.¹ The aggressive, independent stance of the duchy did not slacken, however, because of strong opposition from the mayor. Indeed, Martel and his successors impressed the Aquitanians as interlopers who had usurped and negated the rule of the legitimate Merovingian house. With actually no better qualifications themselves, the ducal family found itself hampered

¹Lynn White, Jr. (Medieval Technology and Social Change [Oxford, 1962], pp. 3-13, 137-138) well expresses the prevailing historiographical view concerning Martel's contribution to the Merovingian military. This interpretation, which contends that Martel revolutionized medieval warfare, is not without its critics. Indeed, Bernard S. Bachrach (Merovingian Military Organization, 481-751, pp. 99-126) argues that the mayor's methods were quite in keeping with the standards of the time and do not represent a direct departure from previous practice. By measure of his success, however, it must be granted that Martel utilized his leadership abilities, his armies, and his resources more effectively than any of his immediate predecessors. In this sense his life's work has to be judged whether or not "revolutionary" at least a solid contribution to the coming military hegemony of the Carolingians.

in maintaining the defensive capabilities of the province without Eudes.

While it is true that various regional problems perpetually diverted the mayor's attention before 735, rendering him unable to concentrate his resources or efforts on any one area for a sustained period of time, his stature and reputation thereafter allowed him to bring his forces singularly to bear on trouble spots. Hence, in the remaining years of Martel's mayoralty, the competitiveness issuing from Aquitaine lost much momentum, owing to the increased pressure that the mayor applied in his attempt to break a wayward Frankish aristocracy leading a separatist duchy. No longer, as under the leadership of Eudes, did the two states contest on a relatively equal plane, characterized by Aquitanian alliances with the Saracens or by their invasions deep into Frankish territory. Instead, struggles were confined to an area mainly south of the Loire River, and the Mayor of the Palace assumed the initiative.

Other matters in the south engaged Frankish attentions. As early as the sixth century the Austrasians under Childebert had met the Lombards of northern Italy in battle. The Pyrenees took on new significance with the appearance of the Muslim; so did the Alps concern the mayors, because of an active papacy increasingly communicating with Martel in particular. The Lombards stood as the natural obstacle to papal peninsular aspirations, and the ensuing difficulties between the temporal

and ecclesiastical powers in Italy aggravated the Franks. In fact, as the relationship between Austrasia and Rome warmed, the thought of Lombard conquests to the south horrified Frankish sensibilities.² Therefore, the Franks desired to maintain access routes to the Mediterranean and to Rome, in order to keep better abreast of domestic Italian affairs. This, Aquitaine could strategically provide.

As the Islamic threat subsided in the last years of Martel's life, other developments served to heighten the prestige of the mayor in Frankish politics. In 737, the Merovingian king, Theodoric IV, died leaving no one to succeed him. An obscure figure,³ this fainéant king was completely dominated by Martel to the extent that upon his passing the mayor felt no compunction in the matter of leaving the throne vacant. Martel's exalted position now prompted him to operate outside

²Robert Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger und des Königs Peppin (Darmstadt, 1962), p. 36: "Das kann nur damals, im Jahre 740, geschehen sein, und man darf es nach all dem als durchaus wahrscheinlich bezeichnen, dass Karl Martell zu einer diplomatischen Vermittlung gegriffen hat, um die Langobarden zu einem Verzicht auf ihre römischen Eroberungspläne zu bringen. Eine Einnahme Roms durch die Langobarden lag ja in keiner Weise im Interesse der Franken, und wäre sie gelungen, so hätte schon Karl Martel zu einer bewaffneten Intervention schreiten müssen."

³Only a few brief references commemorate the accession of Theodoric IV or Theudericus (Liber Historiae Francorum, 53, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 328 and Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 107, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 174). This attests to the dwindling concern of the annalists over the Merovingian house.

the façade of Merovingian scrutiny, a situation that lingered for the next six years. At that time, his sons, who did not initially enjoy such unquestioned authority, had once again to elevate another phantom monarch (Childeric III) in order to govern in a legitimate context as mayors. Just as the father had done, one of Martel's sons later cast aside the king when the foundations of his power permitted him to do so.⁴

The year 735 stands as an ominous date in Aquitanian history, but it was a prosperous time for the extension of Frankish power. In that year, the one in which Duke Eudes died, Martel concluded that the time had come for him to compel the Aquitanians to bend to his will.⁵ Death had severed the personal bonds which brought the duke and his subjects together. Because these bonds, as elsewhere in western Europe, were not strictly heritable,⁶ much confusion always accompanied the

⁴Pepin III and his brother Carloman succeeded Martel as Mayors of the Palace in 741. By 747, however, the latter had decided to enter a monastery at Rome, hence leaving Pepin in a position of sole authority. Therefore, only one son remained in power in 751 when the Merovingian king, Childeric III, suffered deposition. The Merovingians completely pass from view thereafter.

⁵Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 109, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 175-176: "In illis quippe diebus Eodo dux mortuus est. Haec audiens praefatus princeps Carlus, inito consilio procerum suorum, denuo Ligere fluvio transiit, usque Geronnam vel urbem Burdigalensem vel castro Blavia veniens, occupavit illamque regionem coepit hac subiugavit cum urbibus ac suburbana castrorum. Victor cum pace remeavit, opitulante Christo rege regum et domino dominorum. Amen."

⁶On the heritable aspects of a relationship between a

transition from one leader to another. In the last years of Eudes' life, from 732 to 735, Franco-Aquitania relations had slumbered amidst a recognition of the status quo. The pre-occupations of Charles in Burgundia as well as Frisia⁷ (733 and 734 respectively) left him little time to campaign in the south after his involvement there in 732. By 735, though, after having resolved his difficulties elsewhere, Martel decided to capitalize upon both the chaos that immediately followed the death of old Duke Eudes and the inexperience of his sons who now assumed their father's mantle. To this end, he convened his council and received its approval of an aggressive policy.⁸ Crossing the southernmost boundary of Francia, the

vassal and a lord, see Ganshof, Feudalism, p. 101. Also, Marc Bloch (Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon [2 vols.; Chicago, 1966], I, p. 148) outlines the pervasiveness of the personal relationship in the society of the Merovingian period.

⁷Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 733 and 734, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27.

⁸It is problematical whether or not the sons of Eudes had yet denied the suzerainty of Martel or even slighted him. Theodore Breysig (Jahrbücher des frankischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, pp. 75-76) suggests, however, that this was the case: "Sobald die Nachricht vom Tode des aquitanischen Herzogs zu dem Majordomus gelangte, hielt er mit seinen Vornehmen einen Rath, in welchem die Eroberung Aquitaniens beschossen wurde; wahrscheinlich haben die Söhne Eudos dieselbe fast unabhängige Stellung, wie sie ihr Vater gehabt, beansprucht oder haben gar die Anerkennung dieser geringen Abhängigkeit, die Tribute und Geschenke, die äusseren Zeichen dieses Verhältnisses, verweigert." Breysig assumes, therefore, that Martel's invasion represented a justifiable Frankish retaliation rather than an imperialistic offensive. Two facts seem to discount this interpretation: (1) Martel's earlier concern over requiring an oath of allegiance from Eudes in 732 (see

Loire, he pressed on to the Garonne before any opposition materialized. Although the details surrounding the new duke's (Hunald, Eudes' son and successor) resistance are extremely vague,⁹ it is known that Martel campaigned in the area around Bordeaux and then moved upon the Aquitanian stronghold of Blavia (present-day Blayen on the Gironde). After the mayor had subjugated the outlying territory, Hunald apparently decided that it would be futile to continue in his opposition against such a seasoned adversary. Thus, he concluded hostilities by capitulating to Martel's demands.

Hunald's advent attracts attention once again to the ethnographic significance of ducal nomenclature in Aquitaine. The two eldest sons of Eudes incontestably bore Germanic names. Both Hunald and Hatton,¹⁰ the second born son, betray this

chapter three, fn. 60) and (2) the subsequent treatment of Aquitaine under his successors. In short, the mayor had a long-standing interest in Aquitaine that made him appreciate its natural wealth and utility as an appanage to his kingdom.

⁹Ex Adonis Archiepiscopi Viennensis Chronico, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, II (Hannover, 1829), p. 319: "Mortuo Eudone, contra filios illius arma corripuit, eosque vehementer afflixit. Sed variante concertatione, cum ex utrisque partibus plurimi caederentur, tandem foedus non diu mansurum ineunt." Also, see below fn. 10.

¹⁰Historians know far less about this Hatton than they would like, particularly at this time, 735-736, in his career. Contemporary sources maintain a conspicuous silence relative to his activities, to the exception of several brief, general remarks collectively about Eudes' sons in the Annales Tiliani (a. 736), Annales Petaviani (a. 736), and the Annales S. Amandi (a. 736). While nearly identical entries (the three appear in

origin, while a third and fourth possessed the respective names of Remistan and Lupus (in the French, Loup). While it is possible that the name Remistan is a diminutive of the Gallic "Remi,"¹¹ Lupus, as with Duke Eudes' predecessor's name, suggests the Germanic connection. The ducal family took German names, with rare exception, and thus further displayed the Frankish background of an aristocratic faction that migrated into Aquitaine and came to rule over the provincial population.

What sort of agreement did Martel extend to Aquitaine in defeat? He left the area in the possession of Hunald but required him to take an oath of fidelity in which he remained the vassal of the Austrasian mayor and, as well, his two sons Pepin and Carloman.¹² At the outset of his tenure as Duke of Aquitaine, Hunald, became committed by oath to the Austrasians for two generations. In addition, the Franks demanded a brother,

the same volume: Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I [Hannover, 1826], pp. 8-9), the former states: "Karolus dimicabat contra filios Eodonum."

¹¹Several Roman authors, including Gaius Julius Caesar, refer to a people of northern Gaul as Rēmi (Rhēmi). This explains the derivation of the name Rheims, the city.

¹²Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 735, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 28: "Eodo dux mortuus est. Quod cum audiret invictus princeps Carolus, adunato exercitu Ligerem fluvium transiit, usque ad Garonnam et urbem Burdigalensem et castra Blavia occupavit. Illamque regionem cepit et subiugavit cum urbibus ac suburbanis eorum. Ducatumque illum solita pietate Hunaldo filio Eodonis dedit, qui sibi et filiis suis Pippino et Carolomanno fidem promisit."

Hatton, of Duke Hunald be surrendered for imprisonment, presumably as a hostage for the good conduct of the province and its leader.¹³

According to the Annales Mettenses Priores, Duke Hunald thereafter owed Martel his fidelity (i.e., fides), a common term used to express ties of responsibility in feudal society. The lack of specific information pertaining to early feudal commitments in Aquitaine obscures the bases upon which this arrangement and others were made. Did land and military service stand as the common denominators which bound Martel and Hunald together in a working relationship? Perhaps it appears too early in the development of feudal society to receive the attention that it does in succeeding years. Later, during the stress of the campaign of the 760's between Pepin and Duke Waifar, a fleeting reference to land appears in the same context to describe the basis of another tie.¹⁴ The absence of similar, earlier analyses tends to suggest, however, that the mayors and dukes had only loose commitments to one another and likewise did the Aquitanian aristocracy only loosely owe allegiance to the duke. In particular, the latter

¹³Annales Nazariani, a. 736, M.G.H., SS., p. 27: "Hatto ligatus est."

¹⁴See below, chapter five, fn. 51. Herein the continuator of Fredegar notes that King Pepin bestowed on the renegade Remistan the fortress and half the district of Bourges as far as the Cher so that the latter could resist his former duke and nephew, Waifar.

arrangement weakened the power structure in the province, but in so doing it appealed to the Aquitanian nobles, who undoubtedly preferred a local (weak) ducal government to a Carolingian regime which was trying and, to a degree, succeeding in harnessing the Frankish aristocracy. On the other hand, when the surging Austrasians threatened Aquitaine, this more than any other factor united the reluctant nobles under the duke's banner. Hence, it appears that an external threat more often than not mobilized the Aquitanian aristocracy, which in turn explains (1) why the duke so often provoked the Carolingians in later years and (2) why the duke so rarely took the initiative militarily against them (particularly in the cases of Dukes Hunald and Waifar).

The consequences of Hunald's pledge of 735 go beyond his career in Aquitanian affairs.¹⁵ The resurgent Franks used this oath as the basis of their claims on Aquitaine for the next forty years. As a result, they felt free to wield a heavy hand in reprimanding Aquitaine for her insubordination. Furthermore, the Franks accordingly regarded any disobedience

¹⁵M. Rabanis (Les Mérovingiens d'Aquitaine: Essai Historique et Critique sur la Charte d'Alaon [Paris, 1856], p. 71) correctly summarizes the mood of the Frankish policy toward Aquitaine: "Depuis la bataille de Tours jusqu'à l'époque adoptée pour la mort de Eudes (735) ce fut bien autre chose: l'ambition des Ostrasiens se démasqua, et leurs prétentions sur les provinces d'outre-Loire furent publiquement avouées."

from the south as an act of felony rather than of rebellion.¹⁶ As for Aquitaine, the mayor undoubtedly overawed the new duke at the beginning of his career. In light of his brief tenure and headlong ways, it appears that Hunald could never escape the thought that Martel had dishonored him and his line through the events of 735. Beyond all else, the victory of Charles in Aquitaine put into sharp relief his elevated station. The fact that the records of the settlement omitted all mention of the Merovingian king underscored the degree of ascendancy that Charles Martel had achieved. Indeed, he enjoyed a unique position of authority by 736, not only in Francia and Aquitaine but in all of western Europe.

For a record of the post-735 relations between the two areas, dependence upon predominately Austrasian authors is necessary. Consequently, no literary sympathy goes out to Aquitaine and its duke throughout these years, and the image

¹⁶Chamard, Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 37: "Ce serment, prêté non seulement au vainqueur, mais à ses fils Pépin et Carloman, fut la source de toutes les prétentions carolingiennes sur l'Aquitaine et de tous les malheurs dont ce malheureux pays fut la victime pendant plus de quarante ans. Toute tentative d'indépendance de la part des fils et du petit-fils d'Eudes fut désormais, aux yeux des Carolingiens, un acte de félonie plus encore que de rébellion." Chamard not only views the matter in this perspective but Jean-François Bladé ("Fin du Premier Duché d'Aquitaine," Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV [1892], 151-152) fully agrees with this interpretation. Also, see the discussion of Bladé relative to the part that Hatton played in these proceedings (pp. 152-153).

projected of the province's cause is one of disdain.¹⁷

Aquitaine attempted to assert its independence as best it could, while Francia strove to maintain its supremacy, which dated back to the days of Clovis. By the time that Martel's heirs, Pepin and Carloman, became involved in the controversy in 741, both sides had a legacy of accumulated partisan interests which they accordingly attempted to advance. In particular, Pepin and Carloman could not allow their paternal heritage to diminish, while the perplexed Hunald had witnessed the delimitation of his duchy's prerogatives by a waxing power.¹⁸

Shortly before his death Charles Martel must have suspected that his pacification of Aquitaine was only illusory. In order to keep himself better informed on the developments in

¹⁷Reference here is made to the Continuations of Fredegar's Chronicle and that of the Annales Mettenses Priores. For a concise statement of the attitude inherent in the latter relative to this discussion see Richard E. Sullivan (Review of Aufstieg und Herrschaft der Karlinger in der Darstellung der sogenannten Annales Mettenses priores: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Ideen im Reiche Karls des Grossen, by Irene Haselbach, American Historical Review, LXXVI [1971], pp. 1144-1145) who remarks: "The work [i.e., Annales Mettenses] seeks to legitimize the rise of the Carolingians on the basis of a mixture of concepts derived from ancient Germanic, Frankish and Christian sources: The Geblutsheiligkeit of the Carolingian family, the divine favor extended to individual rulers whose conduct was pleasing to God, the Carolingians as the elect of the Frankish gens and especially its nobles, and the establishment of Frankish overlordship of other peoples."

¹⁸This perspective, although in part tinged with moral analysis, is essentially that of E. A. Freeman (Western Europe in the Eighth Century and Onward, pp. 73-74) who shows considerably more interest in the history of Aquitaine throughout these years (735-744) than any account in English.

that quarter, he sent (circa 740) an envoy, Lantfred, the Abbot of St. Denis, to the court of Duke Hunald.¹⁹ Perhaps Martel had even come around to the point of considering a renewal of hostilities against the duke. From the surviving accounts, nothing substantial is known concerning the role that the mayor envisaged for Lantfred. Duke Hunald, however, viewed the abbot as little more than a spy and shortly after his arrival imprisoned him, a direct insult to the Austrasians which would affect relations for the next three and a half years.²⁰ Regardless of this turn of events, other forces

¹⁹E Translationibus et Miraculis Sancti Germani, ed. G. Waitz, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, XV, pars I (Hannover, 1887), p. 5: Etenim cum ducentis circiter vel eo amplius annis in porticu ecclesiae beati Vincentii Martyris sanctum eius corpus iacuisset humatum, anno vicesimo tertio quo Carolus, Pippini senioris filius, regni Francorum tenebat monarchiam, venerabilis vir Lantfredus praefati Sancti Vincentii monasterii pater, divini Spiritus incitamento succensus, qualiter tanto patrono deberet augeri veneratio, tacita coepit mente tractare, atque ut eius felicia membra ob frequentiam populi infra ipsius aulam ecclesiae transferri potuissent, devoto non distitit corde rimari. Sed quoniam piis semper conatibus impedimenta mundi se obiciunt, praedictus abbas a supra scripto principe legationis causa in Aquitaniam mittitur. Interea Carolus moritur. Isdem vero abbas ab Aquitaniae patricio quasi explorator tribus semis annis invitatus tenetur. Tandem substituto in regnum Pippino iuniore reddita pace, Lantfredus absolvi-
tur. Qui reversus, annis fere duodecim in restaurationem monasterii, quod eo absente dissipatum fuerat, occupatur."

²⁰French and German historians of the nineteenth century deal with Lantfred's mission from divergent points of view. Two French accounts of this episode (Devic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, pp. 809-810 and Bladé, Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 155) state that the abbot went to Aquitaine merely to inform on the duke, which in truth probably summarizes rather well his preconceived duties. On the other hand, a German author, T. Breysig (Jahrbücher des

were then at work to alter the framework of Frankish statecraft.

As early as 739, Martel's health began to fail, and even as he sent Lantfred into Aquitaine, his thoughts turned to a division of his realm among his heirs. He called for an assembly of nobles to ratify the partitioning of Francia to his three sons by two women. To the eldest of the three, Carloman, went Austrasia, Alamannia, and Thuringia; to the second son, Pepin, went Neustria, Burgundia, and Provincia; and to an illegitimate, third son, Grifo, born of the Bavarian princess Swanahilda, went parts of both Neustria and Austrasia.²¹

Generally speaking, that part of Francia north of the Rhine including its dependencies belonged to Carloman, while the southeastern sector of Francia fell to Pepin. Most peculiarly, however, no mention of Aquitaine was made in the settle-

frankischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, p. 100) dwells on the fact that new developments arose in Aquitaine due to Lantfred's capture and incarceration, making it impossible for the Austrasians to deal with the Romans. Thus, the latter ignores the provocation that prompted Hunald to act on this occasion against his northern overlords.

²¹Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 110, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 179 and Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 741, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 30. The former observes: "Igitur memoratus princeps, consilio obtinatum suorum expetito, filiis suis regna dividit. Idcirco primogenito suo Carlomanno nomine Auster, Suavia, que nunc Alamannia dicetur, atque Toringia sublimavit; alterius vero secundo filio iuniore Pippino nomine Burgundiam, Neuster et Provintiam praemisit."

ment, nor, for that matter, of Bavaria. Considering Martel's recent efforts in Aquitaine, this seems strange. The omission recognized, however, the modus vivendi between the two areas that the mayor had not yet been able to alter completely to his favor.²² In consideration of domestic affairs (an era of transition from one leader to the other) in Francia, nothing indicates for certain that the mayor had the power to subjugate the duchy even if he had had such in mind. Events proved that for the new, youthful mayors, solidifying their power at home contained enough burdens itself, besides embarking on any imperialistic scheme designed to dominate completely Aquitaine rather than chastising the province. It was a far more comfortable and practical policy to allow a line of parvenu dukes to retain what control they had over the area than to attempt to assert there the prerogatives of parvenu mayors. For geographical holdings, Aquitaine consisted at the time of a vast expanse of territory of which the Loire, the ocean, the Garonne,

²²Berthelot (Histoire Générale, I, 282) puts the matter nicely by saying: "S'il n'est pas fait mention de la Bavière et de l'Aquitaine, c'est qu'elles ont encore leurs ducs. Charles mourut cette même année à Kiersy." With a similar viewpoint, T. Breysig (Jahrbücher des frankischen Reiches: Die Zeit Karl Martells, 714-741, p. 101) notes: "Aquitanien und Bayern werden in der Vertheilung nicht aufgezählt; offenbar waren also dieser beiden Länder nur Rebenreiche des fränkischen Reiches unter eigenen Herzogen, die nur die Oberhoheit des merovingischen Herrschers oder seines Vertreters anerkannten."

and Septimania served as the perimeter.²³

The Aquitanians must have received the news of Charles Martel's death in 741 quite happily, as though nature had finally delivered them from an oppressor. It also must have occurred to them that whoever was to follow him could not possibly exact their obedience as he had done. Subsequent events certainly belie this sentiment, at least on the part of their duke. It was then, on the occasion of Martel's death, that Hunald imprisoned Abbot Lantfred. Not satisfied, he next proceeded to lead his people in open rebellion against the Franks,²⁴ the first of the border states to so react to the

²³Devic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, p. 810: "L'Aquitaine étoit renfermée entre la Loire, l'Océan & la Garonne, & s'étendoit jusques aux frontières de la Septimanie ou Gothie." No inclusive history devoted solely to Aquitaine has been published covering these years but rather a series of discussions debating isolated segments of its political and social development. Quite typical in this respect is the work of French scholars dealing with the extent of its territorial limits and the degree of suzerainty of the Aquitanian duke. Jean-François Bladé (Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 154) maintains: "Le duc Hunald possédait, en effet, l'Aquitaine, avec droit de suprématie sur la Vasconie cispyrénéenne." On the other hand, Jean de Jaurgain (La Vasconie, I, p. 55) contends: "M. Bladé émet, à plusieurs reprises, l'opinion que les ducs d'Aquitaine avaient les ducs de Vasconie sous leur autorité; mais cela est absolument inadmissible, car, pas plus sous les Mérovingiens que sous les Carlovingiens, on ne vit jamais un duc relever d'un autre duc. Waifre était si bien seul duc d'Aquitaine et de Vasconie, comme son père et son aïeul,"

²⁴Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, III, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: "Interea rebellantibus Wascones in regione Aquitania cum Chunoaldo duce, filio Eudone quondam,"

news of the mayor's death.

Upon their assumption of power, Carloman and Pepin had another matter of greater significance with which to deal. Historians today do not know what sparked the incident, but the two older sons of Martel moved against their younger half-brother, Grifo, and his mother. In short order, Grifo was captured and imprisoned, and his mother was sent to the convent of Chelles.²⁵ The incident had served as a grave contretemps for the mayors. Not only had Grifo a considerable following among the nobility, but his illegitimacy was reminiscent of Martel's. The rebellion could well have catapulted Grifo to ascendancy just as logically as the post-714 strife launched the successful career of Charles Martel. As in the earlier instance, the same forces, astute leadership and predominant military force, joined against Grifo to dash his hopes. Significantly, however, the Frankish aristocracy did not support en bloc the claims of Pepin and Carloman, hence giving validity to the fact that schismatic forces fractured Austrasian unity and therefore seriously weakened the mayors' domestic power.

Quick on the heels of the success against Grifo, Aquitaine once again felt the might of the Austrasians. It is

²⁵Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 741, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 32-33: "Carolomannus vero et Pippinus eos subsequentes castrum obsident. Cernens autem Gripo, quod minime potuisset evadere, in fiduciam fratrum suorum venit. Quem Carolomannus accipiens in Nova-Castella custodiendum transmisit. Sonihildi vero Calam monasterium dederunt."

true that Carloman and Pepin had little choice other than to make an object lesson of the duchy in order to prevent uprisings elsewhere. The brothers combined their forces and crossed over the Loire into Aquitaine near the city of Orleans. Devastating the countryside, they marched to Bourges and burned the outskirts without completely humbling the city.²⁶ This display convinced Duke Hunald that his forces, perhaps even his ability, lacked the strength to contend with the youthful mayors, and he turned in flight.²⁷ Undeterred, the Franks then attacked the stronghold of Loches, razing it and taking the inhabitants captive. Before leaving Aquitaine to extinguish another

²⁶The fullest account of this invasion appears in the Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, III, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180.

²⁷Devic and Vaissete (Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, p. 812) clearly leave the impression that Duke Hunald took an unsuccessful stand against the Franks: "Le duc d'Aquitaine, pour arrêter leurs progrès, se mit en campagne & marcha à leur rencontre; mais ces princes l'ayant attaqué le mirent bientôt en fuite. Ils le poursuivirent si vivement que, pour se mettre à l'abri de leurs armes, il fut obligé de passer la Garonne & de se réfugier en Gascogne." The only source that corroborates both this and the latter observation appears in the Annalium Fuldensium Pars Prima, a. 742, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 345: "Karlomanus et Pippinus Hunaltum, Aquitaniae ducem, imperio suo resistentem, bello superatum ad Wascones fugere compellunt: simul et Alamannos duce Thiotbaldo rebellare temptantes mira celeritate comprimunt." Open to doubt is whether or not the Franks pursued Hunald into Gascony as the Annales Petaviani (a. 742, M.G.H., SS., p. 11) indicates: "Carolomannus perrexit in Wasconiam." It seems logical that this particular annalist wrote in a figurative sense rather than the literal, associating Aquitaine and Gascony as one in the same. Pepin and Carloman probably did not campaign that far south in 742.

rebellion in Alamannia, they stopped at Vieux-Poitiers to divide the kingdom of the Franks between themselves. Evidently, this emendation of their father's division became necessary because of the defeat meted out to Grifo and his mother.²⁸

What had Carloman and Pepin accomplished by their march through Aquitaine? Their demonstration of power certainly did not alter the contempt of Duke Hunald toward the Franks nor lessen his vindictive instincts. Indeed, the status of the mayor in Francia as essentially primus inter pares and semi-feudal particularism encouraged the aristocracy continually to challenge the right of succession of each heir. Thus, a tendency developed in the provincial areas to see a change of rulers as the signal for a general revolt, particularly so before the establishment of personal bonds linking the outlying aristocracy to the new mayor. In this context, Aquitaine still maintained her semi-independent stance under her chastened though unrepentant leader, who yet had the freedom to strike back against the mayors when the occasion permitted. To ascribe a haughty independence to Hunald and his duchy in late 742, as

²⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, III, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: ". . . Carlomannus atque Pippinus germani principes, congregato exercito, Liger alveum Aurilianis urbem transeunt, Romanos proterunt, usque Beturgas urbem accedunt, suburbana ipsius igne conburent, Chunoaldo duce persequentes fugant, cuncta vastantes, Lucca castrum dirigunt atque funditus subvertunt, custodes illius castrum capiunt; etenim victores existunt. Praedam sibi dividentes, habitatores eiusdem loci secum captivos duxerunt."

some have done, seems to be carrying the case too far.²⁹

Hunald had been humbled once under Martel and the successes of the father were in time ably perpetuated by the sons. Indeed, after momentarily setting their own house in order (i.e., the matter of Grifo and Swanahilda), the next task of utmost importance for the mayors to perform consisted of a thoroughgoing demonstration of their leadership capabilities. Besides the difficulties in Aquitaine and Alamannia, problems arose elsewhere that allowed the exercise of their talents.

The events of 741 and 742 all seemed to culminate in the ignition of a widespread rebellion against the two young mayors in 743. The death of their father, domestic problems within the Caroling family, and a series of regional revolts all combined to breed a more serious crisis to the Austrasians than had confronted the house since Martel's accession to power. With the earlier disturbances as an impulse, the Saxons, Alamanni, and the Slavs all joined together under the direction of the Bavarians to contest

²⁹E. A. Freeman (Western Europe in the Eighth Century, p. 62) develops this argument in his writing. It appears far more logical to attribute a self-reliant position to Aquitaine twenty-one years previous when Eudes met with his great success against the Muslims at the Battle of Toulouse. Even then, Martel was laboring to wear the province down in a struggle of attrition so that her independent attitude would become more malleable. In fact, one author (T. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, p. 59) judges this in the end to be one of the great accomplishments of Martel's mayoralty.

Frankish leadership.³⁰ Under these circumstances, Duke Hunald elected to collaborate with the Bavarians against Carloman and Pepin in a rather curious way. Chronologically, however, other concerns preceded this involvement.

Before mobilizing their army to encounter the allies, the Frankish leaders restored the enfeebled Merovingian line by crowning Childeric III.³¹ This act indicated the straits

³⁰The concern of E. A. Freeman over Aquitanian affairs throughout this period is well-taken but on occasion misleading. For an excellent case in point see his fn. 1 (Western Europe in the Eighth Century), p. 56. Here, Professor Freeman observes (1) that Slavic participation in the Bavarian War cannot be relied on because of the confused remarks of annalists, citing Annalium Lobiensium Fragmentum, a. 742, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Pertz, II (Hannover, 1892), p. 194: "Karlomannus et Pippinus Odilonem . . . et Tietbaldum . . . Saxones quoque et Slavos commisso prelio super fluvium Lech superant." However, instead see Annales Lobieneses, a. 742, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 1881), p. 227, where the ellipses are omitted and the full text of the Annales Lobieneses appears: "Karlomannus et Pippinus Odilonem ducem Baiuvariorum et Tietbaldum ducem Alemannorum, qui in adiutorium eius venerat, Saxones quoque et Sclavos commisso praelio super fluvium Lech superant." Herein (volume XIII), the vital phrase is ". . . qui in adiutorium eius venerat" Also, Freeman notes (2) that they (Slavs) "appear only in the Annales Lobieneses." On both counts, Freeman is in error. The Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 33) refers to the Slavs and clarifies the part they played in the proceedings: "Baioarii quoque ex alia parte contra eos exercitum adunaverunt conductosque in adiutorium Saxones et Alamannos et Sclavos secum habuerunt." G. Waitz discusses (volume XIII, p. 224) the discovery of the fuller codex of the Annales Lobieneses and its subsequent reappearance in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Also, Professor Freeman's book appeared in 1904; he died in 1892. Since volume XIII of the Scriptores series was published in 1881, he would have had access to it in the preparation of Western Europe in the Eighth Century.

³¹H. Hahn (Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reichs, 741-752)

to which the mayors had come. They ensured by this move the time-honored legitimacy of their position and then proceeded to meet their foes.

More than any previous campaign of Carloman and Pepin, the Bavarian War of 743 presented a situation of manifold implications for the belligerents. Frankish domestic difficulties affected the participants and served to intensify hostilities. Hiltrudis, the sister of the two Austrasian leaders, fled Francia against the wishes of her brothers and obtained both refuge and, eventually, matrimony from Duke Odilo of Bavaria. The fact that Martel's concubine, Swanahilda, had originally come from Bavaria suggests the source of the connection between Hiltrudis and Duke Odilo. Much conjecture necessarily surrounds this marriage alliance, for the same reason that obscurities often hound Aquitanian affairs.³² A full discussion of the

["Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte"; Berlin, 1863], pp. 41, 164) discusses the lineage and obscurity of this last Merovingian king.

³²Not only does confusion exist relative to the marriage but also with the status of Swanahilda. The index of the Annales Mettenses Priores (p. 117) lists her as a concubine of Martel instead of his wife, while that of the Chronicle of Fredegar refers to her as the wife of Martel. Secondly, the confusion is often compounded in regard to Hiltrudis and her relationship to Swanahilda. On the latter, the present author is inclined to agree with the remarks of Bladé (Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 155) who concludes: "Sonnichilde, veuve de ce Maire du Palais, s'était déclarée pour Odilon, et lui avait, malgré l'opposition de Pépin et de Carloman, donné pour femme sa fille Hiltrude." Few contemporary sources enlarge upon the background of Hiltrudis,

rebellions against the Austrasians would not always edify the exploits of the "glorious brothers," as one annalist calls them.³³ Moreover, in a similar vein, this same apologist, explaining this particular uprising, noted that Odilo rebelled in reaction to the generosity of the Franks and because of the overconfidence fostered by his own prosperity.³⁴

The united front presented against the Franks failed. Carloman and Pepin advanced into the field, met the enemy in battle, and, collectively defeating them, brought Duke Odilo of Bavaria into submission.³⁵ Although the details of this

preferring to ignore her and the part she played in the period immediately preceding the war. The Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 33), interestingly enough, comments on her as the "filiam Caroli" without reference as to who her mother was. Hiltrudis is assigned similar origins by Engelbert Muhlbacher (Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern [Stuttgart, 1959], p. 47) without expressly identifying her as Swanahilda's daughter: ". . . gegen ihren Willen hatte er ihre auf Anstiften Swanahilds entflohene Schwester Hiltrud geehelicht." Whatever the case, her sympathies lay with the Bavarian cause throughout.

³³Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 33: "Qua de causa compulsi sunt gloriosi germani exercitum contra ipsum ducere."

³⁴Ibid.: "Ogdilo dux Bawariorum, qui Hiltrudem filiam Caroli ad se fugientem in coniugium sibi copulaverat contra voluntatem Pippini et Carolomanni, ipsum etiam ducatum suum, quod largiente olim Carolo principe habuerat, a dominatione Francorum se subtrahere nitebatur."

³⁵Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 112, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 180: "Inde reversi, anno secundo regni eorum cognatus eorum Odilo dux Bagoariorum contra ipsos rebellionem excitat. Compulsi sunt generalem cum Francis in Bagoaria admoveri exercito; venientesque super fluvium qui dicitur Lech, sederunt super ripam

specific engagement are for the most part superfluous to a discussion of Franco-Aquitainian relations, the fact that Duke Hunald joined an offensive north of the Loire in cooperation with the rebellion of Odilo is of importance.

While the Bavarians and their allies were being hard pressed elsewhere, the Aquitanians under Hunald bridged the Loire and marched up to the city of Chartres. One annalist reported that this was done at the suggestion of Duke Odilo, with messengers relaying information from one side to the other.³⁶ Obviously the rebels intended to create a diversion to which the Franks would respond and therefore fragment their Bavarian attack. Unfortunately, no mention appears of the effect or repercussion of Hunald's raid on Chartres. That which is known merely indicates that the Aquitanians delivered their blow with a strong band of men and destroyed the town by fire, and special attention was often given to the ruin

fluminis uterque exercitus, hinc inde se mutuo videntes, usque ad quindecim diebus. Qui tantundem provocati inrisionibus gentes illius, indignatione commoti, periculo se dederunt per loca deserta et palustria, ubi mons transiunde nullatenus adherat. Noctequē inruentes, divisīs exercitibus, eos inprovivos occupaverunt; commissoque proelio, praedictus dux Odilo, ceso exercitu suo, vix cum paucis turpiter ultra Igne fluvium fugiendo evasit. His triumphis peractis, non sine dispendio multorum, tamen feliciter victores ad propria remeaverunt."

³⁶Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 35: "Haec autem fecit per suggestionem Otilonis ducis, qui per internuntios fedus inierunt, ut unusquisque eorum irruentibus Francis ferre alteri alter subsidium debuissent."

of the Church of the Holy Mother Mary.³⁷

The lack of additional information whets the curiosity of scholars. While Hunald had a powerful force under his command, which even Austrasian accounts acknowledge, why greater advantage did not accrue to the rebels remains a mystery. One wonders whether or not Hunald's timidity overtook him in his hour of success. Did he remember the might of the mayors, or did he simply have a limited objective that, upon completion, required him to return home? It would appear that the cause of the rebellion would have been served better if this initial success had been further pursued. Additional investigation, however, sheds no light in the direction of the factors motivating Duke Hunald.

With success in Bavaria, the mayors did not forget the insult of Duke Hunald. In the campaign of the following year, they once again turned their attentions to the south. Dividing

³⁷The Chronicle of Fredegar does not discuss the attack of Duke Hunald on the city of Chartres. The Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 743, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 35) treats the affair at far greater length than any other account: "Haec autem dum apud Bawarios agerentur, Hunaldus dux Aquitaniae Ligerim transiens, cum manu valida ad Carnotis urbem perveniens, ipsa civitate diruta, igne eam cremavit cum ecclesia episcopali, quae in honorem sanctae Dei genitricis Mariae consecrata fuerat." A complete dependence upon this Annal for information on the raid is unnecessary. Other contemporary works recount the details, although with less emphasis. For example, the Chronicon Vedastinum, a. 743, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. Waitz, XIII (Hannover, 1881), p. 702: "Haec dum agerentur Hunaldus, cuius iam mentionem fecimus, Ligerim transivit, Carnatis urbem igne concremavit."

their forces,³⁸ Carloman and Pepin first pacified the discontent in their respective kingdoms before uniting to tend to Aquitaine. Then, crossing over the Loire with a sizeable army, they pitched camp in Aquitanian territory. The extent of their preparations so overawed Duke Hunald that he declined the opportunity of meeting the mayors in the field. Instead, he decided to attempt the maintenance of his position and kingdom by submitting to the Franks. He succeeded in this but only at considerable cost to himself.

At what price did he achieve his objective? He released his captive of several years standing, Abbot Lantfred,³⁹ and negotiated a treaty with the mayors. Hereby Hunald took an oath of fidelity and promised thereafter to obey explicitly every wish of the Austrasian leaders. He also handed over hostages and assured his masters that all of his resources remained at their disposal.⁴⁰ Probably only by such extreme measures

³⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 113, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 180-181.

³⁹See above fn. 19.

⁴⁰Two different accounts elaborate on what took place as a result of this invasion. The shorter, Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (114, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 181), says: "Inde reversi praecelsi germani, sequente anno provocati coturno Wasconorum, iterum usque ad Ligerem fluvium pariter adunati venerunt. Quod videntes Vascones, praeoccupaverunt, pacem petentes et voluntatem Pippini in omnibus exequentes, muneratum eum, a finibus suis ut rideret, precibus obtinuerunt." The other, Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 744, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 35-36), with its praise

could he keep his status intact and, as well, the integrity of Aquitaine. By his timely intercession, he spared further misery from descending upon his duchy, as so often had occurred when the Franks invaded. He averted a battle of proportions that would surely have been disastrous, and he warded off the customary harrying of the countryside that monotonously accompanied almost all Frankish invasions. By his appeasement, however, Hunald demonstrated as well the basic weakness of his proto-feudal position. He dared not even to engage the Austrasians; he abased himself in a primitive manner and sought the mercy of the invader. Far from being the master of a united, nationalist state, the duke merely endured the crisis while experiencing the leniency of the Carolingians. In the latter respect, the mayors conversely grasped the significance of the tenuous nature of semi-feudal allegiances, thereby tolerating Hunald's provocations. Indeed, the mayors lived with a similar brand of particularism in Francia and no doubt aspired toward a reconciliation with a local Frankish duke in Aquitaine.

An era of improved Franco-Aquitania relations under

for the Austrasian mayors, notes: "Pippinus et Carolomannus non immemores iniuriarum Hunaldi perfidi ducis et vastationis, quam illis [in] Baioariam dimicantibus perpetravit, colleco exercitu Ligerem transeunt et castra in finibus Aquitaniae ponunt. Videns autem Hunaldus, quod eis resistere non valeret, omnem voluntatem eorum se facere sacramentis et obsidibus datis spopondit ipsumque cum omnibus quae habebat invictorum principum servitio se mancipavit."

Hunald never came. Shortly after the crisis of 744, the duke relinquished his post following a famous domestic incident involving his own family. Late that same year, Hunald lured his brother, Hatton, with whom he did not get along, away from the city of Poitiers to his court. Once he gained control over him, he broke his pledge of safe conduct and inflicted a barbarous injury on him: Hunald blinded Hatton and then put him in captivity.⁴¹ Within the feudal hierarchy, if this act would not have incapacitated the duke for leadership, it definitely would have restrained the respect and obedience shown him by the nobility. Whether through guilt or political expediency, Hunald found himself unable to continue as Duke of Aquitaine. He had sustained himself in the past throughout many tribulations inflicted by the Franks but could not endure this family crisis. Accordingly, he retired to the monastery on the Île de Ré and took the vows of a monk. Before his departure, he made certain that the duke of his choice would succeed him. He promoted his son Waifar to the position.⁴²

⁴¹Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 744, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 36: "Eodem quoque anno Hunaldus dux germanum suum nomine Atonem per falsa sacramenta decipiens de Pictavis ad se venire iussit, cui statim oculos eruit, et sub custodia re-trusit. Nec multo post idem Hunaldus corona capitis deposita et monachi voto promisso in monasterium quod Radis insula situm est intravit filiumque suum Waifarum in principatu reliquit."

⁴²Also, the Chronicon Vedastinum (a. 744, M.G.H., SS., p. 702) similarly reports this event, although in a more abbreviated fashion than the Annales Mettenses Priores: "Hunaldus

Although this final incident in Hunald's ducal career is concisely reported, the motivation for his assault on Hatton receives no attention. It may be that Hatton sympathized, or even collaborated with, the Austrasians and thus earned Hunald's enmity.⁴³

Perhaps more improbable, though interesting to entertain, is the thought that Hunald wished to secure the succession of his line in the position of ascendancy in Aquitaine. Being desirous of an early retirement, he disposed of the possibility of an ambitious brother with Frankish support supplanting his son by rendering Hatton unfit for leadership. The reality of a threat from this side of the house did indeed exist. Evidence to substantiate this resides in the fact that Hatton's heirs, through his eldest son Lupus, became the independent dukes of Gascony.⁴⁴ Whether the one situation or the other prevailed

Attonem suum decipiens germanum, ad se venire fecit, eumque caecum reddens, sub custodia retrusit; et nec multo post temporis, coma dempta sibi capitis, monachile habitum sumpsit, Waifarum, ex se genitum, principatum relinquens regni."

⁴³Bladé, Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 157: "Peut-être son frère Hatton s'était-il laissé séduire par les promesses de Pépin et de Carloman."

⁴⁴Devic and Vaissete, Histoire Générale de Languedoc, I, p. 815: "Les historiens ne font plus mention d'Hatton, ce qui nous donne lieu de conjecturer qu'il mourut bientôt après, & peut-être du supplice que son frère lui avoit fait souffrir. Il laissa plusieurs enfans de Vandrade, son épouse, dont nous avons parlé ailleurs. L'aine, qui s'appeloit Loup, fut dans la suite duc de Gascogne, & donna en mariage à Waifre sa fille unique, nommée Adèle, ce qui prouve la réunion de ces deux branches de la maison d'Aquitaine."

to instigate Hunald's cruelty, no one knows.

By the time that Hunald abdicated in 744, the Franks had managed to entrench solidly what Charles Martel had left behind for his heirs. The mayors had consistently and spectacularly demonstrated their ability to crush military insurrections, thereby subverting the more ambitious separatist aspirations of Duke Hunald. The collapse of the Bavarian venture above all else must have disillusioned the Aquitanian duke. Moreover, in the following year (744), his submission without battle to the mayors suggests that Hunald had come around to the point of absolutely fearing the Franks. Perhaps even earlier at Chartres, he had quaked at the thought of further depredations against them. On the other hand, the young mayors had learned their father's lessons well. The keystone to their policy consisted of the expert isolation and systematic removal of discontent. As for the separatist future of the duchy, it looked bleak in the context of Duke Hunald's heritage. Here, however, prospects for the future ultimately hinged on the foresight and the character of Hunald's son, the new Duke Waifar. In this, the Aquitanians were not to be disappointed, either in the inventiveness or the resourcefulness of the new duke in the face of superior Frankish odds.

CHAPTER V

THE ASSERTION OF CAROLINGIAN SUZERAINTY OVER AQUITAINE

Pepin III had already proved his leadership abilities at the time of the political demise of Duke Hunald in 744. Although he was quite young, the prospects of his skillful management of the Frankish state, and in turn the extension of his suzerainty over Aquitaine, were apparent. In this respect, Aquitaine had not much to which it could look forward. Nevertheless, as with Hunald, an aggressiveness, and even haughtiness, emerged in the character of his successor, Duke Waifar. It eventually embroiled Francia and the duchy in hostilities. Initially, however, Waifar trod warily in his administrative role while dealing with the Franks. Assiduously avoiding any affront, he gradually shifted his stance to the extent that by the following decade the duke openly scorned his Frankish overlord, who now claimed a kingly title.¹ With the passage of yet another decade, the relationship further

¹Consult the account of Ludwig Oelsner (Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter König Pippin ["Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte"; Leipzig, 1871], pp. 1-41) concerning the events leading up to the coronation (751) of Pepin III as King of the Franks and the corresponding ramifications of this act.

degenerated into a seemingly endless war of attrition that sapped the attentions and energy of both participants.

Upon succeeding to power in 744, however, Waifar first escaped the rigors of war that had formerly drained the resources of his father. The condition of Austrasian leadership then confronting Waifar diverged considerably from that which opposed Duke Hunald. Earlier, a mature mayor, capitalizing on better ties with the Austrasian aristocracy, thwarted Hunald, whereas the engrossed Pepin spent the 740's trying to re-establish these nonheritable links at home prior to enforcing his will abroad. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say what altered the Aquitanian duke's domestic circumstance to embolden him vis-à-vis the Carolingians. Since the authors of eighth century chronicles and annals were preoccupied with discussions of Austrasian warfare, Waifar's early pacific policy evades their attentions. Tranquillity and relative obscurity enveloped the duchy throughout this era. Perhaps more significantly, a series of internal changes² to the north, which consolidated Pepin's position in the 750's, probably explains more adequately Waifar's growing belligerence. During this peaceful era, it is possible that Waifar even minted coins for circulation in his duchy.³ Whether or not

²See below (pp. 153-154) for the à propos discussion of these changes.

³A measure of his prosperity, it is nonetheless doubtful whether or not Waifar issued coins. An article by Adrien

he did this, the Franks permitted a laissez aller for the provincials south of the Loire without intervening in their affairs until provoked to do so in the early 760's. Much of this can be explained by the cautious nature of Waifar at his accession and also by the weakness of Pepin, who struggled to assemble the elements of power in a semi-feudal state.

The relationship between Waifar and Pepin began to take on new dimensions within four years (748) after the duke came to power. The records of the chronology for the events that explain the war occasionally leave something to be desired. It is known that Pepin exercised considerable patience in dealing with Waifar. On two occasions, the Austrasian resorted to the use of embassies, not troops, in reprimanding the duke. The year 748 marked the beginning of difficulties that prompted the first of these embassies to venture into the duchy. A troublesome family matter then arose in Francia that completely disregarded the limits of territorial boundaries. The incident

de Longpérier ("Deniers de Waifre, Duc d'Aquitaine," Revue Numismatique, Series B, III [1858], 331) advances the notion that he did: "Or, sur l'une de ces deux monnaies d'argent on lit très-distinctement VVFARIVS autour d'un grand A." Another scholar, Jean-François Bladé (Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 172-173), after discussing the matter with qualified numismatists, casts doubt as to the possibility of this. Carrying the case further, yet another, François Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 40), accepts the findings of Longpérier by remarking: "Ce fut vraisemblablement pendant ce temps que des monnaies furent frappées à son nom, avec la marque de l'atelier de Melle en Poitou." Quite possibly, this riddle can never be solved.

concerned Grifo, Pepin's brother, who had greatly perturbed the mayor at the time of Charles Martel's death in 741. Perhaps the pangs of Pepin's conscience, after he deprived Grifo of his inheritance, prompted him to deal more leniently with the princely brother's disobedience than would customarily have been the case.⁴ Indeed, Pepin even went beyond the expediency of toleration and extended to his dispossessed brother a grant of land in 748.⁵ The arrangement worked badly because the indignant Grifo completely rejected the measured hospitality of Pepin, obviously not wishing to subordinate himself to this benefactor, nor to incur any favors from him. No sooner had Grifo been installed at Le Mans, the capital of his domain--which included twelve comitatus--than he rebelled, leaving all behind, and made for Aquitaine. There, after having scorned those above him, says the Annales of Metz, he obtained asylum through the kindness of Duke Waifar, described by this same annalist as the "perfidious leader of the Aquitanians."⁶

⁴Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l'Empire Carolingien (Paris, 1949), p. 51: "Le cas de Grifon n'était sans doute pas unique"

⁵This arrangement might be termed a "governorship." For the details, see Annales Regni Francorum, a. 748, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ.) p. 8: "Grifonem vero partibus Niustriae misit et dedit ei XII comitatos. Inde iterum Grifo fugiens Wasconiam petiit et ad Waifarum ducem Aquitaniorum pervenit."

⁶Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 749, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 42: "Nam Griponi Cinomannicam urbem cum XII comitatibus dedit. Quibus ille solito more despectis, Wasconiam

It is difficult to know precisely when Grifo defected to the side of the Aquitanian duke. One annalist placed this in his entry for 748, while another noted it in the following year.⁷ Whatever the case, he remained there for several years, while Pepin grew increasingly disgusted over the creation of this new hotbed of discontent.

In reaction, the mayor, anointed king in 751, took the necessary steps to dissolve the union by serving the duke notice. Pepin dispatched legates into Aquitaine ordering Waifar to relinquish Grifo into his hands. The Metz annalist recorded this as having occurred in 750.⁸ In light of the relationship

petiit et ad Wagfarium ducem perfidum Aquitaniorum pervenit." Pepin's generosity to Grifo is all the more noteworthy in consideration of the fact that he had just foiled an attempt of his belligerent brother to establish an independent state in Bavaria where the old Duke Odilo had recently died. Lanfridus, the leader of the Alamanni, had thrown in with Grifo, thereby necessitating a confrontation between Pepin and the newly formed coalition. The mayor defeated the rebels, elevated Tassilo to his deceased father's position as Duke of Bavaria, and then forgivingly established Grifo in Neustria with his new possessions.

⁷See above fns. 5 and 6. Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 39) puts Grifo's flight in yet another year, 750: "Pépin avait un frère, nommé Griffon, qui, après avoir essayé de se créer un État indépendant en Bavière, avait reçu de son frère le gouvernement de la ville du Mans et de douze autres comtés circonvoisins. Ne pouvant supporter cette séquestration. Griffon s'était enfui en Aquitaine (750)."

⁸Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 750, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 42: "Unde rumor potentiae eius et timor virtutis transiit in universas terras. Direxit autem legatos suos ad Waifarum, ut sibi fratrem suum ad se fugientem redderet. Quod ille pravo inito consilio facere contempsit." The author of the Annales Regni Francorum neglects to say anything about the

between the Franks and Aquitanian dukes over the past fifty years, Waifar issued to the emissaries an altogether predictable response. He refused. (The same annalist took note of the coronation of Pepin prior to the dispatch of the Austrasian legates to Aquitaine. This hints at the possibility of Waifar's displeasure at Pepin's adoption of a monarchical title. Certainly the mayor, ceremoniously replacing the Merovingian king, must have adversely affected many Frankish aristocrats, above all the entourage of Grifo.) Waifar's refusal amounted to a repudiation of his fidelity to Pepin. The new king had applied the pressure, and Grifo felt compelled to flee Aquitaine the following year in order not to jeopardize any further Waifar's standing with the Franks.⁹ He had already accomplished this,

mission of these legates to Duke Waifar's court. For a most interesting interpretation of Grifo's role in the scheme of Frankish politics, see Walter Mohr (Die Karolingische Reichsseite [Münster, Westfalen, 1962], p. 15) who connects him with the faction led by Carloman: "Eine Vereinigung der Anhänger Karlmanns mit denen Grifos dürfte gedroht haben, weshalb Pippin, um dem entgegenzuwirken, Grifo für sich zu gewinnen suchte. Dieses Experiment schlug fehl. Als dann schliesslich Grifo aus dem Frankenreiche flüchtet, unternimmt Pippin den entscheidenden Schritt. Er wendet sich jetzt um Unterstützung seiner Herrschaft an den Papst, wodurch gleichzeitig die Anhänger Karlmanns und Grifos in ihren Bestrebungen lahmgelegt werden konnten."

⁹The unfortunate story of Grifo came to an end for Aquitanian affairs and otherwise, once he crossed beyond the borders of the province. With a band of followers, he departed for the security of the Lombard king's court but never completed the journey. He perished in an ambush set by Theodewinus, the Count of Vienne. This, the death of Grifo, the Annales Regni Francorum (a. 753, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 10) relates:

however, at least in the eyes of Pepin.

In addition to the incident concerning Grifo, several other things occurred which intensified the anxieties of both sides at about this same time. For one, Pepin advanced into Septimania in 752 with his army. Besieging the old Gothic city of Narbonne, he managed eventually to gain its possession and the submission of the Saracenic leader, Suleiman.¹⁰ Duke Waifar must surely have believed that he was the victim of a planned offensive meant to hem him in on all sides. Furthermore, in the following year, Pope Stephen visited Francia, thus heralding the creation of a Franco-Papal alliance that further isolated Duke Waifar within his own domain.¹¹ A closer relationship with Rome appealed to Pepin and he consistently, though prudently,¹² worked in that direction; thus, he bequeathed

"Et dum reversus est de ipso itinere, nuntiatum est ei, quod Grifo, qui in Wasconiam fugitus est, germanus eius, occisus fuisset." More details appear concerning this event in the Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (118, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 183), which notes that the engagement took place near the present-day city of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne above the river Arche.

¹⁰Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 752, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 43-44.

¹¹The Annales Regni Francorum (a. 753, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 10) significantly relates the occasion of Pope Stephen's visit: "Eodemque anno Stephanus papa venit in Franciam, adiutorium et solatium quaerendo pro iustitiis sancti Petri;"

¹²Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der Merowinger und des Königs Pippin, p. 39. Concerning the prudence which Pepin displayed in his dealings with Rome, particularly as his caution

to his son, Charles, a policy that he had forged. In short, to Waifar it seemed that Pepin, king of the Franks, extended the tentacles of his power in an ever more inclusive fashion to strangle Aquitaine and separate it from sources of possible future support.

In retaliation, or perhaps through his ambitious desires to spread his own influence into Septimania, Duke Waifar struck against the city of Narbonne. Although the degree of his success and the date of the enterprise are uncertain, the duke attacked after the successful campaign of the Franks into the same area.¹³ In so doing, Waifar further plunged himself into even deeper trouble with Pepin.

During the course of the Narbonnese raids, Waifar had committed a serious infringement upon Pepin's prerogatives. The disgruntled king charged him with the execution of certain Goths to whom he had given his protection. To gain indemnity (on this occasion a Wergild payment), the Frankish king once again sent into Aquitaine legates who demanded satisfaction for an offense. Besides this particular concern, however, the king voiced his disapproval of the duke in several other matters as

so involved a third party, the Lombards, see David H. Miller, "Papal-Lombard Relations during the Pontificate of Pope Paul I: The Attainment of an Equilibrium of Power in Italy, 756-767," Catholic Historical Review, LV (1969), 368-376.

¹³Chronicon Moissiacense, M.G.H., SS., p. 294: "Wai-farius, princeps Aquitaniae, Narbonam deprædat."

well. Later events proved the occasion to be a prelude to war. Among the other grievances, Waifar had harbored certain refugees (specified as the king's men) from Francia that Pepin wanted returned. The continuator of Fredegar's chronicle told of these transactions at considerable length, placing them in his entry for the year 760.¹⁴ The aggregate of several incidents (i.e., the case of these refugees, the rebellion of Grifo, and the reaction to Pepin's coronation) points to the conclusion that Pepin contended with a core of dissidents at home and abroad who weakened and diffused his power. Quite in keeping with this semi-feudal age, these Frankish malcontents sympathized with the separatist objectives of Duke Waifar, and their situation illustrated a fundamental shortcoming of contemporary Frankish statecraft. Pepin only tentatively held the allegiance of his nobility, and he lacked an adequate revenue whereby he could enforce his will by other means. In the latter regard, the Austrasians had encroached by necessity for many years upon the property of the Church in order to secure needed funds for the purpose of rewarding persons instrumental in the fulfillment of

¹⁴Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici
Continuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 124, p. 186:
 ". . . mittere non deberet et Gotos praedicto rege, quod
 dudum Waiofarius contra legis ordine occiserat, et solvere
 deberet et homines suos, quod de regno Francorum ad ipso Waio-
 fario principe confugium fecerant, reddere deberet."

their policies.¹⁵ As the trend of events increasingly alienated the king and the duke, Church property once again attracted utmost concern, reminiscent of the era of Frankish migration into the province during the preceding century.

Over the years, the Frankish Church had accumulated south of the Loire River much land from which it derived revenue. Duke Waifar disliked the transference of this wealth out of Aquitaine into Francia, and he stopped the practice.¹⁶ Considering the structure of Carolingian feudalism and its base of support, Waifar had struck the king in a spot that threatened the heart of his military establishment. This incensed Pepin, but the full implications of the duke's embargo are realized only when they are related to the king's recent policies.

Twice during the decade of the 750's Pepin had ventured

¹⁵Both Alfons Dopsch (The Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization, p. 281) and F. L. Ganshof (The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy, p. 95) discuss the economic pressures that stimulated Carolingian involvement with ecclesiastical property.

¹⁶Ibid.: ". . . praedictus rex Pippinus legationem ad Waiofario Aquitanico principe mittens, petens ei per legatos suos, ut res ecclesiarum de regno ipsius, qui in Aquitania sitas erant, redderet, et sub immunitates nomine, sicut ab antea fuerant, conservatas esse deberent; et iudices hac exactores supra predictas res ecclesiarum, quod a longo tempore factum non fuerat," A second account (Annales Regni Francorum, a. 760, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 18) also gives the Austrasian side of the story, however, somewhat more briefly: "Tunc Pippinus rex, cernens Waifarum ducem Aquitaniorum minime consentire iustitias ecclesiarum partibus, quae erant in Francia, consilium fecit cum Francis, ut iter ageret supra dictas iustitias quaerendo in Aquitania."

into Italy to assist the papacy against the Lombards. He succeeded in exalting the cause of the Church in Italy, but in the process he had to neglect affairs elsewhere. Consequently, this allowed Duke Waifar to do much as he pleased in Aquitaine and probably more than he would have normally done in restricting the movement of Church revenue out of his duchy. Moreover, Pepin's recent entente with Rome simply magnified the gravity of Waifar's offense against the Frankish Church. The whole affair embarrassed the king, for if he could not prevent ecclesiastical matters from becoming a cause célèbre in his kingdom, how effectively could he carry out the task of protecting Rome's interests against her enemies beyond the borders of Francia?

With this additional problem weighing upon his patience, Pepin thus instructed his legates of 760 to demand from Waifar the restoration of the time-hallowed rights of the Frankish Church in Aquitaine.¹⁷ In essence, the Frankish legates had delivered an ultimatum to the duke. As such, it was admirably timed, for Pepin was then relatively free to turn his military resources upon Aquitaine. If this were his original intention, Waifar's reply did not disappoint him. The duke rejected every one of the demands that the king placed upon him.¹⁸

¹⁷Only the Continuations of Fredegar's Chronicle (124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186) mentions the legates which Pepin sent to Duke Waifar.

¹⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186: "Haec

The prejudice of contemporary Austrasian authors concerning the tyranny of Waifar in Aquitaine is not to be taken seriously. Some Septimanians actually preferred his rule to that of Pepin.¹⁹ But Pepin's patience had a limit. He had tolerated Aquitanian slights of increasing frequency and severity. The cumulative effect of these insults simply pushed him to the point of losing his temper. With the Aquitanians, however, a rear guard action remained the only feasible option left open to them in thwarting Frankish dominance. The fact that the Franks were becoming the major power in western Europe gravely concerned the Aquitanians, but it perplexed as well the more powerful of the other outlying people, including the Bavarians, the Saxons, and the Lombards. Normally, these people confronted the Austrasians severally but occasionally they did manage to align their efforts. What specific means short of rebellion were left open to these people to combat the Franks individually? Both Bavaria and Aquitaine offered asylum to dissident Austrasian nobles;²⁰ they undermined the king's

omnia Waiofarius, quod praedictus rex per legatos suos ei mandaverat, hoc totum facere contempsit."

¹⁹Annalium Fuldensium Pars Prima, a. 759, M.G.H., SS., p. 347: "Waipharius dux in Aquitania tirannidem exercens, pressuras aecclesiarum Dei movet, depredationes et iniusticias multas facit." Quoting from the Marca Hispanica (239) for evidence, Bladé (Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux, XIV, 173) discusses the implications of the preference among the Septimanian aristocracy for an Aquitanian overlord rather than a Frankish one.

²⁰For Bavarian affairs, see above fn. 6 concerning the

prerogatives in both provinces; and, whenever possible, they generally obstructed his rule in both petty and important affairs. These acts remained the best alternatives by which they could destroy respect for Carolingian power internally and externally. However, for both people, time was simply running out as Pepin gradually attained political mastery. By the 760's, it must have struck the Aquitanian duke that if he did not act at that point, he could not do so at a later, less opportune moment.

Initially, however, neither side (Aquitaine and Francia) suspected the direction that the conflict would take, nor the gravity of the issues at stake. Duke Waifar first impudently displayed his independence while Pepin increasingly took offense at his haughty ways. During the course of the decade (760's), both sides became more embittered as the Frankish objective in war changed from reprimanding the Aquitanians to subjugating them and then to destroying the dynasty of old Duke Eudes.²¹ However, by placing an embargo on the wealth of the Austrasian Church, Duke Waifar had piqued the king. Indeed, by so doing, he touched the very heart of the Frankish administration of Aquitaine. The property of the Austrasian Church in the duchy

case of Grifo and below page 169 for the rebellion of Duke Tassilo.

²¹Thomas Hodgkin, The Life of Charlemagne (New York, 1902), p. 106.

possessed an extraterritoriality that aided the Carolingians in several important ways. Above all else, it provided the Franks with a perpetual entrée into the management of the duchy, and, conversely, it continually served to detract from the autonomous administration of the duke in the affairs of his duchy.²² It is also significant to note that upon the termination of hostilities at the end of the decade, a restoration of the former rights of the Austrasian Church in Aquitaine took place. Thus, the value of these grants was recognized and not allowed to elapse forever as victim to the ravages of war.²³

²²In many ways this controversy strikingly reminds one of the investiture problem as it affected the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire in the eleventh century. For an analysis of the importance of the earlier episode in the eighth century see Engelbert Muhlbacher (Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern, p. 81): "Nicht der aquitanische Herzog, sondern nur der fränkische König konnte den Kirchen die Immunität verliehen haben. Nur an ein dem Reich untergebenes Land konnte die Forderung gestellt werden, sie zu achten, in ihrer Achtung lag die Anerkennung der Oberhoheit, in ihrer Misachtung die Leugnung derselben. Die Immunität gab dem fränkischen Kirchengut in Aquitanien eine extraterritoriale Stellung, sie zog der Verwaltung des Herzogs, dem Streben nach selbstständigkeit eine scharfe Grenze. Im Kirchengut besaß aber das Reich auch Stützpunkte seiner Herrschaft."

²³Ewig, Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, I, 50: "Cette restitution semble avoir été réalisée immédiatement après 768. Nous en avons les preuves pour les églises de Reims, de Trèves et de Verdun, et nous sommes en droit de conclure à une restitution générale des biens des églises austrasiennes en Aquitaine. Il s'agit bien d'une restitution: car les biens aquitains des églises citées se rencontrent dans les enclaves austrasiennes de l'époque mérovingienne: dans le Poitou, le Limousin, l'Auvergne, le Rouergue, la Provence austrasienne. Les donations nouvelles n'allaient pas aux évêchés, mais plutôt aux monastères austrasiens."

Waifar found a way to insult Pepin at the very beginning of the conflict. Not content to leave the king's demands simply unanswered or politely refused, he sent three nobles of his court to rebuff Pepin personally. He used as his emissaries Chunibert, Count of Bourges; Bladinus, Count of Auvergne; and Bishop Bertelannus of Bourges. The names of these men betoken their Germanic, Frankish origins. Thus Waifar scorned the Austrasian with a flourish that left him quite indignant.²⁴ It therefore should have come as no surprise to Waifar when Pepin invaded Aquitaine later that same year. Interestingly enough, the duke took no steps to counter the invasion, and, after viewing the maneuvers of the king, he quickly came to heel and dispatched messengers, Otbertus and Dadinus, to the Franks, promising in particular the restoration of the rights of the Church.²⁵ To acquire Waifar's submission so readily, Pepin had crossed the Loire into the district of Berry and

²⁴Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 186-187: "Dum haec ageretur, Waiofarius, inito iniquo consilio, contra Pippino rege Francorum insidias parat; exercitum suum cum Uniberto comite Bitorivo et Bladino comite Arvernico, qui dudum ante anno superiore ad praedicto rege Pippino cum Bertelanno episcopo Bitorice civitatis missus fuerat et animum regis ad iracundiam nimium provocasset,"

²⁵Annales Regni Francorum, a. 760, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 18: "Et pervenit usque in locum, qui dicitur Tedoad. Et cum haec vidisset Waiofarius, misit missos suos, Otbertum et Dadinum, et dedit obsides Adalgarium et Eitharium regi Pippino, ut omnia rederet, quicquid supradictus rex quaerebat in causis ecclesiasticis."

thoroughly devastated it up to Auvergne. In addition to Waifar's concessions concerning the rights of the Frankish Church in Aquitaine, he also relinquished hostages and gave oaths to the king, who returned to Francia without suffering any casualties.²⁶ For having defied Pepin in such a blustery fashion, the duke's performance is astonishing, but he eventually reacted when the odds for delivering a blow were more in his favor.

Pepin returned home in 760, thinking that he had resolved the Aquitanian problem sufficiently and that he would not have to turn his attention in that direction for some time. This is reflected in the fact that he held his annual Mayfield for 761 in the northern part of his kingdom at Düren (between the cities of Aachen and Köln), signifying his concern with that locality for the coming campaigns of the summer. Even while he was convened in his council (761), word came to Pepin that Waifar had broken his promises of the preceding year by crossing over into Burgundia, laying waste the whole region of Autun, and destroying the approaches to Chalon before returning into Aquitaine with much booty.²⁷ The angry king changed his plans and prepared

²⁶Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 124, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 186: "Waiofarius princeps Aquitanie per legatos suos pacem supplicans, sacramenta vel obsides ibidem donat, et omnes iustitias, quos praefatus rex Pippinus per legatos suos ei mandaverat, in placito instituto facere deberet. Rex Pippinus cum omni exercitu suo inleso re-versus est ad propria."

²⁷The Annales Regni Francorum (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 18) reports on the interruption of Pepin's council at Düren by this bad news: "Dum et supranominatus rex synodum suum

to retaliate against the duke for his disobedience. For Aquitaine, the act amounted to a fatal error. By raiding east rather than north, perhaps Waifar believed that the provocation would not be great enough to merit the full weight of Pepin's wrath. If this was his logic, he erred, for the king disregarded his previous planning and took his entire army south into Aquitaine.²⁸ The affair proved to Pepin that he could never again accept the oaths of the duke at face value. From this time forth, he relentlessly pursued Waifar. The succeeding campaign has additional interest in light of the fact that the eldest of the king's sons, Charles, participated in the foray alongside his father.²⁹

teneret in villa, quae dicitur Dura, nuntiatum est ei, quod Waifarius in omnibus mentitus est;" The Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 51), among others, details the extent of Duke Waifar's devastations: "Waifarius autem, inito pravo consilio, exercitum Wasconum in fines Burgundiae direxit, qui usque ad Cavallonem urbem totam illam partem Burgundiae vastaverunt."

²⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: "Cum haec Pippino rege nuntiatum fuisset, quod Waiofarius maximam partem regni sui vastasset et sacramenta, quod ei dederat, fefellisset, nimium in ira commotus, iubet omnes Francos, ut hostiliter, placito instituto, ad Ligerem venissent." The continuator also mentions that Waifar burned down the "villam publicam" or royal villa at Mailly before returning home with much plunder. This undoubtedly further antagonized Pepin.

²⁹Both the Annales S. Amandi (a. 761, M.G.H., SS., p. 10) and the Annales Petaviani (a. 761, M.G.H., SS., p. 11) refer to this. The latter remarks: "iterum Pipinus fuit in Wasconia una cum Karolo : captoque omni pago Alvernico, Burboni castro et Claromonte igne cremavit."

Hurrying south, the Franks passed through Auxerre in route to Nevers, where they crossed the Loire. The first object of their fury was the Aquitanian stronghold of Bourbon on the Allier River. Successful in the reduction of the place, they took captive those of Waifar's men that they could before setting it afire. Moving on south into Auvergne, Pepin laid waste much of the countryside as he went and next directed his attack against the powerful city of Clermont.³⁰ He thus demonstrated his intent to destroy the more secure fortifications of the Aquitanian duke. Systematically accomplishing this, Pepin obviously wanted to deprive Waifar of any sanctuary to which he could turn. During the siege of Clermont, which represented the climax of Pepin's campaign of 761, a frightful fire broke out in which many men, women, and children perished. The annalist of Metz reported that this occurred against the wishes of Pepin but at the initiative of his soldiers. Besides the capitulation of the city, the king gained yet another success at Clermont. His men captured and imprisoned Bladinus, the Count of Auvergne, who had occasioned Pepin's discontent the previous year as the emissary of Waifar. After acquiring further spoils

³⁰Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 125, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: "Cumque in giro castra posuisset, subito a Francis captus atque succensus est; et homines Waiofario, quod ibidem invenit, secum duxit. Maximam partem Aquitaniae vastans, usque urbem Arvernam cum omni exercitu veniens, Claremonte castro captum atque succensum bellando cepit, et multitudinem hominum, tam virorum quam feminarum vel infantum plurimi, in ipso incendio cremaverunt."

in this region, the Frank moved westward, sowing destruction as he went. He proceeded as far as the city of Limoges before terminating the holocaust to return to Francia.³¹ The annalists of the day noted that Pepin celebrated both that Christmas and the following Easter at Quierzy, north of Paris.

Strategically, King Pepin directed his offensive against the central part of Aquitaine, not venturing to strike against the western part of the duchy. In fact, he spent the fighting season of 761 principally in Auvergne, that of 762 in Berry, and 763 in Limousin.³² Pepin concentrated on the more heavily

³¹As is often the case in eighth century Frankish history, a cross referencing of various sources is necessary in order to piece together the relevant facts concerning Pepin's campaign of 761. Only the Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 51) relates the information pertaining to the king's soldiers burning Clermont against his wishes: "Peragrataque Aquitania usque Clarum montem castrum pervenit, quod non sua voluntate, sed bellatorum vi iniecto concrematum est igne." Likewise, the same annalist, with his usual Austrasian bias, singly proceeds to describe Count Bladinus in a derogatory vein: "In quo itinere Blandinus perfidus comes in presentiam Pippini regis captus est." Also, only in the Annales Regni Francorum (a. 761, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 21) does comment appear pertaining to the advance of Pepin into the area around Limoges: "Rex tamen cuncta, quae extra munitiones invenit, ferro et igni devastans, postquam ad Limovicas oppidum venit, reversus est et in villa Carisiaco hibernis habitis natalem Domini ac pascha celebravit." The annalist of Metz as well as the continuator of Fredegar both speak as though Pepin broke off his campaign of 761 after the successful investment of Clermont.

³²With a lull in the fighting taking place in 764, the earlier campaigns of 761, 762, and 763 have been thus outlined. Ludovic Drapeyron (Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CVI, 814-818) classifies Pepin's yearly movements upon this regional basis but without the succeeding connotations.

fortified cities in Aquitaine, and it appears that the topography of the country helped to determine his course of action. The possibility of Duke Waifar utilizing the rough country of the central massif as refuge probably led Pepin to attempt to cut the duchy in two by his thrusts into Auvergne and Limousin. If this figured into his planning of these three campaigns, the king correctly diagnosed the duke's future defensive posture. Waifar later used the rough terrain of the country for his own protection, but in so doing, he had to turn to the western part of the province. Although Pepin could not force the issue in these early years, he at least restricted the duke's movements into this area.

During the third year's (762) campaign in Aquitaine, Pepin directed his onslaught first against the city of Bourges in Berry. On this occasion he brought along both of his sons to gain experience in the art of war.³³ To take the heavily fortified city he had to construct a wall of great strength around Bourges so that no one could come into or go out of it.³⁴

³³Annales Petaviani, a. 762, M.G.H., SS., p. 11: "iterum domnus Pipinus cum dilectis filiis suis Karolo et Karolomanno perrexit in Wasconiam, et adquisivit civitatem Bituricas."

³⁴Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 126, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 187: "Circumsepsit urbem munitionem fortissimam, ita ut nullus egredi ausus fuisset aut ingredi potuisset, cum machinis et omni genere armorum, circumdedit ea vallo. Multis vulneratis plurisque interfectis fractisque muris, cepit urbem et restituit eam dicioni suae iure proelii et homines illos, quos Waiofarius ad defendendam ipsam civitatem dimiserat, clementiam suae pietatis absolvit; dimissisque reversi sunt ad propria."

After breaching the walls with his siege engines, he departed from the example of the previous year at Clermont by treating the inhabitants of Bourges with clemency. His success there was complete³⁵ but time-consuming. After Bourges, he had only enough of that season left to strike once more before returning to Francia for the winter. Accordingly, he made a lateral march westward into Poitou and attacked the castle of Thouars,³⁶ located just south of the Loire. Pepin succeeded here as he had at Bourges and then journeyed to Gentilly on the Seine to celebrate the winter holidays.

In regard to his accomplishments of the year, it may be said that Pepin refrained from penetrating very deeply into Aquitaine, preferring to operate in the northern part of the duchy. At Bourges, however, Pepin captured Count Chunibert; consequently, he had in his clutches both of the laymen who had participated in the legation from Waifar that insulted him two years before. In addition, Pepin now had under his control the two strongest Aquitanian fortifications in the north. The combined force of these things roused Waifar out of his lethargy.

³⁵Annales Guelferbytani, a. 762, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, I (Hannover, 1826), p. 29: "Franci in Wasconia Bituricam conquesierunt:"

³⁶The Annales Regni Francorum terms the fortification at Thouars a "castrum." Both the entries in the Annales Regni Francorum and the Annales Mettenses Priores are quite brief for the year 762. Once again, the continuator of Fredegar contains the bulk of the information concerning this campaign.

With the loss of both Bourges and Clermont, the Aquitanian duke himself marched out to break down the walls of the remainder of his fortified cities. Evidently wanting to prevent them being used against him, he levelled the fortifications of Poitiers, Limoges, Saintes, Périgueux, and Angoulême.³⁷

As for the Franks, King Pepin convened his yearly Mayfield at Nevers on the Loire, indicative of his intentions for the coming season. He then crossed into Waifar's duchy and began thoroughly harrying the countryside, as if in retribution for the duke's recent destruction of Aquitanian fortifications. In particular, the king ravaged not only the favorite retreats of the duke but also the churches and monasteries.³⁸ Not sparing the source of the people's livelihood, Pepin also destroyed the

³⁷Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 129, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 189: "Videns praedictus Waiofarius princeps Aquitanicus, quod castro Claremonte rex bellando ceperat et Bytoricas caput Aquitaniae munitissimam urbem cum machinis capuisset, et inpetum eius ferre non potuisset: omnes civitates, quas in Aquitania provincia dictioni sue erant, id est Pectavis, Lemodicas, Sanctonas, Petrecors, Equolisma vel reliquis quam plures civitates et castella, omnes muros eorum in terra prostravit, quos postea praecellus rex Pippinus reparare iubet et homines suos ad ipsas civitates custodiendum dimisit."

³⁸Ibid., 130, p. 189: "Postea, Ligere transacto, Aquitania pergens, usque ad Lemodicas accessit, totam regionem illam vastans, villas publicas, quae dictione Waiofario erant, totas igne cremare praecepit. Totam regionem illam pene vastatam, monasteria multa depopulata, usque Hisandonem veniens, unde maxima parte Aquitaniae plurimum vinearum erat, coepit ac vastavit; unde pene omni Aquitania, tam ecclesias quam monasteria, divites et pauperes vina habere consuerunt, omnia vastavit et coepit."

vineyards in Limousin. The furthest extent reached in his southward invasion was Cahors on the Lot River. With his 763 expedition he thus surpassed in distance all his previous trips south.³⁹

Two events of considerable importance occurred during the 763 campaign, of which the chronology is obscured. Some time after the advance on Cahors, an ally of King Pepin, his nephew Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, deserted him in the midst of the campaign.⁴⁰ Not only did this weaken the offensive of the king, but also it constituted a terribly serious crime in the eyes of the Franks. Tassilo's defection in time of war (to

³⁹Joseph Calmette (Charlemagne: Sa Vie et son Oeuvre [Paris, 1945], p. 34) writes: "Dans la quatrième campagne, Gaifier est poursuivi jusque sous les murs de Cahors. A ce moment, le sort de l'Aquitaine paraît tranché."

⁴⁰The importance of this desertion overshadowed all other events of the year. Consequently, both the Annales Mettenses Priores (763) and the Annales Regni Francorum (763) elaborate upon this at the very beginning of their entries for that year. In consideration of the succeeding events (i.e., Waifar's subsequent attack upon Pepin's army), Tassilo must have deserted the king shortly after the Franks reached Cahors, thus leaving Pepin more vulnerable than ever for his return trip. Strangely enough, the Continuations of Fredegar omits mentioning this important affair. The Annales Regni Francorum (a. 763, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 20-22), however, imparts a feeling of bitterness that the Franks associated with Tassilo's desertion: "Ibique Tassilo dux Baioariorum postposuit sacramenta et omnia, quae promiserat, et per malum ingenium se inde seduxit, omnia benefacta, quae Pippinus rex avunculus eius ei fecit, postposuit; per ingenia fraudulenta se subtrahendo Baioariam petiit et nusquam amplius faciem supradicti regis videre voluit." During the rest of his life, the Bavarian duke never managed to escape the taint which he had brought down upon his own head.

the Franks the crime of harisliz) undoubtedly bolstered the nerve of Duke Waifar as much as it certainly shook the confidence of Pepin and in turn the whole Aquitanian effort. In reaction, the Aquitanian duke took heart at this turn of events and ventured out to meet Pepin in set battle for the first time in the war. It was all to no avail, however, as the Franks soundly defeated him and slaughtered most of his army. The duke barely managed to escape the field, and the king thereupon returned into Francia as the fighting season drew to a close.⁴¹

Why did Tassilo abandon Pepin's cause at this critical moment? Contemporary annalists spoke only of the ingratitude of the Bavarian by way of an explanation, but that obviously accounts for just the Austrasian point of view. In many respects, the Bavarian and Aquitanian dukes had much in common in their mutual opposition to the Frank. Yet by assisting the king in his destruction of the power of the Aquitanian duke,

⁴¹Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici
Continuationes, 130, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 189-190:
 "Dum haec ageretur, Waiofarius cum exercito magno et plurima
 Wasconorum qui ultra Geronna commorantur, quem antiquitus vocati
 sunt Vaceti, super praedicto rege veniens; set statim solito
 more omnes Wascones terga verterunt, plurimi ibidem a Francis
 interfecti sunt. Hec cernens rex, persequi eum iubet, et usque
 ad noctem eum persequens, vix Waiofarius cum paucis qui reman-
 serant fugiendo evasit. In eo proelio Bladinus comis Arvernorum,
 quem praedictus rex ceperat, postea ad Waiofarium confugium
 fecerat, in eo proelio interfectus est. Rex Pippinus, obpitu-
 lante Deo, victor extitit." Note the fact that Count Bladinus,
 who had recently escaped Frankish captivity, perished in the
 battle. Also, only this account tells of this sally on the part
 of Waifar.

Tassilo simply cut away at the foundations of his own power. An earlier generation had witnessed an alliance between both dukes against the Franks. The scale and success of Pepin's 763 campaign reminded Tassilo of the common problem that confronted both duchies. Although his desertion momentarily crippled the Frankish effort, it did little ultimately to serve the cause of either Bavaria or Aquitaine.

Pepin spent the following winter in his villa at Longlare in what is today Luxembourg. The nature of the particularly harsh winter that followed prevented him, as well as everyone else, from gaining any respite from the labors of the preceding summer.⁴² The rigors of the experience did not necessarily detain him from campaigning in the summer of 764, but he nevertheless desisted from his perennial expeditions into Aquitaine of the preceding four years. Convening his placitum of 764 in Worms, he thus indicated his regional concern over the recent treachery of the Bavarian duke. Indeed, Tassilo's perfidy completely distracted him from any military

⁴²Chronicon Moissiacense, a. 762, M.G.H., SS., p. 294: "gelu magnum Gallias, Illyricum et Thraciam deprimit, et multae arbores olivarum et ficulnearum decoctae gelu aruerunt; sed et germen messium aruit; et supervenienti anno praedictas regiones gravius depressit fames, ita ut multi homines penuria panis perirent." The entries in this chronicle are not consistently made on the basis of years. Austrasian annalists indicate that Europe actually experienced this in the year 763.

action at all that year.⁴³ Moreover, in 765, he further delayed mobilizing his army against either foe but contented himself in preparing for an ambitious project for the year 766. As for Tassilo, he fortunately went his own way without ever having to meet Pepin in battle. Accordingly, he became increasingly independent so that Pepin's son and successor, Charles, had eventually to attend to him. His defection deeply affected Pepin, however, and besides having endangered the king's position, he significantly added to Pepin's anxieties.⁴⁴

The dilatory attitude of the Franks toward their enemies through 764 and 765 prompted consternation among those who favored their cause. In fact, in several quarters the time appeared ripe to take advantage of the recent turn of events to scheme against Pepin. In particular, the repose of the Franks augmented the production of rumors to discredit and

⁴³Annales qui Dicuntur Einhardi, a. 764, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, VI, ed. G. H. Pertz, recog. F. Kurze (Hannover, 1895), p. 23: "Rex Pippinus distracto in diversa animo propter duo bella, Aquitanicum iam olim susceptum et Baioaricum propter Tassilonis ducis defectionem suscipiendum, populi sui generalem conventum habuit in Wormacia civitate." Perhaps the specter of a two front war nagged at the conscience of Pepin. Taking the field against one or the other of these antagonists just might have provided the stimulus for this eventuality.

⁴⁴Thomas Hodgkin's (Italy and Her Invaders, 744-774, VII, p. 270-271) observation concerning the pressures that the Aquitanian wars inflicted on Pepin comes to mind in this regard. The struggle ". . . occupied Pippin's whole energies for the remaining nine years of his life, which evidently brought him sometimes into serious danger, and which by its toils and anxieties probably shortened his days."

emphasize the deterioration of their power at Rome, where anxious observers took careful note of the Aquitanian struggle. Even before the year 763 came to an end, Pope Paul had written to Pepin rather vaguely informing him of the activity of their common enemies in this respect.⁴⁵ The Pope expressed his great concern over Pepin's welfare in light of his fortunes of late and assured him that their mutual prosperity was inextricably bound together.⁴⁶ The matter, however, did not end there. The following year (764) another papal letter to the Franks ensued, proclaiming that current reports were suggesting that Pepin lacked the power to assist Rome even if he desired to do so.⁴⁷

To whom did the Pope refer as "our enemies" in his letters to Pepin? He surely meant the Lombards and the Byzantines

⁴⁵Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXVII, ed. W. Gundlach, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epp. III (Berlin, 1892), p. 531: ". . . quid erga vos ageretur vel qualiter in itinere, quo profecti estis, peregristis, nimis anxietatis fervore desiderii nostri affectio in hoc ipsud addiscendum sedule provocatur, presertim dum et a nostris vestrisque inimicis adversa nobis de ipsis partibus adnuntiantur."

⁴⁶Ibid.: "Pro quo quaesumus, ut certos nos, sicut desideramus, per vestros nuntios de vestra prosperitate et laetitia reddere iubeatis, quoniam vestra salus nostra est prosperitas et vestra exaltatio nostrum procul dubio est gaudium et inmensa securitas."

⁴⁷Ibid., Ep. XXIX, p. 534: "Sed et hoc in ipsis vestris relationum apicibus continebatur: per vestros vobis fuisse nuntiatum legatos, quod a quibusdam malignis et mendatium proferentibus in istis partibus divulgatum esset, quia, si aliqua nobis necessitas eveniret, nullum nobis auxilium prebere valuissetis."

who might utilize Frankish discomfort for their own ends. Although he applied the plural rather than the singular usage, he did not specifically name any antagonists in his correspondence of 764 and 765. In a subsequent letter, however, he departed from this pattern and mentioned Tassilo, the Bavarian duke, as having communicated with him, seeking papal intercession in order to placate Pepin's anger.⁴⁸ This inquiry, while nothing came of it, arrived sometime after the crisis had subsided. In the interval, Pepin prepared to invalidate these rumors by his exploits in the field rather than by verbal exchanges.

In 766 the king summoned the whole Frankish host to his annual Mayfield at Orleans on the Loire.⁴⁹ Preparing to enter Aquitaine after a respite of two years, Pepin enjoyed on this occasion a peculiar twist of events. With this season of fighting, an advantage began to shift to his favor. Even before he had entered the field in 766, an uncle by the name of Remistan on Duke Waifar's fraternal side deserted the Aquitanian cause and threw in with the Austrasians. Consequently, when

⁴⁸Codex Carolinus, Ep. XXXVI, pp. 545-546.

⁴⁹Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 131, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190: "Evoluto igitur anno, commoto omni exercito Francorum vel plurimum nationes, quod in regno suo commorabantur, usque ad Aurilianis veniens, ibi placitum suum campo Madio, quod ipse primus pro campo Martio pro utilitate Francorum instituit, tenens, multa munera a Francis vel proceris suis ditatus est."

the Franks crossed the Loire, they numbered among their host this new ally whom Pepin rewarded with numerous gifts in order to make an example of his munificence.⁵⁰

Upon entering Aquitaine with his army, Pepin employed himself in reconstructing the fortifications that the duke had earlier razed. Most important in this respect, he rebuilt the fortress known as Argenton on the Creuse River and then entrusted its keeping to the renegade Remistan.⁵¹ Beyond this, he spent his time in devastating the duchy. Marching all the way south

⁵⁰Both the Annales Mettenses Priores (a. 765, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 53) and the Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (128, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 189) mention this episode while the Annales Regni Francorum slights the topic. The former observes: "Remistanus vero avunculus Waifarum ad regem Pippinum confugium fecit, quem pius Pippinus honorifice suscipiens multis muneribus ditavit." In both the above instances where Remistan is introduced, he is referred to as the "avunculus Waifarum." Rather than being the duke's maternal uncle, he actually was the son of Eudes (see the continuator, 133, p. 191), hence Waifar's father's brother (i.e., patruus). Also, note Ludovic Drapeyron's (Revue des Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, CV, 280) concluding remarks relative to this defection which now reversed the embarrassment of the Franks (Tassilo) to the Aquitanians in the loss of Remistan: "La défection de Tassillon, duc de Bavière, ne saurait être raisonnablement comparée à celle de Remistan, qui appartenait et à la famille et au duché même de Waiffre."

⁵¹Annales S. Amandi, a. 766, M.G.H., SS., p. 10: "Pippinus fuit in Wasconia, et fecit Argentum." The only reference to this gift of Pepin's to Remistan appears in the Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (129, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 189): "Rex Pippinus castro cui nomen est Argentonus in pago Bytorivo a fundamento miro opere in pristino statu reparare iussit; comites suos ibidem ad custodiendum mittens, ipso castro Remistanio ad Waiofario resistendum cum medietatem pago Bytorivo usque ad Care concessit."

to the city of Agen on the Garonne, he returned by travelling through Périgueux and Angoulême laden with booty. While he had mastered almost all of the duchy, he gained further satisfaction in receiving the voluntary subservience of many Gascons and Aquitanians.⁵² Quite possibly, those who submitted to Pepin on this occasion were Aquitanian aristocrats of Frankish extraction who had originally come into the province as guardians of Merovingian power and then usurped these rights. The cases of Remistan and that of the emissary Chunibert (*infra*, p. 188) indicate that some within the higher echelons of Frankish society already questioned the prudence of continuing the rebellion. Pepin then proceeded back into Francia, wintered at Samoussy, and observed the Easter holidays at Gentilly.⁵³

With the coming of 767, Pepin decided to bring this well-nigh interminable conflict in Aquitaine to a close by vigorously pressing the issue. Breaking off his conquest of secondary objectives, he began to pursue his immediate quarry, Duke Waifar. The location of his Mayfield for that year attests to the progress of his efforts. He convened his Franks for the

⁵²For the details of his 766 harrying of Aquitaine, see Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes (131, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190) which also substantiates the present remark: "Videntes tam Wascones quam maiores natu Aquitanie, necessitate compulsi, plurimi ad eum venerunt, sacramenta ad eum ibidem donant, dictionis sue faciunt."

⁵³Annales Regni Francorum, a. 766, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 24: "Et celebravit natalem Domini in Salmontiagum villam et pascha in Gentiliaco."

first time in their spring assemblage in Aquitaine at Bourges and even went so far as to entrust the safety of his wife to that city during the fighting season.⁵⁴

Once again journeying south to the Garonne, Pepin acquired many fortifications during the march. While his campaign of the previous year brought him conquests in the southwest, he now traversed the southeastern part of the duchy and took in tow the castles of Ally, Turenne, and Peyrusse.⁵⁵ But in his main purpose he failed; Duke Waifar managed to elude his would-be captors. Thus, the Austrasian annalist observed that the king contented himself in the seizure of many rocks and caves (viz., hiding places) in his unsuccessful pursuit.⁵⁶

⁵⁴To insure her comfort during his absence, he constructed a residence there to which he later returned for the winter months. Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 132, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 190: ". . . cum regina sua Bertradane iam fiducialiter Ligere transito, ad Bitonicas accessit; palacium sibi edificare iubet. Iterum campo Madio, sicut mos erat, ibidem tenere iubet; initoque consilio cum proceris suis, prefata regina Bertradane cum reliquis Francis hac comitibus fidelibus suis in praedictas Bitonicas dimisit." As this year commemorates his first Aquitanian Mayfield, likewise he refrained from going north for the winter. This further indicated his impatience to see the war through as quickly as possible.

⁵⁵Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 767, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 54-55: "In quo itinere multas minitiones adquisivit, castrum videlicet Scorialium, Thorinnam et Petrociam et alias quam plurimas firmitates."

⁵⁶Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 132, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., pp. 190-191: "Ipse praedictus rex cum reliquis Francis et optimatis suis persequendum Waiofarium perrexit. Cumque praedictus rex ipsum Waiofarium persequente non repperiret, -- iam tempus hiems erat, --

Pepin had to suffer one last setback before accomplishing his purpose. After exulting in the defection of Remistan to the Frankish side, the king learned that this same Aquitanian had broken his oath of fealty to him and returned to become, once again, Duke Waifar's man.⁵⁷ So ardently did Remistan now take up the duke's cause that all the districts of Berry and Limoges fell into complete disarray at his coming. His attacks, efficiently and thoroughly lodged, even discouraged the peasants from working in the fields and vineyards.⁵⁸ As with Tassilo, however, Remistan later paid a heavy price to the Franks for his perfidy.

cum omni exercito ad Betoricas, ubi praefata regina Bertradane dimiserat, reversus est." Concerning Pepin's conquest of rocks and caves, see Annales Regni Francorum, a. 767, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., pp. 24-26: "Et inde iter peragens usque ad Garonnam pervenit, multas roccas et speluncas conquisivit, castrum Scorialiam, Torinnam, Petrociam et reversus est Bituricam."

⁵⁷Why did Remistan venture back to the duke's banner at such an inopportune moment? A French historian, François Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 44) assures his readers: "Remistan, l'oncle de l'infortuné prince d'Aquitaine, le traître à son pays, à son sang, à ses propres intérêts, sentit le remords monter à son coeur en voyant la situation désespérée et l'héroïque courage de son neveu. Il s'échappa de la cour du vainqueur, et alla se jeter dans les bras du vaincu."

⁵⁸Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 133, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 191: "Super-scriptos Remistanus contra praedicto rege et Francos seu custodias, quas ipse rex in ipsis civitates dimiserat, nimium infestus accessit et Bitorivo seu et Limoticino, quod ipse rex adquisierat, praedando nimium vastavit, ita ut nullus colonus terre ad laborandum tam agris quam vineis scolere non audebant."

While resting at Bourges before resuming the pursuit of Remistan and Waifar, Pepin learned of the death of Pope Paul.⁵⁹ Undeterred by this news, the king called forth his army from their winter quarters in Burgundy quite early in 768. Not waiting either for Easter or his yearly Mayfield to signal the beginning of his campaign, he went into the field that very February. For the king, the matter of Remistan constituted the first order of business. He assigned to four of his nobles the task of executing a trap which he had planned for the Aquitanian. Detailing a force to them, he therefore divided his army. Taking the main part himself, Pepin then went off to catch Duke Waifar after sending the Queen to Orleans, a safer spot in which to wait.⁶⁰

With the advent of the 768 campaign, Aquitanian resistance began to disintegrate under the pressure of the Franks. The energetic offensive of Pepin quickly netted him numerous

⁵⁹Annales Nazariani, a. 767, M.G.H., SS., p. 31: "Paulus papa obiit."

⁶⁰Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 134, M.G.H., SS. rer Merov., p. 191: "Evoluto igitur eo anno, cum in Betoricas resederet, mediante Fedroario, omnem exercitum suum, quem in Burgundia ad hyemandum miserat, ad se venire praecepit; initoque consilio, contra Remistagnum insidias parat. Hermenaldo, Beringario, Childerado et Uniberto comite Bitorivo cum reliquis comitibus et leodibus suis ad ipsum Remistanium capiendum clam mittens, predictus rex Pipinus cum omni exercitu Francorum iterum ad persequendum Waiofarium ire destinavit." Among those whom the king entrusted with this task was Count Chunibert of Bourges, who, in contrast to the instance of Remistan, became Pepin's man and faithfully served him.

prisoners that spring from within the ducal house itself. The nobles who had been sent out to snare Remistan accomplished their task and accordingly notified Pepin, who was travelling south at the time, of their feat. Upon reaching the city of Saintes, the king experienced yet further success by the acquisition of all the duke's immediate family (mother, sisters, and nieces) with the exception of his wife.⁶¹ As for Remistan, the normally tolerant king departed from his customary leniency and ordered the man hanged. Taking Remistan to the city of Bourges, Counts Chunibert and Gislarius executed him before the inhabitants so that everyone could note the example.⁶² (Count Chunibert's career duplicated that of Remistan. Having earlier deserted the service of Waifar for that of Pepin, it

⁶¹Annales qui Dicuntur Einhardi, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27: "Rex Pippinus, cum primum ad bellum gerendum tempus congruum esse videret, evocato undique exercitu, ad Santonicam civitatem contendit. Captoque in itinere Rimistaino, cum ad urbem praedictam venisset, mater et soror et neptes Waifarum ducis ad conspectum eius adductae sunt. Quas cum pie susceptas servari iussisset, ad Garonnam fluvium proficiscitur, ubi ei Erowicus cum alia praedicti ducis sorore occurrit in loco, qui Montes vocatur, seque et illam regi tradidit." No mention appears in either chronicles or annals relating to Waifar's wife during the last year of the duke's life (768). If more information were known about her perhaps the succession question, as it later puzzles those who attempt to unravel it, would be less perplexing.

⁶²Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 134, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 191: "Igitur suprascripti comites, qui ad Remistagnum capiendum missi fuerant, per divino iudicio et fidem regis capiunt et legatum ad praesentiam regis cum uxore sua adduxerunt. Quem statim rex Uniberto et Gislario comite Betoricas civitate ipso Remistagnum in patibulo eum suspendi iussit."

could be that the king wanted to impress the count with Remistan's example in order to prevent a recurrence of this kind of treachery.) Meanwhile, Pepin hastened on to the Garonne after his principal objective, the duke.

In the southern part of the duchy, Pepin received oaths of allegiance and hostages from the Gascons. Since the Easter holidays were impending, the king interrupted his campaign to journey to Queen Bertrada, who now resided at Sels (Chantoceaux). After dealing there with Saracenic ambassadors, who had presented themselves so inopportunately, Pepin ventured forth against Waifar for the second time that season. Now the queen accompanied him as far as Saintes while he went ahead to Périgord, where the duke reputedly lurked.⁶³ Dividing his forces into four columns, he scanned the Foret de Ver in the district of Périgueux in quest of Waifar, who now drifted from place to place in the manner of a hunted animal. The king was denied the final honor of having captured the duke himself. Several members of Waifar's entourage took matters into their own hands and assassinated him. Allegedly, however, Pepin had connived in this to gain his end. As for the results,

⁶³Annales Mettenses Priores, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 55: "Inde quoque victor revertens pascha dominicum celebravit in castro quod dicitur Sels. Indequē promotō exercitū, assumens secum Bertradam reginam, iterum ad Sanctonis civitatem pervenit. In qua reginam cum reliqua familia sua dimittens, ad Petrogoricam perrexit."

Aquitaine desisted in her rebellion and bent to his will, so the chronicler said, "as in the days of old."⁶⁴

For Pepin the war with Waifar personally amounted to a Pyrrhic victory, as the Aquitanian wars generally did in a far larger sense for the Frankish nation. Physically, the toll that the separatist struggle demanded broke his health and surely contributed to his premature death. Ostensibly, the king had won a victory, but events soon proved both the illusive nature of this and the ingrained persistence of particularism in Aquitanian feudal society. Upon his return to his family at Saintes, Pepin tarried there and then fell ill. Sensing the gravity of his sickness, he travelled back into Francia by way of Tours and died at St. Denis on September 24, 768.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Chronicarum quae Dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici Continuationes, 135, M.G.H., SS. rer. Merov., p. 192: "Dum hec ageretur, -- ut adserunt, cosilia regis factum fuisset, -- Waiofarius princeps Aquitaniae a suis interfectus est. Praefatus rex Pippinus, iam totam Aquitaniam adquesitam, -- omnes ad eum venientes dictionis sue, sicut antiquitus fuerat, faciunt, -- cum magno triumpho et victoria Sanctonis, ubi Bertrada regina resedebat, veniens."

⁶⁵Annales Regni Francorum, a. 768, M.G.H., SS. rer. Germ., p. 27: "Cumque ibi aliquantum temporis moraretur, aegritudine decubuit; in ipsa tamen valitudine Turonos delatus apud sancti Martini memoriam oravit. Inde cum ad Parisios venisset, VIII. Kal. Oct. diem obiit. Cuius corpus in basilica beati Dionysii martyris humatum est." Also see the Annalium Fuldensium Pars Prima (a. 768, M.G.H., SS., p. 348) where simultaneous comment is made on Pepin's final accomplishment in Aquitaine: "Pippinus, interfecto Waiphario et omni Aquitania subacta rediens, apud Parisios 8. Kalendas Octob. diem obiit, anno aetatis 54. filiique eius Karolus et Karlomannus infulas regni suscipiunt." For the

For the Aquitanians, the truly phenomenal aspect of their opposition to Pepin was the longevity of the struggle. Even though at an extreme disadvantage, Waifar perpetuated the unequal separatist contest longer than could reasonably have been expected of him. Only engaging the Frank once in open battle, he particularly excelled at intrigue and conspiracy, but in the end he succumbed to the Austrasian superiority.

Did the degree of Pepin's success surpass that of his father against Duke Hunald? The answer to this question must be in the affirmative in all respects. Most illustrative of this fact, King Pepin apportioned his newly conquered province among his two heirs, his sons Charles and Carloman. This particular fate the duchy had not suffered in many generations. Aquitaine did, however, absorb the blow against its quest for independence and, though militarily defeated, it refused to conform to Austrasian standards. Indeed, the duchy maintained a rebellious spirit that continued to strive for autonomy. The might of Charles rendered success here impractical, but nonetheless the intractability of Aquitanian separatism survived to plague the northern Franks on later occasions.

itinerary of Pepin throughout this fateful year, consult the chart of Ludwig Oelsner, Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter König Pippin, p. 410.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The most impressive aspect of Aquitanian separatism concerns the unflagging effort of the province to rid itself of Austrasian overlordship. The might of Frankish militarism could neither extinguish nor alter the Aquitanian separatist mentality. In fact, after the extensive and prolonged devastation of the duchy by Pepin, another rebellion arose in the year after his death. This ill-fated revolt represented a testing of the leadership prowess of Pepin's successors, Charles and Carloman. In several respects this Aquitanian insurrection, led by a certain Hunald, affected the mainstream of Frankish statecraft. Although the lineage of this Hunald remains confused,¹ he revived the spirit of Waifar's resistance

¹The precise identity of this Hunald perplexes those who study the revolt of 769. The point principally in question relates to whether Charles' antagonist (769) and that of his father (deposed in 744) were one and the same or two separate personages. Scholars have divided their sentiments fairly evenly on the matter. Thomas Hodgkin (Italy and Her Invaders, VII, p. 305) and Jean de Jaurgain (La Vasconie, I, pp. 2-3) both agree that these two dukes have separate identities. On the other hand, François Chamard (Revue des Questions Historiques, XXXV, 47) and Abel-Simson (Sigurd Abel and Bernhard Simson, Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Grossen ["Jahrbücher der Deutschen Geschichte"; Leipzig, 1888], I, p. 43) think otherwise. The latter are convinced that Hunald fled his monastic surroundings on the île de Ré in order to assume the role of leadership vacated by Waifar upon his

and required the immediate attention of the new kings upon their assumption of office. Being the eldest, Charles took the initiative in tending to Hunald and asked Carloman to meet him at Duasdives (ad fluvium Dive) before the invasion of Aquitaine. Carloman came but soon turned against Charles and returned into Francia, leaving him, unassisted, to subdue Hunald. Whether the responsibility for Aquitaine lay jointly or individually with the brothers (a point on which the sources conflict), the independent course that Carloman pursued certainly marked him out in Carolingian society as having failed his brother in time of need.² Thus, a breach opened between the brothers, the effects of which were soon felt in other affairs.

The 769 uprising proved a short-lived affair. After the experience of the past nine years, Aquitaine lacked the strength to resist Charles; consequently, Hunald quickly had to flee into Gascony to gain refuge at the court of Duke Lupus. At the threat of a Frankish advance into that quarter as well, the Gascon duke surrendered Hunald to Charles. This capitulation ruled out the possibility of further rebellion in Aquitaine. In actuality, Hunald's opposition itself was ephemeral. The incident served, however, as a sequel to the efforts of

death. The present author inclines toward this interpretation.

²In many respects, this affair is analogous to that of Tassilo's desertion of Pepin during an earlier Frankish campaign in Aquitaine.

Waifar and crowned the military accomplishments of the Franks in the duchy.

With the success of Frankish arms in Aquitaine, provision had to be made for the establishment of laws under the auspices of the victor. Pepin attended to this at the very end of his life.³ Although Pepin attempted to account for the duchy in these respects (in both jurisprudence and the military), the incompatibility of the Aquitanians later forced Charles to establish the kingdom of Aquitaine in 778. To the Austrasians, the time had arrived to pursue a new policy. Aquitanian separatism had initially arisen in the province during Merovingian times under a migrant Frankish aristocracy seeking to create its own proto-feudal base of power independent of outside supervision. Usurping Merovingian prerogatives, these Frankish aristocrats had repeatedly defied the northern overlord, particularly after the mayors converted their ministerial status to one of domination. With past experience as a guide, the Carolingians considered it far better to have a trustworthy Aquitanian government headed by a member of their own family. Consequently, Charles sent his four year old son,

³See this short, but instructive code devised by Pepin: Capitulare 18, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leges, Sectio II, I, ed. A. Boretius (Hannover, 1883), pp. 42-43. With twelve provisions, five of these concern the affairs of the Church and its property while the remaining ones deal with such matters as the respective jurisdiction of law codes, the rights of travelers, the poor, and the return of the property of the dispossessed.

Louis (the Pious), into the duchy in 781 to be reared as an Aquitanian under Austrasian guardianship. To the king, this plan circumvented the prospects of gambling on the loyalty of a duke charged with Carolingian responsibilities who might then betray him for personal gain.

As the Carolingian state began to crumble at the end of the next century amid dynastic disputes, the duchy utilized Frankish preoccupations to win independence. At this point in Frankish affairs, Aquitaine once again led the way among the provinces in her unfilial devotion to the Austrasians and achieved the consummation of her separatist ambitions.

In the years from Eudes to Waifar the Aquitanians waged their separatist struggle with varying success. While they unflinchingly pursued their objective of complete independence, their success correlated exactly with the fortunes of the Frankish state. In fact, the degree of autonomy that Aquitaine appreciated at any given moment throughout these years served as a barometer for the condition of the Carolingian state. Moreover, as the Franks successively began to thrive under Charles Martel and his heirs, the outlook for the particularist movement south of the Loire worsened. The Carolingians, with the exception of Martel, moved into the duchy only upon the provocation of the duke. Significantly, the increased attention that Aquitaine received coincided exactly with the coming of the Saracen to Spain. In addition, the warming of Franco-

Papal relations also gave new importance to the strategic position of the duchy during this same period. For the ducal house, Eudes' conflict with Martel set the example for the aspirations of both parties. The duke advanced the prerogatives of his position exceedingly well throughout the early years of his tenure in office, only to have his power curtailed late in life. While the latter situation occurred at the hands of Martel, who outlived the duke, both Hunald and Waifar respectively labored under the Nemesis of this particular duke's example. Eudes' successors periodically experienced considerable freedom of movement, as this duke had, as well as having to oppose armies of occupation. Thus, the advance of the Franks into Aquitaine fluctuated from moments of extreme activity and hostility to those of almost indifference. However, as Frankish annals describe the constant fighting that the Austrasians endured, either among themselves or with the dependent kingdoms, one suspects that preoccupation rather than indifference distracted their efforts. Intent on solving a myriad of problems, the Carolingians found that the needs of their barbarized, feudal state enfeebled and diverted their resources. Moreover, similar problems of a particularist era prevented the Aquitanian duke from capitalizing on Austrasian difficulties. Indeed, nothing indicates that Aquitaine culturally or intellectually excelled to the extent of surpassing the rest of western Europe as French nationalist historians of earlier generations fondly

profess. If this had been so, Aquitanian scholars would have assumed a leading role in the cultural renaissance under Charles and Louis the Pious. Such was not the case. This, as much as anything else, refutes the caricature of a more highly developed, Romanized duchy valiantly struggling to resist Germanic, Austrasian forces who possessed the skill to wage war and not much else.

During the course of their struggles the Aquitanian dukes joined with others, whenever possible, to strike back against the Frankish overlord. Hence, Eudes joined with Munuza and later, Hunald with the Bavarians. In the case of the latter union, both duchies had a common plight that readily attracts attention. Both areas were oriented toward the agricultural, which in turn gave them a provincial pride that fostered an independent political position. Beyond this, a noticeable difference existed insofar as Frankish priorities went. The Carolingians intermarried from time to time with the Bavarian ducal family, but not with the Aquitanian. A closer tie connected them with the Bavarians and gave their dealings an intimacy that required an immediate and, perhaps on occasion, a more thoughtful approach. Little advantage would fall to the Austrasians in marrying with the Aquitanian ducal family, however. The dukes lacked hereditary rights to power, as did the Carolings themselves, while the Bavarian house was ancient and legitimate. Interestingly enough, both the Bavarians and the

Aquitani-ans shared a common fate under the most powerful of the Carolingians in the extermination of their ducal houses. As the first to experience this, Aquitaine received independent consideration. Consequently, for this most persistent of administrative and feudal problems, the Carolingians applied a remedy that would suffice throughout the reign of their most illustrious king. No longer would the Austrasians tolerate provincial usurpation among the Aquitanian aristocracy; instead, they entrusted leadership to a prince of their own line apprenticed to the people themselves.

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